Bankr. E.D.N.C.: Sink v. Albrecht- Pre-Bankruptcy TBE Conversion Avoided Ed Boltz Fri, 03/20/2026 - 14:35 Summary: Bankruptcy exemption planning often walks a fine line between legitimate preparation and avoidable transfer. In In re Albrecht, Judge Pamela W. McAfee of the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina addressed where that line falls when a debtor converts jointly owned real property into a tenancy by the entirety shortly before filing bankruptcy. The court ultimately held that the maneuver crossed the line and constituted both a constructively and actually fraudulent transfer avoidable by the Chapter 7 trustee. The Facts Lucas Albrecht and his partner, Kirsten Moore, purchased a Raleigh residence in 2020 as joint tenants with rights of survivorship while unmarried. They lived there together for nearly five years. In February 2025—immediately before filing bankruptcy—two things happened: The couple married, and The next day they executed a deed transferring the property to themselves as tenants by the entirety. Twenty-seven days later, Albrecht filed Chapter 7. Before the transfer, his one-half interest in the home could be reached by individual creditors. After the transfer, the property became tenancy-by-the-entirety property, shielding it from those creditors under North Carolina law. The Chapter 7 trustee, Kevin Sink, sued to avoid the transfer under §548 and the North Carolina Uniform Voidable Transactions Act. Issue #1: Was There Even a “Transfer”? The debtors argued that nothing meaningful had changed—the same property was owned by the same two people—so there was no transfer at all. Judge McAfee disagreed. The Bankruptcy Code defines “transfer” extremely broadly, covering any mode of disposing of or parting with property or an interest in property. Under North Carolina law, the shift from joint tenancy to tenancy by the entirety changes the legal rights in important ways: A joint tenant may unilaterally alienate his interest. A spouse holding property as tenants by the entirety cannot alienate without the other spouse’s consent. Just as importantly, the retitling extinguished the ability of Albrecht’s individual creditors to execute on the property. That change in legal rights—both the debtor’s and the creditors’—was enough. The court held the deed was a transfer under §101(54). Issue #2: Reasonably Equivalent Value? The debtors next argued that even if there was a transfer, it was not constructively fraudulent because each spouse gave and received the same thing: an interest in the same property. Some courts (notably in the Eighth Circuit) have accepted that debtor-focused analysis. But the Fourth Circuit takes a different approach. Following In re Jeffrey Bigelow Design Group, courts must examine the net effect on the debtor’s estate and unsecured creditors. From that perspective, the result here was obvious: Before the transfer: creditors could reach Albrecht’s equity. After the transfer: they could not. Because the transfer reduced the assets available to unsecured creditors, the debtor did not receive reasonably equivalent value. Constructive fraud was therefore established. Issue #3: Actual Fraud and the Badges of Fraud The court also found actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors based on multiple badges of fraud, including: Transfer to an insider (spouse) Debtor retained possession and control Transfer involved substantially all assets Debtor was insolvent Lack of reasonably equivalent value These factors created a presumption of fraudulent intent, which the debtors failed to rebut. The opinion also notes repeatedly that the marriage and re-titling occurred “on the advice of counsel.” That fact did not change the outcome of the avoidance action. As Judge McAfee explained, disclosure of the transfer and reliance on legal advice do not negate the presence of other badges of fraud or prevent the trustee from avoiding the transaction. Commentary 1. Exemption Planning Is Allowed—But Not Unlimited The opinion carefully acknowledges the well-known principle from Ford v. Poston: debtors are generally allowed to convert non-exempt property into exempt property before filing bankruptcy. But Albrecht shows the limit. Exemption planning is permissible until it crosses into fraudulent transfer territory—particularly when the move effectively removes assets from creditors without any offsetting value. 2. The Fourth Circuit’s Creditor-Focused Approach Matters The key analytical move in this opinion is the reliance on Jeffrey Bigelow and its creditor-focused test for reasonably equivalent value. That approach makes outcomes like this almost inevitable. From a debtor’s perspective, nothing changed—they still owned the house. From the creditors’ perspective, however, the estate lost a reachable asset. And in the Fourth Circuit, that is the perspective that counts. 3. Timing Still Matters—A Lot Even though eve-of-bankruptcy conversions are not automatically fraudulent, timing remains powerful circumstantial evidence. Here, the sequence was difficult to ignore: Five years living together unmarried Marriage Immediate deed to TBE Bankruptcy filed 27 days later Courts rarely treat that kind of chronology as coincidence. 4. A Cautionary Tale for Pre-Bankruptcy Planning For practitioners, Albrecht is a reminder that certain planning strategies—particularly those involving tenancy-by-the-entirety conversions shortly before filing—require careful analysis. One notable feature of the opinion is that Judge McAfee repeatedly emphasized that the marriage and re-deeding were undertaken “on the advice of counsel.” That observation cuts in two directions. On the one hand, acting on advice of counsel may help demonstrate that the debtor did not independently act with deceitful intent, potentially providing some protection against allegations of bad faith, denial of discharge, or even more serious accusations such as criminal bankruptcy fraud. But that same fact does not prevent the transfer from being avoided, and it may shift the spotlight elsewhere. When a strategy designed to move assets beyond the reach of creditors fails under fraudulent transfer analysis, the legal advice that prompted the maneuver can come under scrutiny. In short, Albrecht illustrates the asymmetry of failed pre-bankruptcy planning: the debtor may simply lose the benefit of the transfer, while the attorney who recommended the strategy may face the harder questions afterward. It is also a reminder of a practical strategic point in consumer bankruptcy practice. Aggressive or innovative exemption planning is often safer in a Chapter 13 case than in Chapter 7. In Chapter 13: the debtor retains the ability to voluntarily dismiss the case if a court rejects the strategy, and more commonly, the debtor can negotiate with the trustee and propose a plan that pays creditors enough to resolve or neutralize a potential avoidance claim. Chapter 7 offers no such flexibility. A Chapter 7 trustee is affirmatively incentivized to pursue recoveries because trustees receive a statutory commission on distributions and may also recover attorneys’ fees for litigation that brings assets into the estate. As a result, trustees have strong incentives to identify and monetize assets, whether through avoidance actions or other litigation. In that environment, a strategy that might simply require a plan adjustment in Chapter 13 can become full-blown litigation in Chapter 7. ✅ Bottom Line: In the Fourth Circuit, converting jointly held property into tenancy by the entirety on the eve of bankruptcy can be avoided as both constructively and actually fraudulent when the effect is to place equity beyond the reach of individual creditors. And for practitioners considering aggressive exemption planning, Chapter 13 may provide a far more forgiving forum than Chapter 7. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document albrecht_trustee_brief.pdf (187.76 KB) Document albrecht_brief.pdf (272.13 KB) Document albrecht.pdf (201.05 KB) Category Eastern District

Filing for bankruptcy is not a simple process, and most people hire experienced bankruptcy attorneys to help them. However, you are not required to have a lawyer and may file for bankruptcy without legal representation. Be warned, proceeding without a lawyer is not a good idea. You should talk to an attorney about your situation. You should have a lawyer help you file for bankruptcy. These proceedings are known for being complicated, and it is very easy to make a mistake on your own. Certain mistakes could lead to a total dismissal of your case, and you will not be able to take advantage of the benefits of bankruptcy, such as having debts discharged. An attorney can help you make sure your bankruptcy petition is accurate and complete to avoid any errors that could cost you everything. Ask our New Jersey bankruptcy lawyers for a free, private case assessment by calling Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates at (609) 755-3115. Do I Need a Lawyer to File for Bankruptcy in New Jersey? While bankruptcy petitioners may file their cases without a lawyer, doing so is unwise. There are too many things that could go wrong, and the average person likely does not have the skills or experience needed to navigate complex bankruptcy laws and hearings. Filing for Bankruptcy Pro Se When a person files for bankruptcy on their own without a lawyer, it is called filing pro se. You have the right to represent yourself in almost all legal proceedings, including bankruptcy cases, and you can do so if you truly wish. However, filing pro se is usually not a good idea. Only those with experience in bankruptcy law and legal procedures should consider filing their case pro se. Is it a Good Idea to File for Bankruptcy without a Lawyer? It is not a good idea to file for bankruptcy without help from a lawyer. The process is far more complex than most people realize, and too many things could go wrong. Your bankruptcy petition must include very specific information about your finances. Not only does the court need a full list of all your assets, but your current financial situation will determine whether you are even eligible for bankruptcy. When Should I Hire a Bankruptcy Lawyer? You should hire a bankruptcy attorney before you file anything with the bankruptcy court. If you file your petition on your own, it may be possible to hire a lawyer later, but it is best to have a lawyer on your side before you file anything. Your initial petition is crucial and will set the tone for the remainder of your case. Our New Jersey bankruptcy lawyers must be sure to include all your relevant financial and banking information, including various assets or properties you own that could be liquidated. You may also protect certain assets by claiming certain bankruptcy exemptions in your initial petition. Many people are unaware that exemptions even exist, but a lawyer should know how to claim them to protect your property and assets. Possible Complications When Filing for Bankruptcy Without a Lawyer Again, filing for bankruptcy is complicated. There are numerous laws and legal procedures to navigate, and mistakes can be all too easy to make. Some mistakes could cost you everything, which is why you should hire a bankruptcy lawyer before filing anything. Disclosing Your Assets A crucial element of filing for bankruptcy is disclosing your assets. This requires that we provide a full explanation of all your financial assets, including bank accounts, properties, investments, and any other accounts or property. These disclosures must be full and complete. Failing to disclose certain assets may be considered fraud. Even if the failure is only an error, it could set your case back and cost you a lot of time. You might even face sanctions from the court. A lawyer can help you make sure your disclosures are complete and accurate so everything goes smoothly. Legal Errors or Mistakes Mistakes can lead to the dismissal of your case. For example, petitioners who file without a lawyer might accidentally forget to include certain creditors in the case, fail to disclose certain assets, or attempt to hide assets, not realizing that their actions are highly illegal. An attorney knows how to avoid mistakes and, if they do occur, how to correct them before they become a serious problem. Navigating Complex Bankruptcy Laws Filing for bankruptcy is much more than submitting some paperwork and showing up to court. There are important decisions to make and numerous hearings to attend. You must navigate complex legal procedures while understanding how to use the bankruptcy system to your advantage. Obviously, this is incredibly difficult, and a petitioner should not proceed without help from an experienced lawyer. FA Qs About Filing for Bankruptcy Without a Lawyer in New Jersey Am I Allowed to File for Bankruptcy Without a Lawyer in New Jersey? Yes. You are allowed to file for bankruptcy without a lawyer, known as filing pro se, but doing so is not advisable. Filing for bankruptcy is a complex process, and simple mistakes could lead to major consequences. Are There Any Good Reasons to File for Bankruptcy Without an Attorney? No. Many petitioners want to make the bankruptcy process more affordable by foregoing a lawyer and saving money on legal fees. While this is understandable, it is still not a good idea. Your attorney should be able to reach a fee agreement you can afford so you can get legal assistance. Should I Hire a Lawyer Before Filing for Bankruptcy? Yes. You should have a lawyer helping you from the very beginning. Hiring a lawyer after your case has already begin may make the case more difficult for your attorney, thereby complicating your case. How Can a Lawyer Help Me Through the Bankruptcy Process? Your attorney can help you prepare your initial petition, which must contain crucial information about your finances, creditors, and assets. If any of this information is incorrect or incomplete, the entire case could be dismissed. Your attorney can help you make sure all paperwork and documentation are accurate and complete, and that your case moves as smoothly as possible through the courts. What Happens if I Make a Serious Mistake in My Bankruptcy Case Without a Lawyer? You will be held responsible for any errors or mistakes in your bankruptcy case, and the court will not go easy on you because you do not have a lawyer. Your case could be dismissed because of serious mistakes, and you will not be afforded the relief of having any debts discharged. Contact Our New Jersey Bankruptcy Lawyers for Support Today Ask our Cherry Hill, NJ bankruptcy lawyers for a free, private case assessment by calling Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates at (609) 755-3115.

4th Cir.: Herlihy v. DBMP- Fourth Circuit Upholds Stay in DBMP “Texas Two-Step” Asbestos Bankruptcy Ed Boltz Thu, 03/19/2026 - 14:26 Summary:  The Fourth Circuit has again weighed in on the now-familiar “Texas Two-Step” asbestos bankruptcy strategy—and once again sided with the debtor. In , the court affirmed the denial of a motion by several asbestos claimants to lift the automatic stay in the Chapter 11 case of DBMP, LLC, the entity created when building-products manufacturer CertainTeed split its asbestos liabilities into a new subsidiary that then filed bankruptcy in the Western District of North Carolina. The panel majority, in an opinion by Judge Niemeyer, concluded that the bankruptcy court properly applied the Fourth Circuit’s longstanding Robbins factors and that the claimants had not shown the filing was made in bad faith. Judge King dissented vigorously, warning that the Fourth Circuit risks becoming a “safe haven” for wealthy corporations using bankruptcy to avoid jury trials in mass-tort litigation. The Backdrop: A Classic “Texas Two-Step” The case arises from CertainTeed’s effort to resolve massive asbestos liabilities using a strategy increasingly seen in mass-tort bankruptcies. Facing tens of thousands of asbestos claims and billions in defense and settlement costs, CertainTeed executed a Texas divisional merger in 2019. The maneuver split the company into two entities: New CertainTeed, holding most assets and operations DBMP, assigned the asbestos liabilities DBMP received some assets and, more importantly, an uncapped funding agreement obligating the parent enterprise to fund asbestos liabilities and bankruptcy costs. DBMP then filed Chapter 11 to pursue a §524(g) asbestos trust, a special bankruptcy mechanism designed to resolve both present and future asbestos claims. The filing automatically stayed roughly 60,000 asbestos lawsuits nationwide. The Claimants’ Motion The appellants—two mesothelioma plaintiffs and the estate of another victim—sought limited relief from the automatic stay so they could proceed with their state-court tort suits. Their central argument: DBMP’s bankruptcy was filed in bad faith because the enterprise was solvent and capable of paying claims outside bankruptcy. According to the claimants, the bankruptcy existed only to delay litigation and force settlement negotiations. The Fourth Circuit’s Holding The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of stay relief. 1. Robbins Still Governs Stay Relief The court applied the familiar In re Robbins balancing test for lifting the automatic stay: Whether the dispute primarily involves state law Whether lifting the stay promotes judicial economy Whether the estate can be protected while litigation proceeds elsewhere The bankruptcy court concluded—and the Fourth Circuit agreed—that lifting the stay would: Flood courts with asbestos cases Undermine efforts to treat claimants consistently Potentially destroy the Chapter 11 case Thus, the Robbins factors weighed strongly against relief. 2. Bad Faith Could Justify Stay Relief—But Wasn’t Shown Importantly, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that bad faith can constitute “cause” under §362(d). But the court held that the claimants failed to show either: Subjective bad faith, or Objective futility of the reorganization. DBMP, the court said, was pursuing exactly what Congress designed §524(g) to address: companies facing decades of asbestos claims seeking to centralize and equitably resolve them through a trust. 3. Solvency Is Not Disqualifying The majority also rejected the claimants’ central premise—that a solvent company cannot use Chapter 11. Section 524(g) contains no insolvency requirement, and Congress specifically envisioned solvent companies using bankruptcy to manage long-tail asbestos liability and ensure fair treatment of future claimants. The Dissent: Bankruptcy as Corporate Escape Hatch Judge King’s dissent pulls no punches. He describes the Texas Two-Step strategy as a “corporate sleight-of-hand” designed to dump asbestos liabilities into a shell company and force victims into bankruptcy proceedings rather than jury trials. In his view: DBMP was never financially distressed. The bankruptcy was engineered entirely by lawyers under a project code-named “Project Horizon.” The maneuver deprived thousands of claimants of their constitutional right to a jury trial. King warns that the Fourth Circuit’s jurisprudence risks turning the circuit into a haven for mass-tort defendants seeking bankruptcy protection without financial distress. Commentary From a bankruptcy-policy perspective, Herlihy continues a clear trend: the Fourth Circuit remains receptive to large-scale mass-tort restructurings. The decision does three important things. 1. It reinforces the circuit’s tolerance for Texas Two-Step bankruptcies Although the panel emphasized that the legality of the divisional merger itself was not before it, the practical result is the same: the strategy remains viable so long as the debtor can plausibly pursue a §524(g) plan. This follows earlier decisions involving Bestwall, another Western District of North Carolina asbestos bankruptcy. 2. It narrows the path for claimants seeking stay relief The court effectively signals that individual plaintiffs will rarely succeed in lifting the stay in a mass-tort bankruptcy. Allowing even a handful of cases to proceed, the court reasoned, would quickly lead to “hundreds, if not thousands” of similar requests and could unravel the entire bankruptcy process. 3. It highlights a growing policy divide The dissent reflects a broader national debate: Proponents say §524(g) trusts produce faster, fairer compensation for all claimants—including those who have not yet developed disease. Critics argue the strategy strips victims of jury trials and allows profitable companies to manage liability on their own terms. Until Congress intervenes—or the Supreme Court takes a more aggressive stance—the Fourth Circuit appears comfortable allowing these reorganizations to proceed. ✅ Bottom line: For now, the Western District of North Carolina remains a favorable venue for asbestos-related Chapter 11 cases. Unless a challenger can prove both subjective bad faith and objective futility, courts in this circuit are unlikely to lift the automatic stay and send claims back to the tort system. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document herlihy_v._dbmp_llc.pdf (425.79 KB) Category 4th Circuit Court of Appeals

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Audits Are Back: What You Need to Know If you’re considering Chapter 7 bankruptcy, audits are active again—and they’re being enforced more frequently than in recent years. ? Why Audits Chapter 7 audits were created under BAPCPA (2005) to verify the accuracy of filings. Audits are: ✅ Random – selected at random for review ⚠️ Triggered – high income, large assets, or unusual facts Congressional Goal: Protect honest filers and maintain trust in the bankruptcy system. The bankers’ goal: Make filing for bankruptcy harder and more expensive. ? Audit History Timeline Year Status 2006 Program launches, audits fully active 2013 Suspended due to budget constraints 2014 Resumed at reduced levels 2020 Paused due to COVID-19 2023 Resumed, activity increasing One way to make your life easier in case of bankruptcy audits. Close unnecessary bank accounts. Even when enforcement paused, the audits never went away—they were always required by law. ⚡ Audit Triggers: What Can Draw Attention High income (e.g., over $250,000) Large or unusual assets Odd expenses Example: One of my high-income clients received an audit notice this month. The income and expenses were very high. enormous mortgage and enormous car payments. Those big payments help eligibility for Chapter 7, but also trigger the audit. ? What This Means for You Make sure you list all your bank accounts. Or better yet, close the ones you are not using.  Leaving out the bank accounts you “hardly ever use” is an obvious way to get in trouble on the audit. Ensure your budget is consistent and accurate. Don’t just throw down the first thing that comes into your head.  Take a few minutes to think about it. Being thorough keeps your filing smooth and gives you peace of mind if the government picks your case for audit. ✅ Bottom Line Audits may have seemed rare in recent years, but now they are active again. Be careful about what you tell the bankruptcy court.   The post Chapter 7 Audits are back appeared first on Robert Weed Virginia Bankruptcy Attorney.

4th Cir.: Goldman Sachs v. Brown- Bankruptcy Court Keeps Stay-Violation Claims Out of Arbitration — And Keeps the Door Open for a Class Action Ed Boltz Thu, 03/19/2026 - 02:59 Summary: In Goldman Sachs Bank USA v. Brown, the Fourth Circuit has now weighed in—forcefully—on the growing tension between arbitration and bankruptcy. And in doing so, it delivered a significant win for consumer debtors (and their counsel), affirming that core bankruptcy rights—especially the automatic stay—belong in bankruptcy court, not private arbitration. The underlying adversary proceedings arose from a straightforward—but troubling—set of facts: after receiving notice of their respective bankruptcy filings, Goldman Sachs nonetheless continued to pursue collection of prepetition credit card debt against both debtors. Rhea Brown (Chapter 13) and Gregory Maze (Chapter 7) each alleged that Goldman Sachs engaged in repeated post-petition collection activity—emails, letters, and telephone calls—over a period of months, including statements pressuring payment and threatening adverse credit reporting, even after being informed of the bankruptcy and, in some instances, being provided with counsel’s contact information. These actions formed the basis of claims under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) and (6), with the debtors asserting willful violations of the automatic stay and seeking damages, including punitive relief, as well as class-wide remedies on behalf of similarly situated consumers subjected to post-petition collection efforts. The Holding (and the Fight Beneath It) The issue was familiar: Goldman Sachs sought to enforce arbitration clauses in its credit card agreements to compel individual arbitration of § 362(k) claims for willful stay violations. The Fourth Circuit said no. Applying the McMahon framework, the Court concluded that arbitration would create an “inherent conflict” with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Code—particularly: Centralized resolution of disputes Enforcement of the automatic stay Uniformity of bankruptcy law The debtor’s “breathing spell” The bankruptcy court’s specialized expertise and speed is at least the equal of any arbitrator In short, this was not just another statutory claim. This was bankruptcy at its core. A Notable Assist from the Academy Importantly—and quite usefully for future briefing—the majority expressly relied on Professor Kara Bruce’s article: “Bankruptcy’s Arbitration Countercurrent and the Future of the Debtor Class,” 96 Am. Bankr. L.J. 819. That citation is no throwaway. It signals that the Fourth Circuit recognizes—and is willing to embrace—the idea that bankruptcy is a “countercurrent” to the Supreme Court’s otherwise relentless pro-arbitration jurisprudence. Expect to see that article cited early and often in future stay, discharge, and class litigation. Why This Matters: The Class Action Survives Perhaps the most practical—and immediate—impact: Keeping this dispute in bankruptcy court preserves the potential for a nationwide class action against Goldman Sachs. The arbitration clause here was explicit: No class actions Individual relief only Had arbitration been compelled, the case would have fractured into dozens (or hundreds) of individual proceedings—effectively ending any meaningful systemic accountability. By affirming the bankruptcy court’s discretion, the Fourth Circuit preserved: The ability to aggregate claims The deterrent function of § 362(k) And the reality that some violations are only worth pursuing if brought collectively That is not incidental—it is central. Congratulations (and Thanks Where Due) Congratulations to Thad Bartholow on this significant victory. This is exactly the kind of litigation that shapes the boundaries of consumer bankruptcy practice nationwide. And thanks as well to Judge Allan L. Gropper (ret.) for his amicus brief on behalf of NACBA and NCBRC—an effort in which I  had a small but enjoyable role as something of an “appellate paralegal,” filing briefs and shepherding the mechanics of the appeal thanks to admission to the Fourth Circuit Bar. The Dissent—and the Road to SCOTUS? Judge King’s dissent is not subtle. Despite reiterating his collegiality with the majority, he would have compelled arbitration, relying heavily on: McMahon Moses v. CashCall And the Second Circuit’s decision in MBNA v. Hill More importantly, the dissent accuses the majority of: Creating a circuit split Misapplying Supreme Court precedent That combination—arbitration + split + dissent—almost guarantees the next step: ? A petition for certiorari is highly likely. Whether the Supreme Court takes the case is another matter—but this is precisely the type of arbitration/bankruptcy conflict that has drawn its attention in the past. A Quiet Assumption and an Absent Assumption One important caveat: The parties assumed the arbitration agreement was valid and enforceable. But that assumption may not hold in future cases. These credit card agreements impose ongoing obligations on both sides, raising a serious question: Are they, at least in part, executory contracts? If so, and if they were not assumed: In the Chapter 13 plan, or During the Chapter 7 case Then under § 365, they were rejected as a matter of law—and arguably no longer enforceable. That issue was not litigated here. But it is sitting just beneath the surface, waiting for the right case. Final Take This decision is a strong reaffirmation that: The automatic stay is not just another claim—it is the backbone of bankruptcy. Bankruptcy courts retain discretion to protect that system from fragmentation. And arbitration, for all its federal favor, has limits—especially when it collides with the structure of bankruptcy itself. For now, at least in the Fourth Circuit, the message is clear: If you violate the automatic stay, you may have to answer for it in bankruptcy court—and potentially on behalf of a class.   To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document goldman_sach_v._brown.pdf (224.02 KB) Category 4th Circuit Court of Appeals

 Slutty Vegan’s owner couldn’t pay back a $1M Covid-era disaster loan. She isn’t alone according to an article at  bizwoman, which can be found at    https://www.bizjournals.com/boston/bizwomen/news/latest-news/2026/03/covid-era-eidl-loan-program-debt-bankruptcy.html?page=allJim Shenwick, Esq may have been able to help her!Clients or their advisors with questions about SBA EIDL loan defaults should contact  Jim Shenwick, EsqJim Shenwick, Esq  917 363 3391  [email protected] Please click the link to schedule a telephone call with me. https://calendly.com/james-shenwick/15minWe help individuals & businesses with too much debt! & creditors in Bankruptcy cases

4th Cir.: Oliver v. Navy Federal Credit Union- Early Motions to Strike Class Allegations Must Live or Die on the Complaint Alone Ed Boltz Wed, 03/18/2026 - 14:48 Summary: In Oliver v. Navy Federal Credit Union, the Fourth Circuit waded into a recurring procedural skirmish in class litigation: when, and how, may a district court knock out class allegations before any discovery? The answer, according to Judge Heytens for the majority, is both simple and consequential—look only at the complaint, and deny certification at the pleading stage only if Rule 23 is unsatisfied as a matter of law. That deceptively modest holding has real bite, especially in civil rights and consumer cases where class treatment often determines whether claims are practically litigable at all. The Dispute: Algorithmic Lending Bias Meets Early Class-Action Triage Nine minority borrowers alleged that Navy Federal’s “semi-automated underwriting process” and proprietary algorithm produced racially discriminatory mortgage outcomes, asserting both disparate-impact and disparate-treatment claims and seeking certification of a broad class of minority loan applicants. Before discovery began, Navy Federal moved not only to dismiss but also to strike the class allegations. The district court partially obliged, allowing the disparate-impact claims to proceed individually but striking all class allegations. On interlocutory appeal, the Fourth Circuit split the baby: Affirmed denial of Rule 23(b)(3) damages class (predominance/superiority problems evident on the pleadings). Vacated denial of Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive class (commonality plausibly alleged based on a single alleged algorithmic process). The Core Holding: Rule 23(c)(1)(A) Governs Early Class Certification Decisions The Fourth Circuit clarified a doctrinal mess lurking in motions to strike class allegations. The district court had relied on Rules 12(f) and 23(d)(1)(D), but the appellate court insisted the true source of authority is Rule 23(c)(1)(A)—the provision requiring courts to decide class certification “at an early practicable time.” From that textual anchor flows a crucial constraint: A court may deny class certification before discovery only if the complaint itself shows noncompliance with Rule 23 as a matter of law. In other words, district courts retain discretion over timing, but not over standards. Early denial is permitted—but only when the defect is facially fatal. Application: Why the (b)(3) Class Failed but the (b)(2) Class Survived (For Now) 1. Rule 23(b)(3): Facial Defects in Predominance and Superiority The proposed damages class swept across: multiple states, multiple mortgage products, and borrowers with widely varying financial profiles and outcomes. The court concluded those variations made individualized issues obvious from the complaint itself—an “unusual case” where predominance failure could be seen on the pleadings alone. This is a reminder that broad “everything but the kitchen sink” class definitions are perilous, especially when monetary damages are sought across heterogeneous transactions. 2. Rule 23(b)(2): Plausible Commonality Through a Single Algorithm The injunctive class stood on firmer footing. The complaint alleged that all applicants were subjected to a single underwriting algorithm whose variables were opaque and allegedly discriminatory. That assertion, the Fourth Circuit held, plausibly raised common questions capable of classwide resolution—at least at the pleading stage. Discovery might ultimately prove the allegations false. But that is precisely why early dismissal was “premature.” Commentary: This opinion reads like a procedural treatise masquerading as an interlocutory appeal, but its real significance lies far beyond mortgage lending discrimination. For consumer practitioners, Oliver is a quiet but powerful affirmation that procedural shortcuts cannot substitute for factual development—particularly where systemic practices are alleged. 1. A Familiar Theme: Gatekeeping vs. Access to Justice Consumer  lawyers will recognize the tension immediately-  financial institution sdefendants often seek to strangle class actions in their crib by striking allegations before discovery. Oliver pushes back on that trend. The Fourth Circuit’s message is clear: If a plaintiff plausibly alleges a uniform policy—here, a single underwriting algorithm—courts should not demand proof before allowing discovery designed to obtain that proof. That principle resonates strongly in consumer finance cases, including those that later find their way into bankruptcy adversary proceedings involving systemic servicing or underwriting misconduct. 2. The Opinion’s Structural Insight: (b)(2) vs. (b)(3) as Parallel Tracks Oliver also underscores a strategic point often overlooked in consumer litigation: Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes face the gauntlet of predominance and superiority. Rule 23(b)(2) injunctive classes often survive where (b)(3) fails. That dichotomy mirrors bankruptcy litigation practice. Debtors challenging systemic mortgage servicing abuses (e.g., Rule 3002.1 violations) may find injunctive or declaratory relief far more amenable to aggregation than individualized damage claims. 3.  The Dissent: A Warning Shot for Future Litigants Judge Richardson’s partial dissent—favoring broad discretion to strike class allegations early—reads like a roadmap for defendants in future cases. The battle lines are now drawn: plaintiffs will invoke Goodman and Oliver’s “as a matter of law” standard, while defendants will press for discretionary docket control under Rule 23(d). Expect this debate to surface repeatedly in high-stakes consumer financial litigation, especially where algorithmic decision-making is alleged. Final Thoughts Oliver does not certify a class, nor does it vindicate the plaintiffs’ discrimination claims. Instead, it performs a quieter but vital task: preserving the integrity of Rule 23’s sequencing. Discovery first, certification later—unless the complaint itself dooms the class. For those of us who regularly see individual consumer claims dwarfed by institutional practices—whether in mortgage servicing, credit reporting, or student loan administration—that procedural sequencing is not mere formalism. It is often the difference between meaningful systemic accountability and a patchwork of isolated individual cases that never illuminate the broader pattern. In short, Oliver reminds us that Rule 23 is not just about efficiency; it is about ensuring that claims alleging systemic misconduct receive the factual development necessary to test them on the merits, rather than being quietly extinguished at the pleading stage. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document oliver_v._navy_federal_credit_union.pdf (403.48 KB)

W.D.N.C.: Boggs v. New South Finance, LLC — “Negotiable Instruments,” Vapor Money, and Why Pseudo-Legal Magic Words Don’t Stop a Repo Ed Boltz Mon, 03/16/2026 - 14:32 Summary: In Boggs v. New South Finance LLC, the Western District of North Carolina granted the debtor permission to proceed in forma pauperis for screening purposes, but swiftly dismissed her complaint without prejudice after finding it rested entirely on legally baseless theories. The Facts (Such As They Are) Jessica Boggs fell behind on her automobile loan and, instead of curing the delinquency or surrendering the vehicle, sent the lender documents asserting that she had submitted the loan to the U.S. Treasury for “review, settlement, and payment under trust authority.” She later purported to tender a “conditional settlement instrument,” invoking UCC § 3-311 and declaring the debt discharged upon acceptance. When the lender (unsurprisingly) declined to accept anything short of full payoff, it repossessed the vehicle. Boggs then filed suit alleging the repossession violated the UCC and that her pseudo-negotiable instrument had legally satisfied the loan. The Court’s Holding Applying the mandatory frivolity review under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the district court dismissed the complaint, explaining that it relied on theories “commonly associated with the ‘sovereign citizen’ movement,” including the widely rejected notion that debts can be discharged by self-created instruments or references to fictitious trusts. Courts have consistently—and correctly—rejected such arguments as legally baseless, and the same defects doomed Boggs’ case. Because the entire complaint depended on these meritless theories, dismissal—without prejudice—was required. All pending motions for injunctive relief and return of the vehicle were denied as moot. Commentary: This opinion is short, unsurprising, and nevertheless points towards important  issues of access to justice. It sits at the intersection of consumer distress, internet misinformation, and the stubborn persistence of the “vapor money/negotiable instrument” mythology that refuses to die—particularly in the context of auto repossessions. 1. The False Promise of UCC Alchemy Every few months (or weeks?), a case like Boggs surfaces in  North Carolina, featuring debtors who sincerely believe that invoking the UCC, creating a “trust,” or tendering a homemade “negotiable instrument” can legally extinguish a secured debt. It cannot. Article 3 of the UCC governs real negotiable instruments, not unilateral declarations of payment created by the obligor. Courts have consistently—and correctly—rejected these theories as frivolous, because they collapse the most basic premise of commercial law: a debtor cannot force a creditor to accept imaginary payment. The Boggs order fits squarely within a line of W.D.N.C. decisions dismissing sovereign-citizen-style filings involving vapor money, private trusts, and UCC incantations. 2. A Missed (and Perhaps Unavailable) Bankruptcy Opportunity What is most striking to a consumer bankruptcy practitioner is not that the case was dismissed, but that it was filed at all instead of a bankruptcy case. Yet before chalking that up to poor judgment, it is worth considering a more uncomfortable possibility: Ms. Boggs may not have been able to access bankruptcy counsel quickly enough—or affordably enough—to file before the repossession occurred. In the Western District of North Carolina, Chapter 13 attorney compensation in a vehicle case is typically spread over the life of the plan. In a 60-month plan, that can mean counsel is effectively paid as little as $75 per month. Coupled with recalcitrance about allowing filing fees to be paid in installments or advanced by counsel, many lawyers understandably require a meaningful portion of their fees to be paid before filing. When a debtor is unemployed, recently evicted, and facing imminent repossession, that upfront requirement can become an insurmountable barrier to accessing justice. This structural reality contrasts sharply with neighboring districts. In the Eastern District of North Carolina, local practice generally provides that debtor’s counsel is paid approximately $250 per month during the first year of the case, giving attorneys a predictable early stream of compensation. Likewise, in the Middle District, the difference between the adequate protection payment and the equal monthly payment can often be diverted to counsel for a similar initial period. Both approaches recognize the practical truth that front-loading at least some attorney compensation facilitates timely filings—precisely when the automatic stay is most needed to stop repossessions. Against that backdrop, the Boggs filing reads less like irrational defiance and more like the predictable consequence of a system where the availability of bankruptcy relief can hinge on whether a financially desperate debtor can assemble enough cash on short notice to hire counsel. When that barrier proves too high, some debtors turn to internet-promoted “self-help” theories promising debt discharge through UCC magic words or Treasury “setoff.” Those theories fail in court, but they persist precisely because they appear to offer relief without the upfront cost of legal representation. Had Ms. Boggs been able to access Chapter 13 counsel immediately, the automatic stay could have halted the repossession and allowed arrears to be cured over time. Instead, the economic structure of compensation in the WDNC may have left her with a cruel choice: come up with money she did not have, or try the legally illusory alternatives that ultimately cost her the vehicle anyway. 3. The Court’s Tone: Firm but Measured Importantly, the court granted IFP status for the limited purpose of conducting screening review before dismissing the case. That is a subtle but meaningful acknowledgment: the plaintiff was financially distressed and entitled to access the courts, even though her legal theories were unsustainable. This measured approach—access first, dismissal second—is consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s emphasis on liberal construction of pro se filings, while still enforcing the requirement that complaints allege cognizable legal claims. 4. The Broader Lesson for Consumer Practitioners For those of us representing consumer debtors in North Carolina, Boggs is a cautionary tale we have all seen play out in real time. Clients often arrive after attempting self-help strategies based on online templates promising “debt discharge” through Treasury submissions, trusts, or negotiable instruments. By the time they seek real legal advice, the damage is done: repossessions completed, foreclosures advanced, and viable bankruptcy options narrowed by delay. The practical takeaway is not merely doctrinal but educational: consumer bankruptcy attorneys must proactively debunk these myths before they metastasize into litigation that courts inevitably—and swiftly—reject. 5. Why Dismissal Without Prejudice Matters The dismissal without prejudice leaves open the possibility that Ms. Boggs could refile a complaint grounded in actual law—or, more realistically, file a bankruptcy case that addresses the underlying financial distress. Whether she will receive that advice in time is, of course, another question. Bottom Line Boggs v. New South Finance adds little doctrinally, but it reinforces an enduring truth: magic words invoking the UCC do not discharge debts, fictitious trusts do not satisfy secured loans, and sovereign-citizen-style “negotiable instruments” do not stop repossessions. Bankruptcy, however, often can—or at least could have—if the path to accessing it were not sometimes blocked by the very real economics of consumer representation.   To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document boggs_v._new_south.pdf (299.04 KB) Category Western District

N.C. Ct. of App.: Harris v. McLeod — Equitable Mortgages, Foreclosure Equity, and What Bankruptcy Could Have Done Ed Boltz Fri, 03/13/2026 - 15:06 In Harris v. McLeod (N.C. Ct. App. Feb. 4, 2026) (unpublished), the Court of Appeals reversed summary judgment in a dispute over whether an elderly homeowner’s deed to his nephew was an outright conveyance or merely security for a small tax debt—an equitable mortgage in substance if not in form. This opinion already raised classic equitable concerns. But read in early 2026, it now also resonates with the constitutional questions swirling in Pung v. Isabella County, recently argued before the U.S. Supreme Court—questions about whether the law tolerates the destruction of massive homeowner equity to satisfy relatively trivial debts. That broader constitutional backdrop sharpens the stakes in Harris, and it also highlights a bankruptcy strategy that, tragically, is now likely foreclosed by the debtor’s death. Summary: The facts are almost archetypal. An elderly, ill homeowner conveyed his Apex property to his nephew, who paid only about $3,295 in delinquent property taxes. The decedent allegedly believed this was a temporary arrangement: once he repaid the debt, the property would be reconveyed. He promptly tried to repay the amount and reclaim the home. The nephew refused. After the homeowner died, the executor sued, alleging the deed was really security for a debt. The trial court granted summary judgment for the nephew, but the Court of Appeals reversed, holding: The executor’s and friend’s affidavits should have been considered as based on personal knowledge. Genuine issues of material fact remained as to whether the transaction created an equitable mortgage rather than a fee-simple transfer. Key disputed facts included: The grantor remained in possession after the deed. The consideration ($3,295) was grossly disproportionate to the property’s value. The grantor attempted to tender that exact amount shortly after the conveyance. The grantor was elderly, illiterate, and in financial distress. In short, the Court of Appeals recognized the possibility that this was not a sale at all, but rather a distressed homeowner’s attempt to “save his land” through a transaction that equity may treat as a mortgage. Commentary: Harris Meets Pung v. Isabella County Although Harris involves a private conveyance rather than a tax foreclosure, the equities are strikingly parallel to the issues now before the U.S. Supreme Court in Pung. There, the Court is considering whether the Constitution permits the government to seize and sell a home worth far more than the tax debt and compensate the owner only based on the depressed auction price rather than fair market value.  During oral argument, several justices expressed discomfort with situations where trivial tax debts result in the destruction of large amounts of homeowner equity, even if longstanding foreclosure traditions permit such sales. (SCOTU Sblog) That tension—between formal legality and substantive fairness—echoes loudly in Harris. Replace the county with a nephew and the tax foreclosure with a “helpful” deed, and the core question becomes the same: Can someone capture a six-figure equity interest by satisfying only a few thousand dollars of debt? I In the unlikely event that  Pung ultimately pushes constitutional doctrine toward recognizing the equity interest as the true protected property right, that conceptual shift would harmonize with North Carolina’s longstanding equitable mortgage doctrine: substance over form, intent over paperwork, and protection of distressed owners from oppressive transactions. Put differently, Harris is a private-law cousin to Pung. Both ask whether legal formalities can erase real-world equity. The Bankruptcy Angle That Now Likely Cannot Be Used Perhaps the most sobering aspect of Harris is what might have happened had Dennis Junior McLeod filed bankruptcy before his death. A Chapter 7 Trustee’s Likely Theory: Constructive Fraudulent Transfer Assuming the transfer occurred prepetition, a Chapter 7 trustee could have examined the conveyance to the nephew (almost certainly an “insider”) under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 and 548. The facts strongly suggest a classic constructive fraudulent transfer: Transfer of real property worth potentially $135,000–$200,000 Consideration of only ~$3,295 (tax arrears) Transfer made while the debtor was elderly, ill, and financially distressed Retention of possession after the transfer Those are the very hallmarks of “less than reasonably equivalent value” while the debtor was insolvent or rendered insolvent—precisely the kind of transfer a trustee exists to avoid. Indeed, trustees routinely challenge deeds where distressed homeowners deed property to insiders or rescuers who “advance” small sums to cure arrears but end up with title. In bankruptcy, the inquiry would not hinge on subjective intent alone; it would focus on objective value and insolvency—terrain where the estate’s case would likely have been strong. Insider Status Makes It Stronger Transfers to relatives are subject to heightened scrutiny. A nephew is not a per se insider under the Code, but the familial relationship and caregiving context could easily support insider status, extending lookback periods and strengthening the trustee’s avoidance case. The Estate Remedy Had the transfer been avoided: The property (or its value) would return to the bankruptcy estate. The nephew would receive a claim only for the amount advanced (plus perhaps interest). The debtor’s equity—rather than being lost—would be preserved for creditors (and possibly exemptions). In many consumer cases, that result aligns perfectly with bankruptcy’s central goal: preventing overreaching creditors (or insiders) from capturing disproportionate value from distressed debtors. Why That Option Is Likely Gone But bankruptcy is personal to the debtor. Because Mr. McLeod died before filing, the opportunity to invoke a Chapter 7 trustee’s avoidance powers is likely lost. A probate estate does not wield the strong-arm powers of § 544 or the federal fraudulent transfer remedies of § 548 in the same way a bankruptcy trustee does. Thus, the estate must now rely on state-law equitable doctrines—like equitable mortgage and fraud—rather than the broader, often more potent, avoiding powers available in bankruptcy. In a tragic sense, the case illustrates a recurring lesson: timing matters. Filing bankruptcy while the debtor is alive can preserve avoidance remedies that may vanish once death intervenes. Final Thoughts: Equity, Constitutionality, and the “Tiny Debt–Big Equity” Problem Viewed through the lens of Pung, Harris becomes more than a family dispute. It becomes part of a larger national conversation about whether the law adequately protects homeowners from losing massive equity to satisfy modest debts—whether through government foreclosure or private “rescue” transactions. North Carolina’s equitable mortgage doctrine already reflects skepticism toward such outcomes. Bankruptcy avoidance law provides another powerful safeguard. And now, depending on how the Supreme Court ultimately resolves Pung, constitutional law itself may begin to grapple more directly with the same problem: the destruction of homeowner equity that is wildly disproportionate to the debt being enforced. In Harris, the Court of Appeals wisely declined to resolve those equities on summary judgment. Whether through equity, bankruptcy, or constitutional law, the core principle remains the same: when a debtor’s lifetime asset is exchanged for a few thousand dollars, courts should look very closely at whether that transaction was ever truly meant to be a sale at all. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document harris_v._mcleod.pdf (201.93 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals

N.C. Ct. of Appeals: Ray v. TitleMax of Virginia- itleMax’s Cross-Border Title Loans Create Personal Jurisdiction in North Carolina Ed Boltz Thu, 03/12/2026 - 14:36 Summary:  In Ray v. TitleMax, the North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion to dismiss, holding that North Carolina courts may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over out-of-state TitleMax-affiliated lenders who made high-interest title loans to North Carolina residents—even where loan documents were signed across state lines. The plaintiffs, all North Carolina residents, alleged that TitleMax entities operating in Virginia and South Carolina targeted them with car title loans carrying triple-digit AP Rs and then enforced those loans against collateral located in North Carolina. The complaint asserted violations of the North Carolina Consumer Finance Act, usury statutes, and Chapter 75, along with claims seeking veil piercing and punitive damages. The defendants—multiple affiliated TitleMax and TMX Finance entities—argued that North Carolina lacked personal jurisdiction because the loans were formally made outside the state and that the trial court improperly aggregated contacts across corporate entities. The Court of Appeals disagreed and affirmed the trial court. Key Contacts Supporting Jurisdiction The court found ample competent evidence showing that the defendants purposefully availed themselves of North Carolina, including: Marketing and advertising reaching North Carolina residents Direct solicitation and discussions with borrowers located in North Carolina Recording liens with the North Carolina DMV Accepting payments sent from North Carolina Repossessing vehicles physically located in North Carolina Sending mailers and offering referral bonuses to North Carolina residents Collectively, this conduct created a “substantial connection” between the defendants and the forum state, satisfying minimum contacts for specific jurisdiction. The court analogized to Leake v. AutoMoney, which upheld jurisdiction over another title lender engaged in nearly identical cross-border lending tactics. Corporate Affiliates Also Subject to Jurisdiction Significantly, the Court allowed jurisdiction not only over the storefront lending entities but also over corporate affiliates (TMX Finance and CCFI) alleged to control policies, employees, and operations. Evidence suggested centralized control over solicitation, repossession, and loan practices, supporting purposeful availment through corporate direction and control—even absent direct borrower contact. The Court rejected the argument that references to defendants collectively were improper, noting: No party requested specific findings separating each entity; and The defendants themselves litigated as a unified group. Holding Because competent evidence supported findings that defendants deliberately reached into North Carolina to recruit borrowers and enforce title loans against North Carolina collateral, the exercise of personal jurisdiction comported with due process. The denial of the motion to dismiss was therefore affirmed. Commentary: This unpublished opinion may not be binding precedent, but make no mistake—it is a roadmap for consumer advocates confronting cross-border title lenders who attempt to export high-interest lending schemes into North Carolina while claiming immunity from its consumer protection laws. 1. “Sign Here in Virginia” Is Not a Jurisdictional Shield The central defense tactic in these cases is familiar: We didn’t lend in North Carolina; the borrower drove across the state line. Ray decisively rejects that formalism. When lenders: advertise in North Carolina, solicit North Carolina residents, record liens in North Carolina, and repossess vehicles here, they are not passive out-of-state lenders. They are purposefully availing themselves of the North Carolina marketplace—and must answer in North Carolina courts. For bankruptcy practitioners, that matters enormously. These same lenders routinely file proofs of claim, assert secured status, and seek stay relief in North Carolina bankruptcy courts. Ray provides a powerful jurisdictional counterweight: if they can repossess cars in North Carolina, they can defend lawsuits here too. 2. A Quiet but Powerful Veil-Piercing Jurisdiction Theory Perhaps the most significant aspect of Ray is its acceptance that corporate control can establish jurisdiction. The court did not require direct borrower contact by each holding company; instead, it focused on evidence that corporate affiliates dictated policies, approved repossessions, controlled employees, and commingled finances. That is exactly how modern subprime lending enterprises operate: fragmentation on paper, unity in practice. Ray signals that North Carolina courts will look past the corporate shell game—at least at the jurisdictional stage. For consumer bankruptcy litigation, this is critical. When debt buyers, servicers, or holding companies argue they are merely passive affiliates, Ray provides doctrinal support to bring the entire enterprise into court. 3. Convergence with Bankruptcy Policy: Protecting North Carolina Collateral There is also a deeper bankruptcy-law resonance here. Title lenders often argue that their liens—perfected through DMV filings—are enforceable regardless of where the loan originated. Ray flips that script: the act of perfecting a lien in North Carolina is itself a minimum contact supporting jurisdiction. That reasoning dovetails with avoidance and claim litigation in bankruptcy: if the creditor relies on North Carolina law to secure its collateral, it cannot simultaneously disclaim North Carolina jurisdiction when challenged under consumer protection statutes. 4. Practical Implications for Consumer Bankruptcy Attorneys Ray is not merely about forum power; it is about substantive consumer protection enforcement. Expect to see it cited in: Chapter 13 lien challenges to out-of-state title lenders Adversary proceedings alleging unfair and deceptive trade practices Objections to claims asserting usurious title loan balances Stay violation and repossession litigation involving cross-border lenders Even though unpublished, its reasoning is highly persuasive—especially given its reliance on prior precedents like Leake v. AutoMoney. 5. The Larger Policy Message: North Carolina Will Not Be a “Drive-By Usury” Zone The opinion reflects an unmistakable judicial skepticism toward schemes designed to evade North Carolina’s consumer finance laws by relocating paperwork just across the state line. The court looked to real-world conduct rather than contractual formalities. That is exactly the approach bankruptcy courts should adopt when evaluating claims premised on such loans: substance over form, and consumer protection statutes interpreted in light of modern lending realities. Final Thoughts Ray v. TitleMax is another incremental—but meaningful—step in a long-running judicial effort to prevent predatory title lenders from exploiting geographic loopholes. For consumer bankruptcy attorneys in North Carolina, it offers both a shield and a sword: a shield against jurisdictional gamesmanship and a sword for bringing enterprise-wide actors into a single forum. Even as an unpublished opinion, Ray sends a clear signal: If you reach into North Carolina to make and enforce high-interest title loans against North Carolina residents and collateral, you should expect to litigate here. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document ray_v._titlemax.pdf (210.09 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals