Bankr. E.D.N.C.: In re Dupree Farms- Administrative Exhaustion Ed Boltz Thu, 09/26/2024 - 17:37 Summary: The decision centers on a dispute over a crop insurance policy, with Dupree Farms alleging that ProAg misrepresented insurance coverage, leading to reduced payouts. Dupree Farms sought damages for negligent misrepresentation, intentional misrepresentation, and other claims. The court found that federal crop insurance regulations preempted state law claims, and Dupree Farms had not obtained the necessary determination of non-compliance from the Federal Crop Insurance Corporation (FCIC), which is a prerequisite for seeking extra-contractual damages. The FCIC had issued a "No Authority Finding," meaning it could not issue such a determination under the policy in question. As Dupree Farms had not met this requirement, the court granted ProAg’s motion for summary judgment, dismissing Dupree Farms' claims.  Commentary: This seems to  be in the same vein as many other cases which require some form of administrative exhaustion  before seeking judicial review,  including in consumer litigation,  see Brown v. Western Sky regarding Tribal Exhaustion, or bankruptcy. Following the Loper Bright decision by the SCOTUS overturning the Chevron deference,   a closer look at whether the regulations,  such as in this case at 7 C.F.R. Part 400 Subpart P,  creating an obligation to first proceed through "administrative exhaustion"  comply with actual statutory grants. For more regarding this case,  see also Bankr. E.D.N.C: Dupree Farms v. Producers Ag- Jurisdiction for Post-Confirmation Disputes With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document dupree_farms_v_._producers_agriculture_insurance.pdf (324.62 KB) Category Eastern District

Law Review: Argyle, Bronson, Indarte, Sasha, Iverson, Benjamin and Palmer Christopher- Explaining Racial Disparities in Personal Bankruptcy Outcomes Ed Boltz Mon, 09/23/2024 - 18:37 Available at:  http://web.mit.edu/cjpalmer/www/AIIP-Bankruptcy-Bias.pdf Abstract: We document substantial racial disparities in consumer bankruptcy outcomes and investigate  the role of racial bias in contributing to these disparities. Using data on the near universe of US bankruptcy cases and deep-learning imputed measures of race, we show that Black filers are 16 and 3 percentage points (pp) more likely to have their bankruptcy cases dismissed without any debt relief in Chapters 13 and 7, respectively. We uncover strong evidence of racial homophily in Chapter 13: Black filers are 7 pp more likely to be dismissed when randomly assigned to a White bankruptcy trustee. To interpret our findings, we develop a general decision model and new identification results relating homophily to bias. Our homophily approach is particularly useful in settings where traditional outcomes tests for bias are not feasible because the decision-maker’s objective is not well defined or the decision-relevant outcome is unobserved. Using this framework and our homophily estimate, we conclude that at least 37% of the 16 pp dismissal gap is due to either taste-based or inaccurate statistical racial discrimination. Commentary: To start with,  it is necessary  to bear in mind that these findings do not assert that bankruptcy judges or Chapter 13 Trustees are systematically and overtly racist, but subject to the same implicit biases, racial and otherwise, as the rest of us humans.   The authors instead identify at least three possible implicit and often subconscious bases for these statistical gaps: Taste-based Racial Bias:  This can arise if the race of the filer alters the utility she receives when a particular outcome is realized,  e.g., a trustee dislikes fraud more when committed by a Black filer).  Inaccurate  Statistical Discrimination: This can result in dismissals if decision makers have inaccurate beliefs about how a filer’s race predicts the outcomes they care about.  Accurate Statistical Discrimination: Here, while a filer's race may accurately predict differential likelihoods of outcomes, decision makers value any statistical discrimination remains potentially problematic given that the non-race characteristics used in statistical discrimination models are themselves often the product of historical discrimination. This is a long need supplement to the earlier finding by  Jean Braucher, Dov Cohen, and Robert M Lawless in “Race, attorney influence, and bankruptcy chapter choice,” Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 2012, 9 (3), 393–429,  which found that the the implicit racial biases of consumer debtor attorneys influence the chapter choices made by debtors, with a key difference being that  this paper "focus[es] on documenting disparities after an individual has entered bankruptcy while holding constant all filer characteristics that existed at the time of the bankruptcy filing."   As such, the racial differences found "arise mostly due to the bankruptcy system itself rather than choices that consumers make prior to filing."  These differences can include, for example,  White trustees exercising their discretion in part by allowing lower expenses by Black filers, leading to requiring higher required payments to creditors. It is,  however,  worth noting that the authors, in assessing when any implicit racial biases might come into play in a Chapter 13 case,  do inaccurately assert that Chapter 13 cases "require a confirmation hearing to approve the Chapter 13 plan",  when, in fact the vast majority of Chapter 13 cases are confirmed without an actual hearing,  especially one where the debtor appears personally before the bankruptcy judge.  Additionally,  the article assumes that it is  the Means Test  or structural barriers that deter debtors from filing Chapter 7 instead of Chapter 13,  when in most cases Chapter 13 cases are filed either to cure delinquencies on home and vehicle loans (which cannot easily be done in Chapter 7) or because property exemptions are insufficient.  Repeating my regular refrain,  the academic authors of this article would certainly have benefited from direct engagement with the various boots on the ground actors in the bankruptcy system. Also, as always with my posts regarding math-heavy law review articles such as this,  I plead complete ignorance regarding the statistical analyses,  especially as in this article,  deep-learning AI was extensively used to both identify the race of debtors, judges and trustees,  but also to evaluate outcome.  I leave to others more competent to parse and dissect that most important aspect of this research. Ultimately,  while the authors do conclude with several policy recommendations,  including increasing diversity in among trustees and judges and collecting more direct and clear debtor demographics (a long sought dream in the Ivory Tower) to better diagnose disparities of all types,  the vital first real step would be the recognition by those trustees and judges that they are not immune to implicit biases and must confront and struggle against these, just as we all must.   With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document explaining_racial_disparities_in_personal_bankruptcy_outcomes.pdf (729.98 KB) Document explaining_racial_disparities_in_personal_bankruptcy_outcomes_presentation_to_cfpb.pdf (193.09 KB)

E.D.N.C.: Conway v. Palczuk- Law of the Case Doctrine Ed Boltz Mon, 09/23/2024 - 18:34 Summary: The District Court affirmed a bankruptcy court's judgment, which held that the Conways, through their lawsuit, violated the discharge injunction protecting John and Karen Palczuk after their Chapter 11 bankruptcy discharge. The Palczuks had filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 2011 and were discharged in 2012. The Conways did not participate in the bankruptcy process, but in 2018, they sued the Palczuks in state court regarding a failed business venture that predated the bankruptcy, arguing the debt was nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(19), which pertains to securities law violations. The bankruptcy court ruled that the Conways’ lawsuit violated the discharge injunction, which protects the debtor from post-discharge collection actions. The Conways appealed, claiming that their claims were not discharged under § 523(a)(19). The District Court, however, held that the “law of the case” doctrine,  which provides that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern the same issues in subsequent stages in the same case.  As applicable  in this case, meant that the bankruptcy court had already ruled on the dischargeability issue in a prior 2022 decision.  The district court rejected the Conways' arguments that the 2002 decision was clearly erroneous  as it may decline to follow the law of the case only where:  A subsequent trial produces substantially different evidence; A controlling authority has since made a contrary decision of law applicable to the issue; or  The prior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.  As the Conways violated the discharge injunction by asserting a securities violation,  not a §523(a)(19) claim,  the 2022 decision was not clearly erroneous and the bankruptcy court's sanctions award against the Conways for violating the discharge injunction was affirmed Commentary: Whether this law of the case analysis would help or hurt in appeals pending in the wake of Trantham v. Tate  regarding non-standard provisions that contradict local rules may be addressed in cases currently pending at the Fourth Circuit. With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document conway_v._palczuk.pdf (182.74 KB) Category Eastern District

Law Review: Langston, Nicole, Welfare Debt (June 27, 2024). Forthcoming, 113 California Law Review (2025), Vanderbilt Law Research Paper No. 24-30 Ed Boltz Mon, 09/23/2024 - 16:54 Available at:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=4878756  Summary: Past-due child support debt cannot be forgiven, or discharged, in bankruptcy. This policy is grounded in the assumption that all child support debt goes to a parent taking care of a child. However, billions of dollars of unpaid child support debt are not owed to the parent, but instead to the government. The government is owed this debt through a welfare cost recovery system which requires custodial parents that file for welfare benefits to pursue child support from noncustodial parents and assign those rights to the government. This debt, which I coin "welfare debt," oftentimes results in an increased interaction with the criminal justice system, including a cycle of incarceration and criminal fines and fees. The individuals that are stuck in this welfare debt-incarceration cycle follow recognizable racial and socioeconomic lines of vulnerability and marginalization. For the bankruptcy system to uphold its normative principle of forgiving burdensome debt for the most economically vulnerable individuals, welfare debt must be forgiven. Commentary: This article pairs with and continues the discussion of  more generally discharging government debt by Prof. Langston in Discharging Government Debt. Unmentioned,  however, in this article is that pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1322(a)(4), a Chapter 13 may provide that domestic support obligations (DSO) assigned to a government unit under 11 U.S.C.  §507(a)(1)(B),  while remaining priority and non-dischargeable claims,  need not be paid in full or at all during the 60-months of the case.  This falls well short of the author's argument for allowing the discharge of these assigned DSO claims held by government units on the same terms as taxes, but it does often allow a debtor, without harm to his or her children,  to defer repayment of these amounts to the government for as long as five years, which may afford time to both resolve the other debts (usually secured claims for mortgage arrearages or delinquencies on  vehicle loans) and hopefully see an increase in the debtor's income. With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document welfare_debt.pdf (730.29 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Law Review: Ozel, N. Bugra, Depositor Confidence and Creditor Rights: Evidence from State Bankruptcy Exemptions (March 15, 2024). Ed Boltz Sat, 09/21/2024 - 18:41 Available at:  https://ssrn.com/abstract=4866943  Summary: Banking theories highlight the critical role of depositor confidence in maintaining financial stability. In this study, I examine how banks' legal rights during borrower bankruptcies influence depositor confidence and market dynamics. Exploiting staggered changes in U.S. state bankruptcy exemptions for personal bankruptcies from 1994 to 2023 as a quasi-natural experiment, I find that increases in exemptions lead to significant declines in uninsured deposits. I estimate that raising exemptions in the least generous state to match those in the most generous state could decrease uninsured deposits at an average bank by between 2.5 and 6.1 percentage points. The effect is amplified for banks with larger consumer/credit card lending, smaller banks, and banks with lower capital ratios. Conversely, banks specializing in mortgage or agricultural lending, which are less affected by bankruptcy exemptions, experience no significant change in uninsured deposits. In further support of these observations, I find that the enactment of a 2005 federal law that strengthened creditor rights led to an increase in uninsured deposits. Finally, I show that higher exemptions are associated with greater consumer lending concentration, suggesting a shift towards greater specialization amid increased market frictions. These findings underscore the impact of legal frameworks governing creditor rights on depositor confidence and the competitive landscape of lending markets. Commentary: Worth attention is that this study looks only at the impact on uninsured deposits at banks,  which, according to  FDIC reports, account for only  approximately 44% of all funds held. As the FDIC insurance limit is $250,000  the vast majority by both number and amount of  all depositors are insured,  with uninsured depositors certainly being more sophisticated and likely institutional or corporate, thus less prone to causing bank runs and instability.   Additionally,  it is unclear if the FDIC,  which is through its insurance indirectly the most sophisticated of depositors,  or any other bank regulators view higher exemptions as presenting any substantial increased risk of bank failure and require those banks to price credit higher. Further,  while many banks maintain both lending and depository functions,  many other financial institutions, including some of the largest,  are purely lenders with no other banking activities  or with lending segregated into separate corporate entities.   This research also pays scant attention to the mobility of debtors (who, even with the  requirement of 11 U.S.C. §522(b)(3)(A) that an individual to be continuously domiciled in a state for at least 730 days to use its exemptions, do routinely move to other states) and the nationwide reach of many, if not most, lenders,  who neither show evidence of higher interest rates or other restrictions for borrowers,  either at the inception of a loan or by changing terms (positively or negatively) for those that move to another state. Lastly,  to the extent that BAPCPA actually did increase the confidence of uninsured depositors by a whopping 1.3%,  all of us are still waiting to see the mythical $400 a year in annual savings promised by MBNA/Bank of America. With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document depositor_confidence_and_creditor_rights_evidence_from_state_bankruptcy_exemptions_compressed.pdf (679.2 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

N.C. Ct. of App.: Patel v. Patel-Assignment of Judgment to One Debt Is Unenforceable Ed Boltz Sat, 09/21/2024 - 18:39 Summary: In Patel v. Patel (2024), the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed a lower court’s decision that granted judgment on the pleadings to Dhirajlal Patel, the plaintiff, in his attempt to renew a 2012 judgment against co-debtors Kiran Patel, Sandip Patel, and Shiv Investments, Inc. The original 2012 judgment stemmed from a commercial loan default. After the judgment, Dhirajlal purchased the judgment from the creditor (Bank of the Carolinas) for less than the full amount owed, despite being one of the co-debtors. He then sought to enforce the judgment against the other co-debtors. The defendants argued that Dhirajlal, as a co-debtor, was barred from enforcing the judgment, and the appellate court agreed, holding that when a debtor acquires a judgment against himself and co-debtors, the debt is considered satisfied, and the judgment is extinguished. Therefore, Dhirajlal could not renew or enforce the judgment and was only entitled to seek contribution from his co-debtors for the amount he paid. The Court of Appeals,  relying on a trio of rather hoary  old cases, Hoft v. Mohn, 215 N.C. 397, 2 S.E.2d 23 (1939),  Sherwood v. Collier, 14 N.C. 380, 382 (1832), and Scales v. Scales, 218 N.C. 553, 554–55 11 S.E.2d 569, 570 (1940),  found that the following principles emerge:  (1) A judgment on a debt extinguishes, unless it is preserved by statutory process, when the amount owed under the judgment is satisfied.  (2) If a debt is transferred to its debtor, the amount owed as a liability merges into the debtor’s assets, the debt no longer exists, and there is no longer any amount owed on any judgment for that debt; the judgment ceases to exist.  (3) If a co-debtor pays any amount to his judgment creditor and causes the judgment to extinguish, it may only function as a payment in full satisfaction of the debt, and he is entitled not to subrogation of the entire amount of the debt or the entire amount paid, but to a ratable contribution from his co-debtors. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court’s order in favor of Dhirajlal, ruling that the judgment no longer existed, and he should have sought contributions rather than enforcing the expired judgment. Commentary: As the Court of Appeals discusses,  in 2023 North Carolina codified   at N.C.G.S. § 1B-7 a simplified means obtaining contribution payments from non-paying co-debtors, requiring only that a notation be made on the judgment docket to preserve the judgment as a lien against non-paying co-debtors.  Alternatively,  Dhirajlal Patel  could have brought a timely suit against Kiran Patel for a prorated contribution for the amount paid  or arguably could have had a third party,  who was not a debtor,  purchase the judgment. With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document patel_v._patel.pdf (130.97 KB) Category NC Business Court

One of the most frustrating parts about foreclosure is that it is a long and complicated process. You might not know when or how it begins or when it can be expected to end. Generally, most people have at least a few months from the time foreclosure begins to the time it ends, and they can use that time to either fight the foreclosure with a lawyer or plan their next move when it is all over. Under federal law, when a bank or other lender initiates foreclosure because of delinquent mortgage payments, they cannot complete foreclosure until the borrower is more than 120 days delinquent. However, many borrowers can delay foreclosure by challenging it. Maybe you want to work out an agreement with the bank to wait longer while you get funds together. Maybe you decide to file for bankruptcy, which may slow the foreclosure process. Foreclosures usually do not happen overnight, and you should have some time to find a lawyer and figure out how to protect your home. For a free initial review of your case, call Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates at (215) 701-6519 and talk to our Pennsylvania mortgage foreclosure defense lawyers. How Much Time it Takes to Foreclose on a Home in Pennsylvania The foreclosure process must follow a specific set of rules and procedures, and these procedures are largely the same for everyone. Even so, different people get through the foreclosure process at different times. Some might complete the process relatively quickly. Others might spend more time in foreclosure, especially if their situation is more legally complicated. Slowing Down the Foreclosure Process One important factor for anyone facing foreclosure in Pennsylvania is the court system. Pennsylvania is a judicial foreclosure state, meaning all foreclosure proceedings must go through the courts. Foreclosures in Pennsylvania begin like a lawsuit, and the bank must file a claim against you. If and when this happens, our Pennsylvania mortgage foreclosure lawyers will help you file an answer and challenge the foreclosure. The fact that your case must go through the courts might buy you some extra time. Not only that, but the court’s schedule may play a role. If the court is busy and cannot hold foreclosure proceedings for weeks or months, your case will likely take longer to complete. One way to slow down the foreclosure process that you can actually control is by challenging the foreclosure. Banks or other lenders are sometimes too eager to foreclose, and they sometimes get started prematurely. If you have received the first foreclosure notice but have done nothing to warrant such a notice, tell a lawyer immediately. You might also slow down the process by filing for bankruptcy. When the federal bankruptcy court accepts a bankruptcy petition, the court issues an automatic stay under 11. U.S.C. § 362(a). The automatic stay is a court order that prevents creditors and banks from initiating legal action against you, and any currently pending action may be halted. If you are in foreclosure when you file for bankruptcy, the foreclosure process must stop, at least until the automatic stay is lifted. Speeding up a Foreclosure If you would rather get the foreclosure process over with as quickly as possible, you can help speed things along by not challenging the foreclosure. By not putting up a fight, your case will work its way through the courts much quicker. While this might seem like a bad idea, it is what some people want. If foreclosure is a losing battle, your efforts might be better spent on planning your life after the foreclosure rather than fighting it. If you do not challenge a foreclosure, it may be completed about 120 days from your initial notice. Under 12 C.F.R. § 1024.41(f), the bank may not legally foreclose on someone’s property unless they are more than 120 days delinquent with mortgage payments. Missing just one or two payments might get the bank’s attention, but they cannot foreclose at that time. How Foreclosures Usually Begin in Pennsylvania Foreclosure typically begins with a first notice from the bank. The notice, which will likely come in the mail, may be in response to a missed mortgage payment or something else that could trigger foreclosure. The first notice does not mean you are in foreclosure. It means that if you cannot catch up on mortgage payments in the next 120 days, the bank has the right to foreclose and may do so. If you have received such a notice, hire a lawyer immediately. Under the law mentioned above, a lender, creditor, or bank cannot legally foreclose on a house due to late mortgage payments until the borrower is more than 120 days delinquent. So, by federal law, the pre-foreclosure period must last at least 120 days. You may use this time to seek legal representation and meet with the bank to work out a solution. Banks typically just want to get paid, and if there is a way to make that happen for them, they may be willing to show leniency or otherwise work with you so you can avoid foreclosure. The first notice should explain what is wrong. If you are behind on payments, this should be explained in the notice. Not only that, but the notice usually explains what the borrower must do to avoid foreclosure, such as how much money they must pay the bank. Challenging a Home Foreclosure in Pennsylvania You can and should begin working against foreclosure as soon as you receive the first notice. This might be as simple as sending the bank your missed mortgage payments. Your situation might be more complicated if you do not have the money, which is a common problem. Hire a lawyer with experience fighting foreclosures. Retain all communications between you and the lender, which is often the bank. These communications may include emails, letters, and phone calls. Your time to fight the foreclosure may be limited, and the best way to challenge foreclosure will depend on your circumstances. Check with your attorney about how much time you have. It is possible the bank has miscalculated the time, and you are not yet 120 days late. It is also possible that there has been some mistake, and you should not be in foreclosure. Your lawyer can raise these issues and more in court. Contact Our Pennsylvania Mortgage Foreclosure Defense Lawyers for Help For a free initial review of your case, call Young, Marr, Mallis & Associates at (215) 701-6519 and talk to our Philadelphia mortgage foreclosure defense lawyers.

Bankr. W.D.N.C.: In re Hmok- Voluntary Sale Severs Tenancy by the Entireties Ed Boltz Wed, 09/18/2024 - 16:52 Summary: After previously approving the sale of the debtors' home, which was previously owned as tenants by the entirety, the  bankruptcy court subsequently their motion to modify their Chapter 13 plan,  ruling  that the proceeds from the voluntary sale were no longer protected by the tenancy by the entirety exemption. The debtors sought to keep the proceeds, arguing that the exemption applied to the sale proceeds. However, the court determined that pursuant to N.C.G.S 41-63(3) the Tenancy by the Entirety protections do not extend to cash proceeds from a voluntary sale.  The court contrasted this with an involuntary sale by a Chapter 7 Trustee, as in In re Surles (also attached), where the Tenancy by the Entirety protections were preserved as to the proceeds of the sale of the property. Consequently, the court further found that the sale of the property resulted in a substantial and unanticipated financial improvement, which justified modifying the plan to increase payments to unsecured creditors. Although the debtors' paltry homestead exemption was preserved, the court ordered the remaining proceeds to be distributed to the unsecured creditors.   Commentary: This case oddly could seem to urge Chapter 13 debtors (or at least one debtor) seeking to sell assets owned as Tenants by the Entireties  to convert to Chapter 7 first.  Then the Trustee might either force an involuntary sale,  paying only joint debts and the IRS,  but preserving the remainder of the proceeds from the creditors of only the individual debtors,  or, if there are no joint debts,  abandon the asset.  This would likely take longer for the sale to consummate,  but preserve greater assets for the debtors.  This approach might also be more beneficial as Chapter 13 Trustee often seem constrained,  whether by judicial oversight or their own perspective, in negotiating with debtors.  This concern seems  especially apt since in this case where the debtors appear to have been rather blindsided, with little hint when the motion to sell was granted that these proceeds would be lost.  Perhaps had the motion to sell property been filed contemporaneously with the motion to modify plan, the court would have tipped its hand in this regard,  giving the debtors the opportunity to reconsider the sale. With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_surles.pdf (153.43 KB) Document in_re_hmok.pdf (173.72 KB) Category Western District

Law Review: Gouzoules, Alexander, Choosing Your Judge (January 29, 2024). SMU Law Review, forthcoming 2024, University of Missouri School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2024-18, Stafford Patterson Wed, 09/18/2024 - 00:54 Available at:   https://ssrn.com/abstract=4876697    Abstract: Accounts of American litigation pose a contradiction: Forum shopping is acceptable, but judge shopping is not. Formal disfavor toward judge shopping is pervasive, and attempts by parties to manipulate the assignment of their case are deemed abusive and even sanctionable. Nevertheless, sophisticated judge-shopping tactics have proliferated in specific areas of the law—particularly in challenges to executive branch policies and in the reorganization of large companies under Chapter 11. In these disparate areas, judge-shopping strategies have been deployed in high-profile cases, ranging from a challenge to the FDA’s authorization of an abortion drug to the opioid-driven bankruptcy of Purdue Pharma. In these cases and others like them, plaintiffs used permissive venue rules to reach small geographical divisions where a single, preferred judge hears all or nearly all cases. These trends led to recent and contested proposals by the Judicial Conference to encourage random assignment. This article first introduces a framework to distinguish between types of judge shopping, explaining why some forms are more problematic than others. Then, it compares judge shopping across areas of law, examining the basis for common intuitions against the practice. It concludes that judge shopping in the regulatory context is especially concerning, with its attendant impact on national governance and its selection away from judicial expertise in administrative law. In contrast, in bankruptcy cases, judge shopping can be disentangled from other controversial—and independently fixable—bankruptcy problems. When examined as a conceptually independent issue, judge shopping in the bankruptcy context raises relatively fewer concerns. Having concluded that judge shopping is more problematic in some areas than others, this article examines potential reforms to address it, including and in addition to the Judicial Conference’s recent recommendations. Alternative possibilities include the abolition of single-judge divisions, reforms to venue statutes, the use of three-judge district court panels to review certain cases, and the granting of judicial peremptory strikes.   Commentary:   While citing to two cases of judge shopping by consumers,  this is article does not address that in many districts consumer debtors are far more restricted in even venue shopping than corporations are, to the extent that consumers are often subject to bench bondage, where a single  judge personally hostile in regards to a particular issue,  whether vesting,  student loan discharge, or even Chapter 13 in general,  can have as results as unfair as when corporations are able to hand-select a preferred bankruptcy judge. Again an example of the disparate treatment of Fake and Real People in Bankruptcy.    With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments

 CELSIUS PREFERENCE CLAWBACK ADVERSARY PROCEEDINGS As many readers of our posts are aware, we have represented numerous former Celsius customers who have been sued in preference clawback actions in Adversary Proceedings in the SDNY Bankruptcy Court.We have also been retained by clients who have settled their cases and asked us to review the 10-page Settlement Agreements.At Shenwick & Associates, our bankruptcy and crypto experience has aided us in settling many cases on very favorable terms for the defendants.Recently, the Bankruptcy Court held a hearing and determined that outstanding settlement offers will expire at 5:00 p.m. on October 15, 2024. We believe it is in the best interest of most defendants to settle their actions as soon as possible.Clients who are defendants can contact Jim Shenwick, Esq. to discuss pending lawsuits or settlements.Jim Shenwick, Esq  917 363 3391  [email protected] Please click the link to schedule a telephone call with me.https://calendly.com/james-shenwick/15minWe help individuals & businesses with too much debt!