In a display of pre-election bipartisanship, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a fraudulent transfer judgment in favor of Stanford International Bank Receiver Ralph Janvey against five Democratic and Republican campaign committees totaling approximately $1.6 million.    Janvey v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, Inc., No. 11-10704 (5th Cir. 10/23/12), which can be found here. While the opinion involved a receivership rather than a bankruptcy proceeding, the issues under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act have bankruptcy implications as well.The District Court granted summary judgment to the Receiver on claims that the contributions were made with actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud creditors.    The Receiver alleged, and the District Court agreed, that payments made as part of a Ponzi scheme are presumptively made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud.   According to the Receiver, this shifted the burden to the committees to show a defense such as good faith or reasonably equivalent value.   The Committees did not argue on appeal that the Stanford entities received reasonably equivalent value for their political contributions.   Unfortunately this meant that the opinion did not contain what would have been an interesting discussion of what contributors receive for their donations.   The Committees no doubt concluded that the political risks of arguing that fraudsters receive a reasonably equivalent benefit for their contributions was too dangerous to advance (even if it could have been factually supported).Instead, the Fifth Circuit addressed three issues.   First, the Court ruled that a Receiver, like a bankruptcy trustee, may pursue claims under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act on behalf of creditors.   The Committee had argued that the Receiver was not himself a creditor and therefore lacked standing to pursue the claims.Next, the Court concluded that the transfers were made within the applicable limitations period.    Under Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Section 24.010(a)(1), a plaintiff must institute an action to recover transfers under the intent to defraud provision within one year after the later of when the transfers were made or when they "reasonably could have been discovered by the claimant."    In this case, the Receiver was appointed on February 16, 2009 and filed suit on February 20, 2010.    The Committees argued that because records of  the contributions were available online and had been discussed in the media, that the Receiver should have known about them not later than February 18, 2009, which would have made the suit untimely.   Because February 16 was President's Day, the Receiver was not able to gain access to the Stanford offices until February 17.    While this would have given the Receiver two days to discover the fraud, the Fifth Circuit applied a more sympathetic standard.   It stated: Given the extent of the Stanford enterprises, the Receiver’s duties with regard to them, and the extent of the fraudulent transfers, it would not have been reasonable to expect him to immediately discover the fraud. Opinion, p. 7.   Furthermore, the Court noted that it was the Defendants' burden to prove the limitations defense which meant that they were required to prove when the Receiver should have discovered the fraud.   Apparently, three days to discover a fraud, even one based on publicly available records, was reasonable.   Because 11 U.S.C. Sec. 546 gives a bankruptcy trustee two years to commence an avoidance action, the benefit of the one year discovery rule is not readily apparent.    However, if a transfer took place more than one year prior to bankruptcy but was not readily discoverable during that time, a trustee could still file suit within two years after the order for relief.   Assume that a transfer was made on January 1, 2010 and the Debtor filed bankruptcy on January 1, 2012.    If creditors of the Debtor could not have discovered the transfer during the one year period prior to bankruptcy, then the trustee would have until January 1, 2014 to file suit.   While the discovery rule does not extend the trustee's period of time to file suit after bankruptcy is filed, it would extend the reach-back period for avoiding a transfer made prior to bankruptcy.    Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that federal election law did not preempt TUFTA.    The Federal Campaign Act of 1971 preempts "any provision of State law with respect to election to federal office."    Unfortunately for the Committees, the Court held that generally applicable fraudulent transfer laws are not state laws "with respect to election to federal office."   The Court also held that the federal election laws do not occupy the field of election law so thoroughly as to preempt the suit.   The Court wrote that the federal election law did not apply to a contributor using an impermissible source of funds as opposed to the committee making an improper use of those funds.   Further, the Court noted that the committees' argument would lead to the absurd result that funds "stolen by force or fraud" would be protected so long as the committees otherwise complied with election law.Because firms likely to fail have been known to curry favor by making political contributions, this opinion may help trustees avoid preemption arguments in the future.  

Upper Crust Pizza files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. Upper Crust is a Boston based chain of pizza parlors. Prior to the filing, they operated 17 locations. As part of the restructuring of those locations has been closed. This company plans to keep operating the other 16 locations. The filing of a bankruptcy petition under [...]

The Fifth Circuit has added a new decision to its judicial estoppel jurisprudence, holding that a creditor that submitted claims in different amounts in successive cases was not estopped.   While it may seem that the court is applying the estoppel doctrine in an uneven manner, penalizing debtors but not creditors, the decision faithfully follows the elements laid out by the court.    Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Oparaji (Matter of Oparaji), No. 11-20871 (5th Cir. 10/5/12), which can be found here.   What HappenedThe Debtor Titus Chinedu Oparaji filed a chapter 13 proceeding on September 2, 2004 (“First Case”).   During the First Case, he fell behind on his mortgage payments to Wells Fargo.   Over time, Wells Fargo filed several amended claims and the Debtor filed several modified plans.   The amended claims filed by Wells Fargo understated the amount of the post-petition arrearages.  When the Debtor failed to complete his plan payments within five years, the First Case was dismissed.After the First Case was dismissed, the Debtor continued to miss payments to Wells Fargo.  On February 1, 2010, the Debtor filed his second chapter 13 case (“Second Case”).   By this time, the arrearage owed to Wells Fargo had grown to $86,003.25.   The Debtor argued that based on the claims filed in the First Case that the arrearage could not possibly be that high.   The Bankruptcy Court found that Wells Fargo was bound by the claims filed in the First Case under the doctrine of judicial estoppel and the District Court affirmed.The RulingThe Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that Wells Fargo had not “asserted a legally inconsistent position that was accepted by the Bankruptcy Court.”   Opinion, p. 6.   The elements of judicial estoppel are: (1)  a party asserts a legal position that is “plainly inconsistent” with the position taken in another case; (2) the court in the other case accepted the party’s original position; and (3) the inconsistent positions were not taken inadvertently.The Court found that a creditor who files a post-petition claim in one case is not estopped from asserting a higher claim in a subsequent case.   Under section 1305(a), a creditor may file a post-petition claim but is not required to.   This contrasts with the common scenario where a debtor omits an asset.   While a debtor must list all assets in its schedules, the creditor is not under a duty to amend its proof of claim to include post-petition arrearages.   The Debtor argued that while Wells Fargo was not required to file a post-petition claim, that once it did so, it was required to include all post-petition amounts.   The Fifth Circuit distinguished the Oparaji case from In re Burford, 231 B.R. 913 (N.D. Tex. 1999).  In Burford, the confirmation order required the creditor to create a payment schedule that would “fully retire the debt.”   However, in this case, the creditor submitted a claim without expressly representing that there were no additional amounts owing.Because Wells Fargo never asserted that the amount contained in its post-petition claim constituted all the amounts owed, the Fifth Circuit found that it had not asserted inconsistent positions.   As a result, judicial estoppel did not apply.    The Court went further and found that even if Wells Fargo had asserted inconsistent positions, the dismissal of the First Case meant that the parties were returned to their position status quo ante.  What It MeansJudicial estoppel is meant to prevent parties from gaming the system. While, on the surface, it might appear that Wells Fargo took inconsistent positions, its inconsistency was not legally significant.  Wells Fargo’s only fault was that they did not assert their rights in the First Case as aggressively as they could have.   Had the Debtor completed its plan in the First Case, the parties and the Court would have had a difficult time sorting out which post-petition defaults were included in the plan and which ones were not.   Had the Debtor filed an “all current” motion at the conclusion of its plan and obtained an order, it could have bound Wells Fargo.  However, neither one of these occurred.   The Debtor did not complete its plan and it did not obtain a determination that it was current on its mortgage.   As a general rule, a dismissed case should rarely, if ever, give rise to judicial estoppel.   By definition, a dismissed case is one in which no party obtains relief (although the debtor enjoyed the benefits of the automatic stay for a period of time).    If a party does not obtain relief, then it is hard to say that the court accepted the party’s position in any meaningful respect.   The real benefit of this case may be for debtors who omit a creditor or an asset in an initial case and then accurately disclose it in a subsequent case.   In that instance, Oparaji should be good precedent that judicial estoppel will not apply.

  Life has a way of moving on, even when the client is in a Chapter 13. Assets come and go, life gets better or sometimes worse. The direction of travel changes. When a Chapter 13 case converts to Chapter 7, bankruptcy lawyers struggle with what assets the Chapter 7 trustee can liquidate. The facts in Warfield v. Salazar illustrate the problem: the debtors filed Chapter 13 when they were entitled to a pre petition tax refund. They did not succeed in confirming a plan and the case converted.  Only between filing and conversion, they had received and spent the tax refund. The Chapter 7 trustee made demand on the debtors for the amount of the refund. There was no contention that the right to the refund wasn’t property of the estate as of the commencement of the case.  But at conversion, it no longer existed. Both the bankruptcy court and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel held that the plain language of 348(f) controlled:  Except as provided in paragraph (2), when a case under chapter 13 of this title is converted to a case under another chapter under this title— (A) property of the estate in the converted case shall consist of property of the estate, as of the date of filing of the petition, that remains in the possession of or is under the control of the debtor on the date of conversion; The refund didn’t exist as of the conversion date and therefore the debtor has no obligation to turn over its value to the Chapter 7 trustee. In the absence of bad behavior that lend to the loss of the asset, the plain language of the statute prevails. Note too how 348 deals with one of the other condundrums of Chapter 13:  the provisions of §1306  that property of the estate includes all property acquired during the Chapter 13 and all earnings after the commencement of the case. Suppose the debtor has prospered during the 13 and has twice the cash on hand at conversion that he had at filing.  Or he inherited property more than 6 months after filing, or he received a gift or other windfall. Section 348 provides that the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion is limited to the assets the debtor had at filing and still has at conversion. Not only does 348 simplify our analysis, but it assures the debtor, worried about the reach of 13 into their post filing life, that the good that comes after filing but before conversion is not lost to creditors. Image courtesy of InAweOfGod’sCreation. Like This Article? You'll Love These! What You Need To Know About Converted Cases Exemptions & Property of the Estate Convert, Don’t Dismiss, That Bankruptcy Case

Letters in the client’s mailbox superficially offer great news:  the junior mortgage will be forgiven! That good news just adds on a new facet to our job description:  spotting possible  tax consequences and alternatives for our clients by reason of  tax on cancellation of debt. As  the National Mortgage Settlement  gains momentum, we can expect to encounter this more often. The topic is huge and the taxes nominally involved may swamp all the other unsecured debt that a prospective client has. All I can do here is outline the issues and the resources for further study.  Master this area and your clients will think you walk on water. In the beginning We start with the principle that when debt is forgiven, the amount forgiven is treated for tax purposes as if it was received in cash by the debtor.  It is included in income and subject to tax  IRC 108 lists the statutory exceptions to that rule, including our stock in trade: bankruptcy.  Debts forgiven in bankruptcy do not cause the inclusion of  the forgiven debt in income. Foreclosure Your clients may be surprised or dismayed to learn that a foreclosure may result  not only in the loss of the property but in a tax bill to boot. Where the value of real estate has fallen dramatically, a foreclosure not involving bankruptcy may generate a 1099-C  (the statement of the amount of cancelled debt) for the difference between the loan balance and the deemed fair market value of the property.  Six digit numbers are easily possible. Therein is one of the stellar qualities of a bankruptcy solution to debt.  If the individual’s personal liability for a junior mortgage loan is discharged in bankruptcy, should the debt be subject to a foreclosure in the future, no tax consequences ensue.  It is also one of the reasons that I have taken clients with no significant, existing debt, into bankruptcy before the inevitable foreclosure.  The bankruptcy discharge will insulate them from tax on the difference between the mortgage balance and the fair market value of the property. Qualified principal residence safe harbor When the foreclosure crisis started, perhaps  the  only useful Congressional response was creating an exclusion from inclusion in taxable income for qualified debt on a taxpayer’s principal residence. The exclusion only applies to debt used to buy, build or substantially improve the home.    So, if the debt is a refinance, your client may not qualify. Further, the provision is set to expire at the end of 2012. Insolvency Another exception to the rule that cancelled debt is included in gross income for tax purposes is insolvency.  If the debtor is insolvent, the cancelled debt is not included.  The non obvious trap here is that retirement assets are included in the balance sheet test.  So, your client may think he has nothing, but if there is a fat 401(k), they may not be as broke as they think they are.  The worksheet for calculating insolvency for these purposes is found in IRS publication 4681. So, if you have the opportunity to counsel a homeowner who has received an announcement that their line of credit loan is being cancelled, point out the issues to them.  Look at the alternatives and be prepared to send them to sophisticated tax advisors who can assess the tax consequences of the disappearing debt. Image courtesy of Pixabay.  Like This Article? You'll Love These! Beware The Taxes That Follow Foreclosure Lien on Phantom Property Upsets Debt Totals How Long Can Underwater Lien Hold Its Breath?

There was the dot com bubble, the housing bubble, now the student loan bubble. Student loan debt has grown dramatically in the recent past. In 2010 student loan debt exceeded credit card debt. In 2011 it surpassed auto loans. There is now more than one trillion dollars in student debt according to the Consumer Financial [...]

If you are not current on your car payments, your options will depend greatly on the type of bankruptcy you choose. If Chapter 7 bankruptcy is right for you, because you have mostly unsecured debt or would like to complete the process quickly, you may be wondering whether you have to surrender your car in [...]

Filing for bankruptcy is a huge decision, that will have an impact on your life for years to come. This impact can be good, and it can also be bad. For most people, it is a huge relief with some negative side effects. But no matter what your situation, below are a list of things [...]

Continuing our series of e-mails on real estate workouts, many clients are concerned about potential exposure to deficiency judgments resulting from real estate foreclosures. The New York law that deals with deficiency judgments is § 1371 of the Real Property Actions & Proceedings Law. The law provides that: 1. A plaintiff in a mortgage foreclosure action may bring an action for a deficiency judgment if the defendant has been personally served in the action. 2. The action for the deficiency judgment must be made within 90 days after the foreclosure sale. 3. The law provides that the deficiency judgment shall be equal to the amount the defendant is liable to the plaintiff (as determined by the judgment), plus interest, plus the amount owing on any subordinate liens and encumbrances, including interest, costs and disbursements, including referee's fees, less the market value of the property as determined by the court at the time of the foreclosure sale. Accordingly, if the value of the property is greater than the deficiency owed, the plaintiff will not be able to obtain a deficiency judgment. Notwithstanding the language in RPAPL § 1371, before commencing deficiency judgment actions, secured creditors (such as banks) go through a calculation. They ask themselves the following questions: 1. If we bring a deficiency action, does the defendant have assets or earnings to satisfy the judgment? For example, if the bank believes that the defendant will file Chapter 7 personal bankruptcy to protect his or her assets, or if the defendant is "judgment proof," then they will not commence the action. Some borrowers who do have the ability to pay some or all of the judgment will come forward and offer to settle before an action for deficiency is commenced. 2. Does the defendant have the potential for good future earnings (such as a medical doctor), such that if the creditor obtains the judgment (which is good for 20 years under New York State law), they will be able to collect the judgment from future earnings? 3. What is the fair market value of the property? As mentioned above, the court will determine the fair market value at the time of the foreclosure sale, which can become a battle of appraisals, so creditors must prepare to bring in expert witnesses to testify on this issue. 4. How long will it take and how much will it cost to obtain and collect the judgment? 5. Is the deficiency a result of a "strategic default"? A "strategic default" involves a borrower who has the ability to pay his or her mortgage but chooses not to. Often that decision is tied directly to the property being "underwater" (the fair market value of the property is less than the outstanding liens encumbering the property (mortgages, home equity lines of credit, etc.)). Loan originators rely heavily on their servicers (the entities that are responsible for day–to–day management of mortgage accounts) to determine if a borrower is a strategic defaulter and then makes a determination whether to seek a deficiency judgment. Clients or colleagues having questions about deficiency judgments should not hesitate to contact Jim Shenwick.

The Fifth Circuit has affirmed a $1 million fee enhancement to a chief restructuring officer who achieved results described as “rare and exceptional.”  Matter of Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 11-10774 (5th Cir. 8/10/12).   The opinion can be found here.   The Court rejected the argument that a recent Supreme Court opinion on fee shifting precluded enhancements and, in the process, set forth a comprehensive framework for allowance of professional fees in bankruptcy.   Curiously, the opinion did not mention the Court’s opinion in Matter of Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc., 157 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. 1998).What HappenedWhen Pilgrim’s Pride Company filed for chapter 11 relief in December 2008, its prospects did not look good.   It had lost about $1 billion the previous fiscal year and was incurring negative cash flow of $300 million a year.   The Debtors anticipated that unsecured creditors would receive, at best, a debt for equity swap, and that equity would be cancelled.    CRG Partners, LLC was engaged as chief restructuring officer.    Just over a year later, the company confirmed a plan which paid all secured and unsecured creditors in full and distributed equity interests valued at $450 million to the pre-petition shareholders.   After the plan was confirmed, CRG requested that it be allowed compensation of $5.98 million plus an enhancement of $1 million.    The Debtor’s Board of Directors supported the enhancement.   The U.S. Trustee objected to the enhancement on the basis that CRG had already been adequately compensated through its lodestar-calculated fee.   The Bankruptcy Court denied the request for enhancement based on Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn, 130 S.Ct. 1662 (2010).   The District Court reversed, finding that Perdue was not binding in the bankruptcy context.On remand, the Bankruptcy Court approved the enhancement and the U.S. Trustee appealed.    The UST argued that Perdue precluded the enhancement.   The Fifth Circuit rejected the Trustee’s position and affirmed the Bankruptcy Court order approving the additional award.An Overview of Professional FeesIn reaching its conclusion that enhancements remained viable, the Court of Appeals provided an extensive discussion of the history of awards of professional fees in the Fifth Circuit.   Under the Bankruptcy Act, courts in the Fifth Circuit applied the twelve Johnson factors, which included such requirements as the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions, skill required, undesirability of the case and reputation of the attorneys.    In re First Colonial Corp. of America, 544 F.2d 1291, 1298-99 (5th Cir. 1977), quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974).   (Attorneys of a certain level of experience will remember preparing fee applications reciting the twelve Johnson/First Colonial factors even though many of them were usually irrelevant to the specific case).   While Johnson was a civil rights case, the First Colonial court found the factors to be “equally useful whenever the award of reasonable attorneys’ fees is authorized by statute.”     Id. at 1299.   While the same factors might be applicable, bankruptcy courts were advised to make awards at the lower end of the spectrum in light of the “strong policy of the Bankruptcy Act that estates be administered as efficiently as possible.”    Id.The lodestar method was recommended by another Act case, In re Lawler, 807 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1987).    Under the lodestar method, the Court determines a reasonable number of hours multiplied by a reasonable rate and then adjusts the resulting fee up or down based upon the other Johnsonfactors.When section 330(a) was adopted as part of the Bankruptcy Code, it retained the overall framework of compensation under the Act, but rejected the “economy of the estate” limitation.   This meant that bankruptcy lawyers could be compensated at the same rate as other skilled professionals.   Section 330(a) was amended in 1994 to include a list of six non-exclusive factors to be considered in awarding compensation and two instances in which the court should deny compensation.    Notwithstanding the statutory definition, the Fifth Circuit found that the prior case law and the statutory provisions provided a complimentary framework.Following the Bankruptcy Code’s enactment, we made clear that the lodestar, Johnson factors, and §330 coalesced to form the framework that regulates the compensation of professionals employed by the bankruptcy estate.   (citation omitted).   Under this framework, bankruptcy courts must first calculate the amount of the lodestar.   (citation omitted).    After doing so, the courts “then may adjust the lodestar up or down based on the factors contained in §330 and [their] consideration of the factors listed in Johnson.”   (citation omitted).    We have also emphasized that bankruptcy courts have “considerable discretion” when determining whether an upward or downward adjustment of the lodestar is warranted.Opinion, at p. 8.   The Court also conducted an historical analysis of fee enhancements in bankruptcy, finding that, although they were extraordinary, they had been allowed under both the Bankruptcy Act and the Code.    The Court noted that (I)f enhancements were possible when fees were awarded “at the lower end of the spectrum of reasonableness,” then they surely remained possible after that ceiling was removed and the statutory text was otherwise unchanged.Opinion, at p. 13.    The Court’s point is that because the Bankruptcy Act allowed enhancements despite the focus on economy of administration that it would be reasonable for enhancements to be allowed under the more liberal provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.In conclusion, the Court ruled that enhancements were a part of the process of upward or downward adjustment of the lodestar and remained available in extraordinary situations.In sum, we have consistently held that bankruptcy courts have broad discretion to adjust the lodestar upwards or downwards when awarding reasonable compensation to professionals employed by the estate pursuant to § 330(a). However, this discretion is far from limitless. Upward adjustments, for instance, are still only permissible in rare and exceptional circumstances--such as in Rose Pass Mines and Lawler, where the applicants had provided superior services that produced outstanding results--that are supported by detailed findings from the bankruptcy court and specific evidence in the record.Opinion, at 15.Sub Silentio and the Rule of Orderliness Having concluded that enhancements remained viable, the Court turned its attention to whether the Supreme Court had “unequivocally, sub silentio overruled our circuit’s bankruptcy precedent.”   Opinion, p. 15.    In Perdue, the Supreme Court rejected a request for an enhancement in a civil rights case.   In interpreting the term “reasonable fees” under 42 U.S.C. §1988, the Supreme Court noted that the courts had initially applied the twelve Johnsonfactors, but had transitioned to a lodestar approach in order to “cabin() the discretion of trial judges.”    The Supreme Court concluded that enhancements could be allowed under section 1988, but only where the hourly rate used in the lodestar calculation did not adequately measure the attorney’s true market value, where the litigation involved an “extraordinary” outlay of expenses and where there was an “exceptional delay” in payment, especially where that delay was due to the defense.    The Court also noted that in civil rights cases, the presumption should be against an enhancement because defendants would be less likely to settle if faced with an open-ended fee request and because civil rights judgments were often paid by the public rather than the defendant.    The Fifth Circuit found that Perdue did not apply in the bankruptcy context.   Relying on the rule of orderliness, as recently articulated in Technical Automation Services Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Insurance Corp., 673 F.3d 399 (5th Cir. 2012)(which held that Stern v. Marshall did not implicate the authority of Magistrate Judges), the Fifth Circuit found that Perdue was not directly on point and therefore did not compel the Court to abandon its prior precedent.   Among other things, the Court found that bankruptcy fee requests did not entail the same settlement considerations as civil rights cases and that the bankruptcy estate rather than the taxpayer would be paying the fees.   The Court also noted that while the term “reasonable fees” in section 1988 offered little guidance to courts, that section 330(a) of the Bankruptcy Code contained detailed criteria for awarding fees.   As a result, the Court concluded that until rescinded by a higher authority, fee enhancements were still possible in bankruptcy.   As a result, the Court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s enhanced fee award to CRG Partners.What It MeansIn the particular case, Pilgrim’s Pride means that a particular professional was recognized for doing an extraordinary job.    In the larger context, Pilgrim’s Pride is significant for what its historical analysis said for what it left unsaid.    From an historical perspective, Pilgrim’s Prideevidences the development of bankruptcy law as its own discipline.    As of 1977, both bankruptcy law and civil rights law followed the twelve Johnsonfactors.   In the intervening 35 years, bankruptcy has developed its own body of fee jurisprudence.    While both bankruptcy law and civil rights law moved from the Johnson factors to a primarily lodestar based approach, Congress saw fit to define bankruptcy standards in more detail.     The Pilgrim’s Pride decision recognizes that bankruptcy fees fulfill a different role than fees in civil rights cases.    While the Court did not fully articulate it, I believe the difference is this.   Bankruptcy is inherently a collective process in which scarce resources are marshaled for the benefit of the creditor body and (in some cases) equity.    Allowing enhanced fees in rare cases provides incentives for professionals to take on difficult cases and be recognized when they deliver superior results.   Civil rights cases, on the other hand, are focused on compensating a harm and are a zero sum proposition.   Every dollar paid to the plaintiffs and their attorneys is a dollar taken away from the defendants and, by extension, the taxpayers.    While civil rights actions should incentivize government actors to obey the law in future cases, this function is secondary to compensating the wronged individual.    In a bankruptcy case, the professional may not only allocate scarce resources according to an ordered scheme of priorities, but may actually increase the pool of resources.   In a civil rights case, it seems that counsel is focused on obtaining an equitable transfer of resources from one party to another.    Pilgrim’s Pride also curious because it does not mention the requirement that a professional demonstrate an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit to the bankruptcy estate” as required by In re Pro-Snax Distributors, Inc. in order to be compensated.   There is a tension between Pro-Snax and section 330(a)(4)(A)(i)(I) which mandates denial of fees for services not “reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate.”   There is a significant difference in requiring that services be “reasonably likely” to benefit the estate as opposed to actually yielding an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit.”    In the one instance, compensation is based on whether the services appeared to be reasonable at the time, while the other makes compensation contingent on results.    Pilgrim’s Pride discusses the Johnson factors, the lodestar test and the statutory provisions of section 330(a), but does not discuss Pro-Snax.  Judge Carl Stewart, who authored Pro-Snax, was on the panel that decided Pilgrim’s Pride.It is certainly possible that the panel did not see the need to discuss Pro-Snax for the reason that Pilgrim’s Pride was a case involving not just an “identifiable, tangible and material benefit,” but an extraordinary one at that.    However, given the Court’s comprehensive discussion of the framework for fees in bankruptcy and its contrast with fees in civil rights cases, the actual results requirement would seem to be a reasonable thing to mention.   My personal opinion (which is partially motivated by self-interest) is that the Pro-Snax panel never intended to impose an actual results requirement.    The Pilgrim’s Pride opinion discusses how “the lodestar, Johnson factors, and §330 coalesced to form the framework that regulates the compensation of professionals employed by the bankruptcy estate.”    Under Johnson, results were one of twelve factors to be considered.   Under section 330(a), the court is instructed to examine whether the services were “beneficial at the time” and whether they were “reasonably likely to benefit the debtor’s estate.”   The lodestar may be adjusted upwards or downwards based upon the results.    Given that results are a factor to be considered under each of these approaches, it is much more reasonable to conclude that the Pro-Snax panel meant to emphasize the importance of results but not to make them an absolute requirement.   At the very least, it will make for an interesting argument when the Court is asked directly to reconcile Pilgrim’s Pride, Pro-Snax and the language of section 330(a).Disclosure:   I have a case pending on appeal that raises the application of Pro-Snax.