Chapter 7 Trustee Kevin McCarthy Kevin McCarthy is one of the four Chapter 7 trustees in the Alexandria, Virginia, Bankruptcy court. When you file a bankruptcy case in Alexandria, the computer assigns you to one of the four trustees. Trustee Kevin McCarthy doesn’t post his picture. Lawyers work as Chapter 7 trustees part-time, on commission. Besides his trustee work, he’s a partner in the law firm of McCarthy and White, PC, located in McLean, VA. He focuseses his legal work on creditors’ rights. He graduated from Notre Dame in 1968 and Georgetown Law in 1974. As a Chapter 7 Trustee, he has two sets of bosses. The US Justice Department, through the Office of the United States Trustee. And the two Bankruptcy Judges here, Judge Brian F. Kenney and Judge Klinette H. Kindred. We paid a $338.00 filing fee when we filed your bankruptcy case. Sixty dollars of that went to Trustee McCarthy. For each case, including yours, he gets an additional $60.00 that is indirectly collected from Chapter 11 bankruptcies. (Congress thinks the bankruptcy courts to raise enough in fees to pay for themselves. No other part of the federal court system does that.) As your Chapter 7 Trustee, Kevin McCarthy is in charge of your bankruptcy hearing, which is called the “meeting of creditors.” There are very, very rarely any creditors at the meeting of creditors. So the Chapter 7 Trustee asks the questions. (Because the trustee is not a judge, he should be called “sir” not “your honor.”) The bankruptcy court computer schedules fourteen hearings an hour. That’s just over four minutes per case. Bankruptcy hearings in Alexandria are by Zoom Trustee hearings for Kevin McCarthy are usually scheduled on Wednesdays at 10:00 AM, 11:00 AM, and Noon. You attend by Zoom. You enter his Zoom hearings by using these codes: Meeting Id 723 721 3164, Passcode 0426782547 If you are not an experienced Zoomer, here’s some help on how to join a meeting using an ID and passcode. (Before your Zoom hearing date, Kevin McCarthy has his own form that we are required to fill in. We’ll go over that with you when we have our rehearsal call. We are also required to send in bank statements for each of your accounts one week before your hearing is scheduled. ) That’s a permanent Zoom ID and passcode. You can test it out any evening, and it will take you to the Kevin McCarthy Trustee waiting room. That way, you’ll be sure you’ll know what to do on your hearing date. This is what you see when you enter the Kevin McCarthy waiting room. (Except you won’t see my picture in the corner.) The post Chapter 7 Trustee Kevin McCarthy appeared first on Robert Weed Bankruptcy Attorney.
Chapter 7 Trustee Kevin McCarthy Kevin McCarthy is one of the four Chapter 7 trustees in the Alexandria, Virginia, Bankruptcy court. When you file a bankruptcy case in Alexandria, the computer assigns you to one of the four trustees. Trustee Kevin McCarthy doesn’t post his picture. Lawyers work as Chapter 7 trustees part-time, on commission. Besides his trustee work, he’s a partner in the law firm of McCarthy and White, PC, located in McLean, VA. He focuseses his legal work on creditors’ rights. He graduated from Notre Dame in 1968 and Georgetown Law in 1974. As a Chapter 7 Trustee, he has two sets of bosses. The US Justice Department, through the Office of the United States Trustee. And the two Bankruptcy Judges here, Judge Brian F. Kenney and Judge Klinette H. Kindred. We paid a $338.00 filing fee when we filed your bankruptcy case. Sixty dollars of that went to Trustee McCarthy. For each case, including yours, he gets an additional $60.00 that is indirectly collected from Chapter 11 bankruptcies. (Congress thinks the bankruptcy courts need to raise enough in fees to pay for themselves. No other part of the federal court system does that.) As your Chapter 7 Trustee, Kevin McCarthy is in charge of your bankruptcy hearing, which is called the “meeting of creditors.” There are very, very rarely any creditors at the meeting of creditors. So the Chapter 7 Trustee asks the questions. (Because the trustee is not a judge, he should be called “sir” not “your honor.”) The bankruptcy court computer schedules fourteen hearings an hour. That’s just over four minutes per case. Bankruptcy hearings in Alexandria are by Zoom Trustee hearings for Kevin McCarthy are usually scheduled on Wednesdays at 10:00 AM, 11:00 AM, and Noon. You attend by Zoom. You enter his Zoom hearings by using these codes: Meeting Id 723 721 3164, Passcode 0426782547 If you are not an experienced Zoomer, here’s some help on how to join a meeting using an ID and passcode. (Before your Zoom hearing date, Kevin McCarthy has his own form that we are required to fill in. We’ll go over that with you when we have our rehearsal call. We are also required to send in bank statements for each of your accounts one week before your hearing is scheduled. ) That’s a permanent Zoom ID and passcode. You can test it out any evening, and it will take you to the Kevin McCarthy Trustee waiting room. That way, you’ll be sure you’ll know what to do on your hearing date. This is what you see when you enter the Kevin McCarthy waiting room. (Except you won’t see my picture in the corner.) The post Chapter 7 Trustee Kevin McCarthy appeared first on Robert Weed Bankruptcy Attorney.
Law Review: Jonathan M. Seymour, Bankruptcy Appeal Barriers, 82 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 87 (2025). Ed Boltz Fri, 05/23/2025 - 17:26 Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol82/iss1/4 Abstract: Appeals in bankruptcy do not look like appeals elsewhere in the federal court system. In particular, bankruptcy appeal barriers are strikingly distinctive. These barriers serve outright to block an appeal from being decided. An appellate court may dismiss an appeal, rather than consider the merits, if facts on the ground have changed so much since the original decision that providing a remedy to an appellant, even if victorious, would not be prudent. Take ongoing litigation in the Boy Scouts bankruptcy case. A plan of reorganization was confirmed fixing the entitlements of victims to compensation. Dissenting creditors argued bitterly the plan was unlawful and have appealed. And they have been proven right: The Supreme Court recently found in its Purdue Pharma decision that bankruptcy courts lack the authority to approve the plan’s central legal device. Even so, those outraged creditors may receive nothing. The Boy Scouts argue that their appeal should be dismissed without reaching the merits because the plan is, in key respects, already implemented. And the existing case law surrounding bankruptcy appeal barriers offers considerable support for this outcome. This Article attempts both to assess the significance of bankruptcy appeal barriers and to evaluate potential justifications for them. These barriers matter deeply to affected litigants but also have systemic consequences. The constitutional legitimacy of the bankruptcy courts is predicated on their supervision by Article III judges. This supervision is substantially eroded by bankruptcy appeal barriers. Nor are these concerns wholly abstract. Bankruptcy judges are powerful. Appeal subjects the insular world of bankruptcy to outside scrutiny from generalist judges who do not necessarily buy into the precepts of bankruptcy culture and are not presented with the same in-the-moment incentives as bankruptcy judges. This Article additionally finds troubling the degree to which some appellate courts seem ready to resort to appeal barriers as an escape hatch to avoid deciding appeals even in quite simple cases, often involving unsophisticated parties. The justifications for bankruptcy appeal barriers, therefore, require a careful look. Normatively, this Article suggests that bankruptcy appeal barriers are on shaky ground. To make the case that bankruptcy appeal barriers could be sharply constrained or even abolished, this Article draws analogies both to the more general federal law of remedies, and to instances under state law—such as Delaware corporate law—where appellate courts must grapple with how to engage in an after-the-fact evaluation of an already consummated transaction. Commentary: One notable and conspicuous omission in Bankruptcy Appeal Barriers is its near-total silence on appeals arising in Chapter 13 cases, writing with the assumption that "bankruptcy" means "corporate bankruptcy". While Prof. Seymour’s analysis of equitable and statutory mootness is incisive and thorough for Chapter 11—particularly large corporate reorganizations—the article does not meaningfully engage with how appeal barriers affect individual debtors, whether under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, who constitute the vast majority of bankruptcy filers. This omission is significant for several reasons: Numerical Importance: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 consumer filings vastly outnumber Chapter 11 cases by at least an order of magnitude, not only in terms of numbers of cases, but arguably even in terms of the amount of debt involved. The appellate issues that arise—such as plan confirmation denials, feasibility, good faith findings, and motions to dismiss—are not only common but carry enormous practical consequences for consumer debtors, creditors and the economy as a whole. Unique Appeal Dynamics: The issues that trigger appeals in Chapter 13 are often final for debtors in practical terms, yet not considered final orders under Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, leading to additional procedural confusion. The article references Bullard but does not explore its chilling effect on Chapter 13 appeals or how it interacts with equitable mootness. Barriers Without Doctrinal Support: While Equitable mootness is rarely explicitly invoked in Chapter 13 appellate rulings, its same bases—finality, reliance, disruption—are sometimes used informally to dismiss appeals as moot or futile, with the effects of this informal "mootness creep" in Chapter 13 cases unexplored. In overlooking consumer cases, particularly under Chapter 13, the article misses a critical point: Bankruptcy appeal barriers are not only a threat to the integrity of Chapter 11 practice but also to the fairness of consumer bankruptcy outcomes. If courts can dismiss consumer appeals—particularly over denied confirmations, claim disputes, or plan modifications—as moot or disruptive without examining the merits, then Chapter 13 becomes not just procedurally burdensome, but structurally biased against debtors. Further, while decisions in Chapter 13 or other consumer cases are often overlooked and ignored by the small subsection of the bankruptcy bar involved in Chapter 11, those very opinions often have serious ramifications in corporate bankruptcies, including Bullard and Till v. SCS Credit Corp., until those also creep into their cases. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document bankruptcy_appeal_barriers.pdf (971.88 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies
Law Review: Littwin, Angela, Adams, Adrienne and Kennedy, Angie- Bartenwerfer v. Buckley and Coerced Debt Ed Boltz Thu, 05/22/2025 - 15:38 Available at: https://ablj.org/bartenwerfer-v-buckley-and-coerced-debt-vol-99-issue-1-pdf/ Abstract: Bankruptcy professionals may be surprised to learn that debt and domestic violence (DV) are connected. Professors Littwin, Adams, and Kennedy coined the term “coerced debt” to describe debt that the batterer in an abusive relationship incurs in the victim’s name using fraud or duress. The Supreme Court’s holding in Bartenwerfer v. Buckley that § 523(a)(2) can prevent the innocent spouse of someone who committed fraud from discharging debt implicates coerced debt because each coerced debt has two victims: the DV victim and the creditor. Bartenwerfer raised the possibility that creditors could prevent DV victims from discharging coerced debts due to fraud of which they were victims. Bartenwerfer v. Buckley & Coerced Debt analyzes Bartenwerfer and cases under the Nineteenth Century precedent the Court embraced to show that Bartenwerfer is much narrower than it appears. The underlying law of fraud controls, and in every case reviewed, the law of fraud requires that the spouses have a business relationship to transmit fraud liability. The professors also make the normative case that victims of coerced debt deserve discharge, illustrating their arguments with data on business debts from the first in-depth study of coerced debt. Commentary: Consumer bankruptcy courts increasingly face debts arising from financial abuse and coercion, especially with rising awareness of domestic economic abuse. Bartenwerfer poses risks if misapplied, but this article provides the framework for limiting its reach and protecting innocent debtors. For practitioners, the message is clear: be proactive in demanding factual and legal showings of imputation, and be thoughtful about when and how to raise the coercion defense. Where a creditor asserts § 523(a)(2) based on the fraud of a debtor’s spouse, the burden falls on that creditor to prove a qualifying relationship under state partnership or agency law. Many claims will collapse under this scrutiny, including when there may be a business relationship between spouses. In North Carolina, to impute a business relationship, a creditor must show the existence of a partnership under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 59-36, which defines a partnership as “an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners of a business for profit.” Courts look at multiple factors to determine whether a partnership exists: Joint ownership of property or business assets; Sharing of profits and losses; Joint decision-making or management; Representations to third parties that both spouses are business partners. Merely owning property together, including as tenants by the entirety, or having a spouse help with incidental tasks, does not create a partnership and the existence of a coercive personal relationship should undercut other evidence. See, e.g., Hines v. Arnold, 103 N.C. App. 31, 34, 404 S.E.2d 179, 181 (1991). As a bit of humor (because, as Mark Twain said, "humor equals tragedy plus time") related to the different contemporary uses of the word "partner"- When I was first admitted to the ICU following my fall in Colorado a year ago, after realizing my that my wife was in North Carolina and would not immediately be able to get to the hospital, the nurses asked if there was anyone more nearby who they could call. When I responded that "My partner, John, is at the Broadmoor Hotel", they were (even to me in battered and bruised condition) practically giddy that my medical emergency suddenly had even juicier aspects. Despite being clearly disappointed when I clarified that he was merely "my law partner", they still provided amazing medical care for which I (and my spouse and also my partner) are very grateful. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document bartenwerfer_v._buckley_and_coerced_debt.pdf (590.88 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies
Bankr. M.D.N.C.: In re Bryant- Pending Personal Injury Claim is Exempt Ed Boltz Wed, 05/21/2025 - 15:51 Summary: Vermelle Jones Bryant filed a Chapter 7 case in October 2021 but failed to disclose a potential personal injury claim stemming from a medical procedure that occurred just weeks earlier. The case proceeded as a no-asset case, and she received a discharge in early 2022. Nearly three years later, Bryant settled that prepetition claim for $204,000. After the Bankruptcy Administrator moved to reopen the case, the Trustee objected to Bryant’s amended exemption claim under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1C-1601(a)(8), arguing that because the compensation was not in hand on the petition date, it did not qualify as exempt. Judge Lena James rejected the Trustee’s narrow, literalist reading and instead adopted a broader interpretation consistent with longstanding bankruptcy practice in North Carolina. Finding the statutory term "compensation for personal injury" ambiguous, Judge James applied North Carolina’s principle that exemption statutes must be liberally construed in favor of debtors. The court found that Trustee’s novel argument—that only “funds in hand” as of the petition date are exemptible—was not only unsupported by precedent, but would have led to absurd and inequitable results. As the Court noted, such an interpretation would create arbitrary and punitive distinctions among debtors based solely on the timing of a settlement or the administrative speed of their personal injury lawyer. More troublingly, it would have opened the door to post-discharge clawbacks of recoveries that debtors had never concealed with fraudulent intent. The court refused to read into the statute a temporal restriction that simply isn’t there and instead harmonized the plain text with decades of consistent judicial practice and related legislative amendments. Her invocation of the North Carolina Supreme Court’s distinction between assignable proceeds and unassignable causes of action further bolstered the logic that a debtor holds a protectable interest in “compensation” even when it has not yet been quantified or received. She concluded that the statute permits the exemption of compensation received postpetition so long as the underlying injury—and hence the legal right to recover for it—occurred prepetition. The Court emphasized that North Carolina law recognizes a debtor’s prepetition property interest not only in a personal injury claim but also in the prospective proceeds of that claim. The opinion also noted that the General Assembly has not altered the language of the statute despite decades of consistent bankruptcy court interpretations allowing exemptions in such scenarios. Commentary: Judge James’ well-reasoned and thorough opinion in In re Bryant squarely reaffirms a debtor-friendly principle that has long animated North Carolina bankruptcy practice: that a prepetition personal injury, even if unliquidated and undisclosed, gives rise to a property interest in potential compensation which the debtor may later exempt under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1C-1601(a)(8). This is particularly as, unlike the federal exemption for personal injury claims, North Carolina exemption is not only for an unlimited amount, but also protects emotional distress damages, not just bodily injuries. Further, in light of Judge Flanagan from the Eastern District Court in Alston v. NCR that FDCPA claims are personal tort claims, debtors should clearly be entitled to retain all of these causes of action. As a practical aside, the Court also advised debtors’ attorneys to use the statutory phrase “compensation for personal injury” in their exemption schedules rather than the colloquial but legally muddier term “personal injury claim” and disclose the amount as "Unknown" or for an estimated amount. This clarity could help avoid future litigation over the scope of claimed exemptions, but might require some changes to the Local Form 91-C to more clearly accommodate that Lastly, a great job by Koury Hicks and Erica NeSmith but also everyone that has worked to compile the scattered and obscure legislative history regarding North Carolina exemptions, particularly as Judge James specifically "commends the efforts of several members of North Carolina’s bankruptcy bar to gather and publicly disseminate the limited legislative history available for N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1C-1601 and its later amendments." Much of that can be found at North Carolina Exemptions Legislative History with special thanks to Travis Sasser, Kelly Newcomb, Erica NeSmith and others for their contributions. If anyone has more, please let me know, so those can be added. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document in_re_bryant.pdf (688.31 KB) Category Middle District
N.C. Ct. of App.: Fine Line Homes v. Luthera- Materialman's Lien Invalid due to Absent Date in Claim of Lien Ed Boltz Tue, 05/20/2025 - 16:00 Summary: In this case out of Davidson County, Fine Line Homes, LP filed a mechanic’s lien in the amount of $44,554.77 against property jointly owned by Anita Luthra and Sarina Steinbacher following a dispute over construction work at a residential home. Fine Line had a written contract with Luthra, but not with Steinbacher. After Luthra terminated Fine Line’s services and declined to pay the outstanding balance, the contractor filed a claim of lien and then brought a lawsuit to enforce the lien or, in the alternative, recover under quantum meruit. Both defendants responded pro se, raising factual and legal defenses. Most significantly, Luthra alleged that the lien was defective because it lacked a critical statutory requirement—the date of last furnishing of labor or materials. The trial court agreed and dismissed the lien enforcement action with prejudice, holding that the omission of the “last furnishing” date rendered the lien invalid. Relying on the plain language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 44A-12 and longstanding case law, the trial court concluded that the date of last furnishing is a mandatory statutory element that determines the validity and enforceability of a lien. While § 44A-12(c) allows for “substantial” compliance with the lien form, the court found that omitting the date of last furnishing was a fatal error, not a mere technicality. The trial court denied dismissal of the quantum meruit claim and allowed certain counterclaims by Luthra to proceed. Fine Line Homes appealed, arguing that the trial court improperly required strict compliance with the statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal. Citing Brown v. Middleton, 86 N.C. App. 63 (1987), the Court reiterated that the 1977 amendment to § 44A-12 expressly requires the inclusion of the last date of furnishing. The appellate panel emphasized that this date is essential not only for public notice purposes but also to determine whether the lien was timely perfected and enforced under §§ 44A-12(b) and 44A-13(a). As the omission of this date made it impossible to evaluate the lien’s timeliness, the claim was defective on its face. Commentary: This case is a sharp reminder that even where courts tolerate some technical lapses under the doctrine of “substantial compliance,” certain statutory elements remain non-negotiable. North Carolina’s lien statutes strike a careful balance between protecting contractors’ rights and preserving the clarity of title for property owners and creditors. The date of last furnishing is not merely a procedural nicety; it serves as the linchpin for the 120-day lien filing and 180-day enforcement windows. While the Court of Appeals refrained from drawing a bright line between substantial and strict compliance, Fine Line Homes reinforces that there are “substantially required” elements—and the accurate first AND last furnishing dates are one of them. Contractors and construction counsel must treat lien preparation with the same rigor as filing a civil complaint. A missing line on a form could, as here, forfeit a claim worth tens of thousands of dollars. Those dates should be verified (including through discovery) with both the homeowner, the installer and the lienholder, a claim of lien includes a verification is recognized under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-209 as being made under penalty of perjury, opening erroneous claims of lien to not only potential UDTPA claims (with treble damages) but also criminal prosecution. Consumer-side practitioners should also note how this decision preserves defenses against improperly filed liens and highlights the potential exposure contractors face to counterclaims, including fraud and unfair trade practices, when liens are filed carelessly. The validation of interlocutory appeal here under the "substantial rights" doctrine also underscores how critical lien priority is in construction disputes. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document fine_homes_v._luthera.pdf (118.77 KB) Category NC Court of Appeals
4th Cir.: Navient v. Loman- TCPA and Sham Litigation Ed Boltz Mon, 05/19/2025 - 16:24 Summary: In this high-profile litigation, Navient Solutions, LLC—a major student loan servicer—sued a group of lawyers, debt-relief companies, and associated individuals, alleging they orchestrated a fraudulent scheme that encouraged borrowers to cease loan payments and file meritless lawsuits under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). Navient’s theory was that the defendants manufactured sham TCPA claims in order to generate settlements and debt forgiveness, thereby violating RICO and committing fraud and tortious interference. At trial, Navient prevailed with a jury award of over $2 million. But the district court later granted Rule 50(b) motions for judgment as a matter of law, setting aside the verdict. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that the TCPA litigation filed by the defendants was not “sham litigation” and was therefore protected by the First Amendment under the Noerr–Pennington doctrine. Because Navient’s damages were solely tied to the costs of defending those lawsuits (and not any independent wrongful acts), and because the suits themselves were not objectively baseless, Navient could not recover. Key to the Fourth Circuit’s ruling was its application of Waugh Chapel South, LLC v. UFCW Local 27, 728 F.3d 354 (4th Cir. 2013), adopting the California Motor “series of lawsuits” standard for determining whether a pattern of litigation constitutes a sham. The court found that the TCPA actions—though possibly coordinated for economic gain—raised legitimate legal issues, especially considering the pre-Facebook v. Duguid (2021) uncertainty over what constituted an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS). Navient had itself acknowledged the unsettled nature of the law and settled many of the suits. The panel declined to opine on the broader questions of whether Noerr–Pennington immunity extends to private arbitration, pre-suit conduct, or to non-litigant participants, finding that Navient had waived those arguments or sought no damages stemming from such activity. Commentary: While not a bankruptcy case, Navient v. Lohman offers a revealing look at how far courts will stretch the Noerr–Pennington doctrine to protect even aggressive and perhaps morally dubious litigation strategies. The Fourth Circuit made clear that First Amendment protections for petitioning the government extend to serial TCPA filings—even if those suits were ginned up by debt-relief outfits coaching borrowers to manufacture claims—so long as the underlying legal issues are debatable. For consumer bankruptcy practitioners, this case indirectly bolsters the ability of debtors’ attorneys to bring novel or coordinated legal actions without fear of RICO retaliation, provided their claims are grounded in real legal uncertainty. It may offer comfort to those involved in consumer advocacy against large creditors or servicers, particularly in areas where statutory interpretation remains in flux. However, the opinion stops short of giving blanket immunity to all conduct surrounding such litigation. Practitioners should take note that if Navient had better quantified harm outside the litigation itself—say, through economic losses tied to broader marketing or pre-litigation conduct—the outcome might have been different. In short, courts remain protective of access to legal process—even if used repeatedly, creatively, or for profit. But they may not look kindly on poorly framed damage theories or waived appellate issues. Practice Tip: In Chapter 13 bankruptcy case, especially for nondischargeable debts, debtors might include the following: Nonstandard Plan Provision – Revocation of Consent to Receive Autodialed or Prerecorded Calls Pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 227 and applicable law, the Debtor(s) hereby revoke any and all prior express consent, whether written, oral, or implied, previously given to any creditor or their agents, servicers, debt collectors, or attorneys, to call or text any telephone number associated with the Debtor(s) using an automatic telephone dialing system (“ATDS”), artificial voice, or prerecorded voice. This revocation applies to: All telephone numbers previously provided to creditors, including but not limited to mobile, landline, and VOIP numbers; All creditors listed in this plan and/or schedules, including successors and assigns, whether or not such creditors have filed a proof of claim; All calls or texts placed in connection with any debt, including but not limited to student loans, credit cards, auto loans, and mortgage obligations. For the avoidance of doubt, this provision constitutes a permanent and unequivocal revocation of consent under the TCPA. Creditors who place ATDS, prerecorded, or artificial voice calls to the Debtor(s) after the effective date of plan confirmation may be subject to damages under the TCPA. With proper attribution, please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document navient_v._loman.pdf (162.87 KB) Category 4th Circuit Court of Appeals
Chapter 7 Trustee Lauren Friend McKelvey Lauren Friend McKelvey is the newest of the four Chapter 7 trustees in the Alexandria, Virginia, Bankruptcy court. When you file a bankruptcy case in Alexandria, the computer assigns you to one of the four trustees. Lawyers work part-time as Chapter 7 trustees. Ms. Friend McKelvey is a partner in Reitler, a New York-based law firm that does business law, with a focus on venture capital. Business debt and bankruptcy have been part of her work with the Reister law firm, where she has done corporate law generally. Earlier, she was general counsel for a successful corporate start-up. (Chapter 7 trustees here mostly deal with simple consumer bankruptcies, so her heavy background in corporate and business law is unusual.) As a Chapter 7 Trustee, she has two sets of bosses. The US Justice Department, through the Office of the United States Trustee. And the two Bankruptcy Judges here, Judge Brian F. Kenney and Judge Klinette H. Kindred. We paid a $338.00 filing fee when we filed your bankruptcy case. Sixty dollars of that went to Trustee McKelvey. For each case, including yours, she is paid an additional $60.00 that is indirectly collected from Chapter 11 bankruptcies. (Congress thinks the bankruptcy courts to raise enough in fees to pay for themselves. No other part of the federal court system does that.) What Does a Chapter 7 Trustee Do? Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee Lauren Friend McKelvey As your Chapter 7 Trustee, Lauren Friend McKelvey is in charge of your bankruptcy hearing, which is called the “meeting of creditors.” There are very, very rarely any creditors at the meeting of creditors. So the Chapter 7 Trustee asks the questions. (Because the trustee is not a judge, she should be called “ma’am,” not “your honor.”) She will ask routine questions about your I Ds, whether you went over your papers when you signed them, and do you have any valuable assets she can sell. Most people don’t have any valuable assets the trustee can sell, so the hearing is pretty routine. The bankruptcy court computer schedules fourteen hearings an hour. That’s just over four minutes per case. Most don’t take that long. Bankruptcy Hearings in Alexandria are By Zoom Trustee hearings for Ms Friend McKelvey are usually scheduled for Thursdays at 10:00 AM, 11: AM, and 12:00 PM. You attend by Zoom. You enter her Zoom hearings by using these codes. Meeting ID 535 852 2867, Passcode 8330439029 If, you’re not an experienced Zoomer, here’s some help on how to join using a meeting ID and passcode. That’s her permanent Zoom ID and passcode. You can test it out any evening and it will take you to her Trustee waiting room. That way, you’ll be sure you’ll know what to do on your hearing date. This is what you’ll see when you Zoom into the Trustee waiting room. (Except you won’t see my picture in the corner.) The post Chapter 7 Trustee Lauren Friend McKelvey appeared first on Robert Weed Bankruptcy Attorney.
The legal chatter is full of the promise of Artificial Intelligence to revolutionize the practice of law. It can write your letters, your briefs and your website, they say. But there’s a catch here (other than the fact that AI sometimes makes stuff up, including case law, out of whole cloth.): ChatGPT and its ilk […] The post Use your authentic voice to humanize yourself and the law appeared first on Bankruptcy Mastery.
Shocking Results: Credit Scores Drop the First Year After Bankruptcy A couple of years after filing for bankruptcy, many people find their credit scores are worse than the day the bankruptcy was approved. I was shocked when I saw that. According to LendingTree, most people see a boost of about 69 points when they file, but their scores typically drop back down by 29 points within a year. The good news is, your credit score will improve if you follow these tips. Here’s How to Rebuild Your Credit As soon as the bankrupycy is discharged, you’ll be able to get approved for credit cards, with a very small limit. Get one. Start charing one tank of gas a month and pay it in full. After maybe six months, you’ll sdtart getting approved for higher limit cards; get maybe three of those. Charge a tank of gas on each once a month, and pay them all in full. If you get offers to raise the limits on your cards, go for it! But don’t charge any more. You want to increase your limits, but don’t increase your charging; stick to the one-gas-tank rule. (Some people talk about credit builder loans where you deposit money and borrow against it, but I’m not sure that’s any better than charging gas. Our biggest local credit unions, PenFed and Apple, don’t offer those loans.) Why Credit Scores Might Drop Again There are a couple of mistakes that can cause scores to drop after bankruptcy. First, some folks avoid credit cards altogether, but it’s essential to keep building your credit history. You don’t want bankruptcy to be the most recent thing on your credit report. (Making timely car payments doesn’t usually help your score much.) Second, some people max out their new cards. Your credit utilization—how much of your available credit you use—matters a lot. If you’re close to your limit, your score will drop. Keep to my simple strategy: Charge one tank of gas on each card each month and pay it off in full. For Some People, Life Keeps Happening Some people carefully rebuild their credit, and then, bam!, something hits them. Life can throw curveballs like job loss or health issues. People end up with ruined credit for no fault of their own. If you find yourself back in a tight spot—like facing wage garnishment—feel free to reach out for help! For More Info For more info, see my blog on Five Websites to Check After Your Discharge. PS Please Give Me A Review. If this article is helpful, please give me a review. The post Will Your Credit Score Improve a Year After Bankruptcy appeared first on Robert Weed Bankruptcy Attorney.