Bankr. W.D.N.C.: In re Holland — Means Test Reality Beats Wishful Thinking Across All Three NC Districts Ed Boltz Fri, 01/09/2026 - 16:53 Summary: Judge Laura Beyer’s decision in In re Holland drives home a now-settled point in North Carolina bankruptcy practice: if a debtor does not intend to keep collateral and make payments, then the debtor does not get to deduct those payments on the Chapter 7 means test. The Hollands were above-median debtors with multiple secured debts and stated their intention to surrender a 2023 Kia K5. They hadn’t made payments on the Kia in months, it had already been repossessed, and stay relief had been granted. Yet they still deducted the $590 Kia payment on the means test. The Bankruptcy Administrator objected. Once that deduction disappeared, the Hollands had sufficient disposable income to trigger the presumption of abuse under § 707(b). Judge Beyer agreed and ordered dismissal unless the debtors converted to Chapter 13. A Unified North Carolina Rule: Sterrenberg (EDNC), Hamilton (MDNC), and Holland (WDNC): This isn’t just a Western District trend — it now reflects all three North Carolina bankruptcy districts. In re Sterrenberg (Eastern District of North Carolina) Judge Randy D. Doub Judge Doub held that a debtor who intends to surrender collateral cannot deduct secured payments tied to that collateral on the means test. A deduction cannot be based on payments the debtor already knows will not be made. https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/in-re-sterrenberg-no-895409367 In re Hamilton (Middle District of North Carolina) Judge Catherine Aron Judge Aron reached the same result: allowing secured-payment deductions on property the debtor plans to surrender distorts the means test and conflicts with the forward-looking approach of Lanning and Ransom. https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/in-re-hamilton-no-891123578 In re Holland (Western District of North Carolina) Judge Laura T. Beyer Judge Beyer follows the same reasoning, expressly adopting the forward-looking interpretation and disallowing deductions tied to surrendered collateral. Across EDNC, MDNC, and WDNC, the message is consistent: If you aren’t going to keep it and pay for it, you don’t get to deduct it. Commentary: Why Debtors Should Not Rush to Surrender or Reaffirm This case also highlights an important strategic lesson for consumer debtors: ⭐ It is often in the debtor’s best interest not to surrender vehicles or other secured property until after discharge, and not to sign reaffirmation agreements. Why: declaring surrender during the case can remove a means-test deduction losing that deduction can turn a Chapter 7 into a 707(b) “abuse” case debtors get pushed into Chapter 13 unnecessarily reaffirmations recreate personal liability on depreciating assets most lenders will accept payments without reaffirmation surrendering after discharge does not change the means test at all Put differently: ✔️ Keep the car if possible during the case ✔️ Do not reaffirm unless there is a compelling reason ✔️ Decide about surrender after discharge once your financial circumstances have stabilized Holland shows how quickly a routine Chapter 7 can unravel once a debtor checks the “surrender” box too early. Sterrenberg and Hamilton show that this outcome isn’t a fluke — it’s doctrine. In bankruptcy, sometimes the smartest move is not bold action. It’s patient inaction. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_holland.pdf (372.68 KB) Category Western District

W.D.N.C: Moseley v. Latino Community Credit Union-If you click “I agree,” don’t be surprised when they actually check your credit Ed Boltz Thu, 01/08/2026 - 15:40 Summary: In this Western District case, the pro se plaintiff, Brittney Moseley, brought what has become a fairly common species of Fair Credit Reporting Act litigation — alleging that a lender “pulled” her credit report without authorization and, in the process, violated both the FCRA and North Carolina’s Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The Court did not buy it. Moseley applied online to open a membership account with Latino Community Credit Union. As part of that process, she electronically signed an application that — in clear, unambiguous language — authorized the credit union to verify her identity and obtain a credit report if necessary. The account rules repeated the same thing: eligibility for membership includes consent to check your credit and banking history. That’s the ballgame. Because the record showed: A real credit report existed, The credit union accessed it, and It had a permissible purpose — i.e., the consumer’s written authorization and a legitimate transaction initiated by the consumer — the Court concluded that there was no FCRA violation, and therefore no UDTPA violation either. The Court converted the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment (with the parties’ consent) and entered judgment for the credit union. It also denied the plaintiff’s attempt to file yet another amended complaint, finding that amendment would be futile because the documents already in the record doomed the theory of liability. As the Court put it, obtaining a credit report “in connection with an application to open a financial account with the consent of the consumer” simply isn’t unfair, deceptive, or unlawful.   Commentary: Cases like this are an important reminder — for both lawyers and consumers — about the real-world consequences of online agreements. The credit unions and banks have learned (sometimes the hard way) to put conspicuous authorization language directly above the signature line, and courts are increasingly unwilling to ignore that language when consumers later claim surprise. This is also another example where adding more allegations to a complaint cannot salvage a claim once the documentary record contradicts the narrative. Rule 15 is liberal, but not magical: if the authorization is right there in black and white, no amount of “re-pleading” can make it disappear. For consumer advocates, the takeaway isn’t that FCRA claims are frivolous — many are not — but that these cases live or die on the paper trail. Where creditors fabricate applications, misuse credit pulls, or go fishing without a legitimate purpose, liability remains very real. But when the consumer clicks “I agree,” courts will hold them to it. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document moseley_v._latino_community_credit_union_1.pdf (329.39 KB) Category Western District

M.D.N.C.- Custer v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage II: Class Certification Granted in “Pay-to-Pay” Mortgage Fee Case Ed Boltz Wed, 01/07/2026 - 16:32 Summary: In yet another chapter of what is becoming a running series on pay-to-pay mortgage fees, Chief Judge Catherine Eagles has issued a significant opinion certifying a statewide class of North Carolina homeowners against Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. (DMI). The ruling allows claims under both the North Carolina Debt Collection Act (NCDCA) and the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA) to proceed on a class-wide basis. This case ties directly back to earlier discussions here: Custer v. Dovenmuehle Mortgage (2024) — holding that the NCDCA does not require default before protections apply https://ncbankruptcyexpert.com/2024/11/06/mdnc-custer-v-dovenmuehle-mortgage-nc-debt-collection-act-does-not-require-default Custer v. Simmons Bank (2025) — where claims survived despite “bad threats” arguments and highlighted that loss-mitigation fees can still be actionable https://ncbankruptcyexpert.com/2025/11/21/mdnc-custer-v-simmons-bank-dmi-cause-action-loss-mitigation-fees-survive-bad-threats Williams v. PennyMac (2025) — another strike against “pay-to-pay” fees as lenders tried to argue creative contractual interpretations https://ncbankruptcyexpert.com/2025/12/23/mdnc-williams-v-penny-mac-dim-view-pay-pay-mortgage-fees Collectively, these cases are forming a fairly coherent message: Mortgage servicers should not treat borrowers as captive revenue streams for junk fees. What DMI Was Doing DMI charged borrowers: $9.50 to pay by automated phone system $11.50 to pay a live representative Meanwhile, the actual cost of processing these payments was measured in pennies — often less than 50 cents per transaction. And — critically — the mortgage documents did not authorize these charges. Worse, DMI appeared to treat the fees not as cost-recovery, but as a profit center. Judge Eagles noted that the Uniform Mortgage documents routinely used in North Carolina expressly prohibit charging fees that are not permitted by law or contract — which is going to be a recurring issue for servicers who have reflexively adopted the “everybody charges these” mindset. The Class That Was Certified: The Court certified a statewide class consisting of: All North Carolina borrowers whose mortgages were serviced by DMI and who paid a pay-to-pay phone fee between April 10, 2020 and the date notice is issued. The Court found that: The legal theories are the same for everyone. DMI used standardized practices. Damages are manageable. Individual borrowers are unlikely to litigate $10–$15 fees on their own. In other words — exactly the type of case Rule 23 exists for. Key Legal Takeaways 1. NCDCA + UDTPA remain powerful consumer tools The Court recognized that charging unlawful fees may constitute: unconscionable debt collection (NCDCA), and an unfair or deceptive trade practice (UDTPA). And importantly — statutory damages may apply, which shifts leverage away from servicers and toward consumers. 2. “Consent” arguments didn’t carry the day DMI floated arguments that borrowers “agreed” to the fees simply because the automated phone system disclosed them. But Judge Eagles noted: It isn’t clear DMI is even covered by the “any fee the borrower agrees to pay” statute. The core question — whether DMI could legally charge the fee at all — is still common across all class members. The Court also gently reminded DMI that it previously resisted producing loan documents — making it difficult to now claim that individual contracts somehow change everything. 3. Courts increasingly reject “junk fee” rationalizations Echoing the trajectory in Williams and the earlier Custer decisions, the Court showed skepticism toward the idea that “everyone does this” equals legality. Mortgage servicers cannot tack on charges simply because: payment convenience is nice, servicing platforms allow it, or they think borrowers won’t fight back. Commentary: Where This Is Headed We are seeing a pattern emerge — across federal courts and in North Carolina specifically. Judges are increasingly unwilling to let mortgage servicers: hide behind technicalities, charge fees untethered from cost, or impose “convenience” tolls that borrowers never bargained for. This opinion matters especially in bankruptcy and consumer practice because: Many Chapter 13 clients were hit with these fees repeatedly. Those charges often compounded delinquency problems. Trustees, courts, and debtors’ counsel can now more confidently challenge them. And yes — servicers will almost certainly continue to argue: “But borrowers could have mailed a check instead!” That’s not likely to carry much weight when the real story is: “We charged people extra to pay us — and then profited on the difference.” Final Thought: Between the earlier Custer rulings, Simmons Bank, Williams, and now this class certification order, mortgage servicers should be getting the message. North Carolina law does not permit turning payment mechanics into a side-business. And for once, the small $10 fees that nobody used to fight about may wind up costing a servicer far more than it ever collected. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document custer_v._doevenmuhle.pdf (305.57 KB) Category Middle District

Law Review: Iuliano, Jason Bridging the Student Loan Bankruptcy Gap Ed Boltz Tue, 01/06/2026 - 15:24 Available at:  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5944454 Abstract: In November 2022, the Department of Justice and Department of Education announced sweeping reforms designed to make student loan bankruptcy discharge more accessible to struggling borrowers. Drawing upon an original (hand collected) dataset of more than six hundred adversary proceedings filed during the first year of implementation, this article presents the first empirical analysis of whether these reforms have achieved their goal and bridged the “Student Loan Bankruptcy Gap”—the chasm between those who could benefit from bankruptcy discharge and those who actually pursue it. The results are mixed but suggest the gap, although narrowed, remains wide. On the positive side, success rates have reached 87% in the post-reform period. But on the negative side, filings remain remarkably low. This article evaluates the reforms along four key metrics of success and proposes solutions to make bankruptcy relief more accessible to struggling borrowers. Bridging the Student Loan Bankruptcy Gap: Progress — But Still Miles To Go: Professor Jason Iuliano’s newest article, Bridging the Student Loan Bankruptcy Gap, offers something that has been sorely missing in the conversation about student-loan discharges: data rather than rumor, analysis instead of folklore, and a grounded assessment of whether the Department of Justice’s November 2022 attestation process actually changed anything. And yes — it has. Borrowers who file adversary proceedings are winning. But the real problem remains: almost no one files. It Isn’t Really the Law That’s the Problem — It’s Behavior Across multiple articles — including: Student Loans, Bankruptcy, and the Meaning of “Educational Benefit” (which helped catalyze the Crocker, McDaniel, and Homaidan line of cases clarifying that not every supposed “student loan” is actually protected by §523(a)(8)), and The Student Loan Bankruptcy Gap:  Where Prof. Iuliano documented how prior to the SLAP Guidance,  out of the ~250,000 student loan debtors who filed for bankruptcy, fewer than three hundred discharged their educational debt. Iuliano has shown that the dominant myth — student loans cannot be discharged — has done more damage than §523(a)(8) itself ever could. Lawyers stopped filing. Clients never heard about the possibility. Courts stopped seeing the cases — and the myth hardened. The DOJ’s 2022 guidance tries to correct course by: Defining clearer presumptions under Brunner Simplifying evidence through attestation Encouraging stipulations instead of trial by attrition The result? Roughly 87% success among those who actually file. And yet filings remain anemic — proof that culture changes slower than doctrine. Judges: Some Obstacles — But Many Quiet Allies It must be acknowledged — there are still a few rogue judges who seem determined to block agreed student-loan discharges, even where the DOJ stipulates that undue hardship exists. These judges, driven by an ill-conceived sense that they personally safeguard federal fiscal responsibility  (which, if our system was working, would be the job of Congress), insist on second-guessing both the borrower and the government. The result is needless litigation, higher costs, and exactly the kind of access-to-justice barrier both the Biden and Trump administrations have sought to avoid. But those judges are the exception — not the rule. Across the country, many bankruptcy judges are doing the opposite: encouraging Student Loan Adversary Proceedings (SLA Ps) adopting student-loan management programs creating standardized discovery schedules pushing user-friendly procedures rather than obstacle courses Instead of weaponizing Brunner, they are demystifying it — and signaling clearly that debtors should bring these cases. That matters. Culture follows procedure. More Can Be Done— Especially on Fees If we truly want SLA Ps to become routine tools rather than heroic undertakings, we need to make them economically feasible. Right now, many debtors simply cannot afford counsel — and many attorneys understandably hesitate to shoulder unpaid litigation risk. One simple fix: Allow “no-look” fees in Chapter 13 for student-loan adversaries, payable through the plan. Treat SLA Ps as a recognized service — not a boutique add-on. If attorneys could rely on standardized compensation, more cases would be filed. More courts would see the right facts. More borrowers would receive discharges. And the Student Loan Bankruptcy Gap would actually begin to close. This is the kind of structural tweak that aligns incentives instead of relying on heroics. Connecting Back to “Full Discharge Ahead” This all echoes themes discussed earlier in the review of: Pang & Belisa / Jimenez-Dalie & Bruckner — Full Discharge Ahead The winds are shifting: DOJ is more reasonable courts are less hostile scholarship supports workable frameworks judges increasingly support bringing the cases The barrier now is no longer doctrinal despair — it is professional inertia. Final Thought: Ask — Because Now You Might Receive Iuliano’s newest article reinforces something bankruptcy practitioners cannot afford to ignore: The discharge is no longer fantasy. The gap persists only because most people never try. Our task — as lawyers, judges, trustees, and educators — is to make sure that borrowers learn that relief exists, that the courthouse door is not welded shut, and that the promise of a fresh start applies to student loans as much as to everything else. And while some still cling to the myth that protecting the Treasury means punishing borrowers forever, the better view — the bankruptcy view — remains: Fresh starts make better citizens, better economies, and better futures. With proper attribution,  please share. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document bridging_the_student_loan_bankruptcy_gap.pdf (483.74 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

N.C. Ct. of App.: The Law Office of Robert Forquer v. Arcuri- Co-Signer on Deed Not Liable for Mortgage Payoff Ed Boltz Mon, 01/05/2026 - 16:19 Summary: This case began as an interpleader filed by a closing attorney caught in the middle of a family property dispute — wisely deciding not to referee a fight over sale proceeds while trying to deliver clear title. Susan Arcuri and her late partner, John Renegar, owned a house in Charlotte as tenants-in-common. In 2021, Arcuri alone signed a $245,000 promissory note, but both she and Renegar signed the Deed of Trust, which described both as “Borrowers” — while also expressly stating that any co-signer not on the Note was not personally liable for the debt. When Renegar passed away, his interest passed to his two adult children. The property was eventually sold, and everyone agreed the lien had to be paid. The disagreement? Who’s share took the mortgage hit. Arcuri argued: Everyone had to give up proceeds proportionally because everyone pledged their interest. The Renegar children argued: Only Arcuri signed the Note — so payment comes from her half. The trial court agreed with the children, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The majority emphasized a core principle: A deed of trust secures a debt — it does not create a new obligation to pay one. And Section 13 of the Fannie Mae form deed could not be clearer that co-signers like Renegar encumber the property only, without assuming payment responsibility. Therefore, the mortgage payoff was deducted solely from Arcuri’s share of the proceeds . The opinion does correct one misstep below: the deed did encumber the Renegar heirs’ interest — but encumbrance is different from personal liability. That distinction mattered, but not enough to change the outcome. Chief Judge Dillon concurred, offering a richer surety analysis. He explained that someone who mortgages property for another’s debt is often treated like a surety — responsible only to the extent of the pledged property. In his view, there is a rebuttable presumption that Renegar was acting as surety, and Arcuri failed to offer competent evidence that the loan was actually for joint benefit. Since she didn’t rebut the presumption, the payoff properly came from her side. Commentary: What makes this opinion interesting — and highly relevant to bankruptcy lawyers — is how clearly it separates: Who owes the debt What property is pledged Who ultimately bears the economic burden when property is sold Creditors — and sometimes debtors — tend to conflate these. The Court’s reasoning reinforces what we too often see in practice: Signing the deed of trust is not the same as signing the note. This is particularly common with non-borrowing spouses, partners, elderly parents helping their children qualify, and anyone else who winds up “on title” but not “on the loan.” The Court wisely refused to treat the sale payoff as some kind of equitable contribution obligation. There was no separate agreement shifting responsibility. No implied assumption. No magic language in the deed that turned a non-obligor into a debtor. And had this landed in bankruptcy? A Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 trustee might have argued “benefit to the estate,” “marshalling,” or equitable contribution — but those are uphill climbs without evidence. The opinion makes clear: The encumbrance survives. The obligation does not expand. Proceeds follow liability unless facts show otherwise. Chief Judge Dillon’s concurrence is also worth flagging for practitioners. His surety analysis opens the door — in other cases — for evidence showing: both parties benefited from the loan, the loan refinanced joint debt, improvements increased shared value, or the parties intended shared obligation. Had Arcuri produced competent evidence (not an unverified pleading), the outcome may have been different. That’s a practice pointer worth remembering. Takeaways for consumer bankruptcy and real-property lawyers ✔ Always review both the Note and Deed of Trust — they are related, but not identical. ✔ Co-signing a deed does not create personal liability without signing the note. ✔ Encumbrance ≠ obligation. ✔ Evidence matters — especially when seeking contribution. ✔ In bankruptcy cases, don’t assume joint ownership means joint liability. And finally — the closing attorney did exactly what closing attorneys should do in these situations: interplead and walk away slowly. With proper attribution,  please share. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document the_law_off._of_robert_forquer_v._arcuri.pdf (174.32 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals

Although you use bankruptcy to get out of debt, you do have to spend a little to file a bankruptcy petition with the court in New Jersey and ensure the case resolves successfully, with all debts repaid or discharged. You can expect to spend several hundred dollars on the bankruptcy filing fee, much less than that on mandatory credit counseling courses and legal fees. More complex cases may take longer and ultimately cost more to file and finish. Delaying filing for bankruptcy may ultimately cost you more, so don’t wait to submit your bankruptcy petition today in New Jersey. Call the New Jersey bankruptcy lawyers of Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates for a free analysis of your case today at (609) 755-3115. How Much Does Filing for Bankruptcy Cost in New Jersey? There are several costs to consider before initiating a bankruptcy case in New Jersey, starting with the filing fees the petitioner must pay to the court. Court Filing Fees Court filing fees vary depending on the chapter of bankruptcy under which the debtor is filing. The fee to file a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case in New Jersey is currently $338 in 2026. The filing fee for a Chapter 13 case is $313, so there is not a major difference between the cost to file a Chapter 7 or 13 bankruptcy petition with the court. There is also typically a fee to file an appeal of a bankruptcy case in New Jersey. Mandatory Credit Counseling Debtors must take mandatory credit counseling courses before filing for bankruptcy in New Jersey. Credit counseling courses range in price, but generally don’t cost more than $50, with some costing substantially less. You must complete the credit counseling course within 180 days of filing the bankruptcy petition. If you don’t, the court won’t accept the case. You may also have to take additional counseling courses before obtaining a debt discharge at the end of bankruptcy. Legal Representation Debtors should also factor in the cost of representation into the total cost of a bankruptcy case. While filing without an attorney might cost less initially, it may end up harming you in the long run if you make costly mistakes during the case. Even accidentally omitting or providing incorrect information may lead to a costly dismissal, forcing you to restart the entire bankruptcy process. Why Do Some Bankruptcy Cases Cost More to File? Some bankruptcy cases cost more to file and see through because of their complexity and length, the debtor’s eligibility for a debt discharge, and the debtor having to re-file the case after a dismissal. Bankruptcy Chapter The specific bankruptcy chapter dictates the basic filing fee. However, there is very little difference between the filing fees for Chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcies in New Jersey. Case Complexity and Length A longer, more complex case may cost more due to the amount of work and preparation required. The more assets and creditors involved, the more complicated the case gets. Rushing complex cases risks mistakes that can lead to dismissal of the bankruptcy case. No Debt Discharge A bankruptcy case may end up costing you much more than you anticipated if you do not receive a debt discharge, absolving you of repaying certain unsecured debts. If there is no debt discharge, you must repay those unsecured debts, which may require you to liquidate more assets or extend the repayment period. Debt discharges can be withheld for several reasons, such as providing inaccurate information or filing repeatedly. Case Dismissal If a bankruptcy case is dismissed before all debts are repaid, the petitioner can re-file. Still, they must repay the filing fees and retake credit counseling courses within six months of the new filing date, increasing the overall cost of bankruptcy. A case dismissal means creditors can resume debt collection, meaning interest rates might spike, and wage garnishment might begin, costing you a lot. Does Delaying Filing a Bankruptcy Case Cost More? Anyone struggling with debt in New Jersey should not wait to learn whether bankruptcy is the right solution. Delaying a bankruptcy case might cost you more for several reasons, namely, because the debt has continued to grow unchecked. The more debt you incur as you wait to file for bankruptcy, the more you will have to repay during your bankruptcy case. If you file a Chapter 7 case, you will repay debts via asset liquidation. If you file Chapter 13, you will follow a three to five-year repayment plan that our Trenton, NJ bankruptcy lawyers help set up based on your income and expenses. Accumulating more debt because of high interest rates, worsening your credit score, and ultimately paying more are risks of delaying a crucial bankruptcy case to improve your financial health in New Jersey. What Costs Can You Avoid by Filing for Bankruptcy in New Jersey? You can avoid many costly collection efforts from creditors by filing for bankruptcy in New Jersey with our lawyers’ help and benefiting from an immediate automatic stay. Wage Garnishment Wage garnishment is a major consequence of accumulating debt. With wage garnishment, the court allows your employer to withhold some of your income and send it directly to the creditors seeking repayment. This can directly affect your ability to pay other bills, worsening your overall financial health. Creditor Lawsuits Avoid costly creditor lawsuits by filing a bankruptcy case. When you do this, any ongoing creditor lawsuit must pause, as the bankruptcy case takes precedence. If a creditor violates the automatic stay during this time, they can face consequences from the bankruptcy court, so tell us if that happens to you. Mortgage Foreclosure or Vehicle Repossession Mortgage foreclosure and vehicle repossession are very real risks of delaying a bankruptcy case for too long. We may use federal exemptions to protect your car and a large portion of the equity in your home during the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, so you don’t have to worry about transportation or living accommodations while repaying debts. Does it Cost the Same to File for Bankruptcy After a Case is Dismissed? Creditors may petition to dismiss bankruptcy claims for a variety of reasons, enabling them to resume debt collection efforts, such as wage garnishment or mortgage foreclosure. If the case is dismissed and you file it again, do you have to pay the filing fee again? You pay the standard filing fee a second time if you file for bankruptcy again after a case is initially dismissed by the court. While the filing fee remains the same, the protections under the automatic stay do not. If you re-file your case within the same year, the automatic stay will only stop creditors from collecting debt for 30 days, though we can file a motion to extend it. It may cost less to “reinstate” a closed bankruptcy case rather than filing a new case, and we can see if that saves you some money. What Makes the Cost of Filing for Bankruptcy Worth It? The asset protection from the automatic stay, debt reduction from the debt discharge, and the opportunity to rebuild your credit are clear benefits that make the cost of filing for bankruptcy worth it for debtors in New Jersey. Asset Protection After you pay the filing fee to open a bankruptcy case in New Jersey, an automatic stay will most likely take effect. The automatic stay prohibits any creditors associated with the case from contacting the debtor outside the case or attempting to collect money from you. The peace of mind this alone provides makes bankruptcy filing worth it for many debtors. You may also protect assets further in a Chapter 7 case by selecting exemptions that shield your home, vehicle, or personal property from liquidation. Debt Reduction The point of bankruptcy is to reduce or eliminate debt. Some unsecured debts may be entirely erased through a discharge, such as credit card debt, medical bills, and even personal loans. Being proactive and addressing debt stops it from growing and worsening your financial situation. Rebuild Credit Filing for bankruptcy also gives you the opportunity to begin rebuilding your credit. If you don’t file and let debt continue to grow, the worse your credit score might become, hurting your ability to buy a home or vehicle. The bankruptcy case will remain on your credit report for several years and will eventually be removed. FA Qs About the Cost of Filing for Bankruptcy in New Jersey Is Filing for Bankruptcy in New Jersey Too Expensive? Compared to the cost of creditor lawsuits and growing interest on unpaid debts, filing for bankruptcy may be considerably less expensive, especially if you receive a debt discharge and don’t need to repay everything you owed, such as credit card bills. Can You Pay Bankruptcy Costs in Installments? Debtors without the cash to pay all of the bankruptcy filing fees at once may pay in installments, most likely four over 120 days. We can help you complete and submit the installment payment application. Be prepared to pay 25% of the filing fee upfront, even if you qualify for installment payments based on your income. Can You Get a Waiver for Bankruptcy Filing Fees? You may get the bankruptcy filing fee waived if your income is below 150% of the federal poverty level for 2026, and we show that you cannot pay in installments and still support yourself. Does it Cost Less to File Chapter 7 Bankruptcy? Overall, Chapter 7 bankruptcy generally costs less to file because it ends the quickest, in 3 to 6 months, even though the initial filing fee might be slightly higher. Does it Cost More to File Chapter 13 Bankruptcy? Chapter 13 may cost more to file because it generally takes three to five years. Does it Cost More to File for Bankruptcy without a Lawyer? When debtors file without our New Jersey bankruptcy lawyers’ help, they risk spending too much on filing fees, agreeing to bad interest rates for repayment plans, and not receiving the debt discharge they deserve. How Do You Pay Filing Fees for a Bankruptcy Case? Filing fees for bankruptcy cases are paid to the court, and you may pay online with a debit card, by mail, or in person via money order or cashier’s check, not cash. For Help with Your Bankruptcy Case, Call Us in New Jersey Call Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates at (609) 755-3115 for a free and confidential case review from our Voorhees, NJ bankruptcy lawyers.

Bankr. W.D.N.C.: In re Granite City Mechanical- ERTC Refunds Don’t Survive Contact with SBA EIDL Debt Ed Boltz Fri, 01/02/2026 - 17:39 Summary: In In re Granite City Mechanical, Inc., the Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of North Carolina (Judge Laura T. Beyer) held that the United States may offset unpaid Employee Retention Tax Credits (ERT Cs) against a debtor’s outstanding COVID-19 EIDL loan owed to the SBA. The debtor sought turnover of approximately $91,926.51 in pending ERTC refunds, arguing that the CARES Act insulated those credits from offset and that SBA lacked mutuality or had waived its rights. The Court rejected those arguments, denied the turnover motion, and granted relief from the automatic stay to allow the offset. Key holdings: ERT Cs are “overpayments” under 26 U.S.C. § 3134(b)(3) and are therefore subject to offset under 26 U.S.C. § 6402(d). Mutuality exists because the United States is treated as a single creditor for setoff purposes, even when different federal agencies are involved. The SBA’s claim was prepetition, and default existed under the modified EIDL note. There was no waiver of offset rights. Any ERTC checks already issued but not cashed must be returned to the IRS. The Court aligned itself with other bankruptcy courts nationally that have allowed ERTC offsets against SBA EIDL debt. Commentary: This is one of those decisions where the result may be disappointing to debtors, but the legal analysis is hard to argue with—and harder to ignore going forward. For the last few years, ERT Cs have felt like "found money": a retroactive lifeline for businesses battered by COVID, often arriving years after the worst had passed. But this opinion is a reminder that the federal government never forgets which pocket the money comes from. Judge Beyer’s opinion is methodical and unsentimental. Once ERT Cs are defined—by Congress itself—as tax “overpayments,” the rest of the analysis almost writes itself. Section 6402(d) doesn’t say some overpayments may be offset. It says any overpayment shall be reduced by debts owed to other federal agencies. That statutory language is not subtle, and the Court rightly refused to engage in linguistic gymnastics to pretend otherwise. Two practical takeaways stand out. First, for debtors with SBA EIDL loans, ERT Cs are not safe harbor funds. If your client owes SBA money—and most do—those credits are functionally earmarked for repayment whether you like it or not. From a planning standpoint, that means ERT Cs should be treated less like incoming cash and more like a contingent government recapture. Second, the mutuality argument was always a long shot. Courts have consistently treated the United States as one creditor for setoff purposes, and this case follows that well-worn path. If anything, Granite City confirms that trying to slice the federal government into agency-specific silos is an argument better suited for a law review article than a bankruptcy courtroom. What’s perhaps most important is what this case signals for Chapter 11 and Subchapter V debtors going forward. If ERT Cs are part of the reorganization calculus, practitioners must assume that SBA will assert offset rights early and aggressively—and that courts will likely permit it. In short: ERT Cs may help businesses survive COVID—but they won’t help them outrun the SBA. And as this decision makes clear, when Congress writes “shall,” bankruptcy courts in North Carolina are inclined to read it exactly that way. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_granite_city_mechanical.pdf (381.67 KB) Category Western District

4th Cir.: Hultz v. Bisignano- Subjective Medical Evidence: Lessons for Student Loan Discharges under the Brunner Test and Chapter 13 Hardship Discharges Ed Boltz Wed, 12/31/2025 - 19:48 Summary: In Hultz v. Bisignano, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed the denial of Social Security Disability benefits to Crystal Hultz, a claimant whose primary disabling condition was fibromyalgia. Relying heavily on its earlier decision in Arakas v. Commissioner, the Fourth Circuit held that Administrative Law Judges may not discount a claimant’s subjective testimony about the severity of fibromyalgia symptoms based on the absence of objective medical evidence—even as one factor among many. The court emphasized that fibromyalgia is a condition that eludes objective measurement, waxes and wanes, and is proven largely through consistent subjective reports corroborated by treatment history and lay testimony. Because the ALJ repeatedly relied on objective findings, treatment gaps, and periods of apparent improvement to discredit Ms. Hultz’s testimony—and improperly discounted her treating rheumatologist’s opinion—the Fourth Circuit reversed outright and remanded for calculation of benefits rather than another hearing. Commentary: Although Hultz arises in the Social Security context, bankruptcy courts —especially those adjudicating hardship discharges under Chapter 13 and undue hardship claims under the Brunner standard for student loans—should take careful notice. At its core, Hultz is not just a fibromyalgia case. It is a judicial reminder about how courts must evaluate human suffering when medicine cannot neatly quantify it. The Fourth Circuit makes explicit what bankruptcy courts too often forget: when a condition is inherently subjective, demanding objective proof of severity is not “skepticism”—it is legal error. This matters enormously in bankruptcy. Hardship discharges under § 1328(b) and Brunner-based student loan discharges routinely turn on judicial assessments of a debtor’s medical condition, functional capacity, and future prospects. Too often, those determinations devolve into a search for lab results, imaging, or physician statements phrased with actuarial certainty—precisely the kind of evidence that conditions like fibromyalgia, chronic fatigue, severe depression, long COVID, and many autoimmune disorders simply do not generate. What Hultz reinforces—echoing Arakas—is that subjective evidence is not second-class evidence when the disease itself is subjective in manifestation. Consistent testimony, corroborating family statements, long treatment histories, medication trials, and waxing-and-waning functionality are not red flags; they are clinical hallmarks. Translating that to bankruptcy practice: In Chapter 13 hardship discharge cases, a debtor should not be denied relief because they occasionally function, attend appointments, or experience partial symptom relief. As Hultz underscores, intermittent capacity is fully consistent with total inability to sustain full-time work. In student loan cases, Brunner’s “additional circumstances” and “certainty of persistence” prongs must be evaluated through this same lens. A debtor with fibromyalgia (or similar conditions) does not fail Brunner simply because their MRI looks fine or their doctor notes temporary improvement. Most importantly, bankruptcy courts should resist the impulse—explicitly rejected by the Fourth Circuit—to treat the absence of objective medical findings as evidence of exaggeration, malingering, or insufficient hardship. There is a quiet but important throughline here: law must adapt to the limits of medicine, not punish debtors for them. The Fourth Circuit has now said, more than once, that courts err when they substitute demands for clinical certainty in places where science itself cannot deliver it. Bankruptcy judges within the Fourth Circuit—and practitioners litigating these issues—should treat Hultz as persuasive authority well beyond Social Security law. When evaluating medical hardship, the question is not “Where is the objective proof?” but rather: Is the debtor’s lived experience credible, consistent, and supported by the record as a whole? That shift in framing can—and should—change outcomes. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document hultz_v._bisignano.pdf (252.83 KB) Category 4th Circuit Court of Appeals

N.C. Ct. of App.: Horne v. Ginkgo Aurora- Chapter 75, Debt Collection, and the Problem of Injury Ed Boltz Tue, 12/30/2025 - 19:37 While this decision is, on its face, a fairly ordinary residential rental dispute—replete with mold allegations, maintenance requests, and implied-warranty skirmishing—the part that should actually catch the attention of consumer and bankruptcy attorneys is the Court’s treatment of the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act and its companion Debt Collection Act provisions. Strip away the habitability noise, and what remains is a clear and instructive appellate holding: a technically incorrect debt demand, standing alone, is not actionable under Chapter 75 without proof of actual injury. That theme runs quietly but consistently through the opinion, and it is where the case does its real work for consumer-side practitioners . The Backdrop (Briefly) The tenant vacated his apartment and sued the landlord over alleged habitability issues. The landlord counterclaimed for unpaid rent and fees, initially asserting the tenant owed $9,339.21. At trial, the landlord conceded that figure was overstated because it included rent during a renovation period when the unit could not have been re-rented. The correct amount was $7,251.21, which is exactly what the trial court awarded. The tenant appealed across the board—but critically did not challenge the trial court’s findings of fact, a mistake that narrowed the appeal to questions of law almost immediately. The Debt Collection Act Claim: Error Without Consequence For consumer and bankruptcy attorneys, the key issue is the tenant’s claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-54(4), which prohibits falsely representing the character, extent, or amount of a debt. Importantly, the Court of Appeals did not say the landlord’s conduct was acceptable. It acknowledged that the landlord should not have represented the higher amount once it was clear the rent could not lawfully be charged. That concession matters—and future litigants should not gloss over it. But acknowledgment of a misstatement is not the same thing as liability. To prevail under the North Carolina Debt Collection Act, the plaintiff must still satisfy the familiar Chapter 75 framework, including proximate injury. On that point, the tenant’s case failed completely. The Court emphasized: The tenant never paid the overstated amount. The tenant did not rely on the incorrect figure. The tenant believed he owed nothing and stopped paying rent altogether. There was no evidence that the difference between $9,339.21 and $7,251.21 caused any specific, identifiable harm. Generalized assertions that the tenant’s credit was harmed were not enough. The Court noted the absence of evidence tying any credit impact to the overstatement, as opposed to the undisputed fact of nonpayment itself. Wrong number, corrected before judgment, no injury—no Chapter 75 claim. Why This Holding Matters Beyond Landlord-Tenant Law This is the part bankruptcy and consumer lawyers should underline. The opinion reinforces a trend that shows up repeatedly in Chapter 75 and FDCPA-adjacent litigation: technical violations are not self-executing damages triggers. North Carolina courts continue to insist on proof that the statutory violation actually mattered. For bankruptcy practitioners, the parallels are obvious: overstated proofs of claim, inflated pre-petition demand letters, incorrect payoff figures, sloppy post-default accounting. This case signals that while those errors may be improper—and may need to be corrected—they will not automatically support Chapter 75 liability without evidence of real, causally connected harm. The Rest of the Opinion (Why It Fades into the Background) The habitability, constructive eviction, and UDTPA claims all fell quickly because the tenant failed to challenge the trial court’s factual findings. Once those findings were binding, the appellate court had little choice but to affirm. Those sections are less doctrinally interesting and largely fact-bound. They matter to landlord-tenant practitioners, but they are not where this case earns its citation value. Bottom Line Horne is not a retreat from consumer protection law. It is a reminder that consumer protection statutes still require proof. A debt can be misstated and still be non-actionable. A collection error can exist without damages. And in North Carolina, Chapter 75 remains a powerful tool—but only when the plaintiff can show that the unfair act actually caused injury. For consumer and bankruptcy attorneys, that is the real takeaway—and the reason this otherwise routine rental dispute deserves a closer read. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document horne_v._ginkgo_aurora.pdf (184.25 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals

N.C. Ct. of App.: Roach v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. — When “That’s Not Right” Still Isn’t Enough (and Timing Is Everything) Ed Boltz Mon, 12/29/2025 - 19:35 In Roach v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the North Carolina Court of Appeals again draws a hard line between conduct that feels unfair and conduct that is legally actionable under Chapter 75. The court affirmed summary judgment for Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., holding that the borrowers’ grievances — however sympathetic — did not amount to unfair and deceptive trade practices. This is a foreclosure case with a long backstory, and that backstory matters. The Longer Backstory: Two Bankruptcies, No Durable Resolution What the Court of Appeals opinion understandably treats as background noise is, for consumer bankruptcy lawyers, a familiar and critical pattern. After the initial loan modification in 2011 and years of financial distress, Julie Roach filed two Chapter 13 cases in the Western District of North Carolina: Case No. 13-31410 (WDNC) Case No. 16-30128 (WDNC) Both cases were dismissed, apparently due to missed plan payments. That fact does not appear to have been disputed, and it quietly explains much of what followed. Repeated Chapter 13 filings that never complete often leave debtors in the worst possible posture: foreclosure delayed but not resolved, arrears growing larger, and servicer patience wearing thin. By the time the January 2016 foreclosure sale occurred, the Roaches were already deep into the cycle of “almost saved, but not quite.” The State-Court Claims: Chapter 75 as a Last Line of Defense Fast forward several years, and the Roaches sued Wells Fargo under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1, arguing two main theories: Misrepresentation — Wells Fargo allegedly said the foreclosure sale would be postponed if “proof of funds” and a “gift letter” were submitted. Wrongful denial of reinstatement — the deed of trust allegedly allowed reinstatement during the upset-bid period. The Court of Appeals rejected both theories, and in doing so reiterated several principles that bankruptcy and consumer lawyers ignore at their peril. Why the Chapter 75 Claim Failed 1. “Eleventh-Hour” Efforts Are Not Deception The court emphasized that: Plaintiffs had long notice of the foreclosure sale. Wells Fargo had no obligation to negotiate or postpone at all. The documents submitted at the last minute were, at best, conditional and incomplete. Even assuming Wells Fargo said it would “review” documents, proceeding with the sale did not amount to substantial aggravating circumstances. Without that extra layer of egregious conduct, Chapter 75 simply does not apply. As the court essentially said: this may feel wrong, but it is not deceptive under North Carolina law. 2. Reinstatement Rights Live (and Die) in Contract Law The reinstatement argument failed for a different reason. Even if the deed of trust allowed reinstatement: A power-of-sale foreclosure is contractual, not judicial. Any wrongful refusal to reinstate would therefore be breach of contract, not an unfair trade practice. A breach claim — notably — was not what plaintiffs pled. Once again, pleading strategy mattered. The Missing Piece: Timing and the Mortgage Modification Program Perhaps the most striking feature of this case is when it all happened. Julie Roach’s second Chapter 13 case was dismissed in 2018 — just as the Western District of North Carolina’s Mortgage Modification Program (MMP) was being implemented. For those of us practicing in WDNC, the irony is hard to miss. Had the case survived long enough to meaningfully engage the MMP: There would have been structured deadlines and formal servicer accountability. Communication failures and “fax black holes” would have been less likely. Modification review would have occurred inside the bankruptcy case, not in the shadows of an imminent foreclosure sale. And, critically, the process might have produced a sustainable payment that made plan success — and case completion — possible. Instead, the Roaches were caught in the older system: informal loss-mitigation conversations, inconsistent representations, and last-minute scrambling with catastrophic consequences. Why This Case Matters to Bankruptcy Lawyers Roach is not just a Chapter 75 decision. It is a cautionary tale about what happens when distressed homeowners run out of procedural guardrails. It reinforces that: Chapter 75 is not a substitute for a viable bankruptcy strategy. Repeated dismissed Chapter 13s weaken, rather than strengthen, a borrower’s position. Once foreclosure occurs, state-law remedies narrow dramatically. Programs like the WDNC Mortgage Modification Program exist precisely to prevent this kind of end-stage collapse — but only if the case lasts long enough to use them. Bottom Line The Court of Appeals closed with a telling observation: the dispute boiled down to moral unease versus legal entitlement — and entitlement won. From a bankruptcy perspective, the deeper lesson is this: Timing matters. Programmatic tools matter. And surviving long enough in Chapter 13 to use them can make all the difference. By the time the Roaches reached Chapter 75, the foreclosure had already happened — and North Carolina law was no longer inclined to rescue them. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document roach_v._wells_fargo.pdf (172.35 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals