The In re Dotson, 2013 WL 5652732 (Bankr. WD Va., Oct. 16, 2013) case involved a request for sanctions for a discharge injuction violation and FDPCA claims.   After the chapter 7 discharge, Bank of America retained United Recovery Group to collect a discharged debt.  United threatened to intercept the debtor's car payment and garnish her wages or bank account unless $3,500 was paid immediately, and also contacted the debtor's mother.  United also indicated that upon receipt of $3,663.15 settlement funds they would 'file a dismissal of the action.'   In fear of the consequences of the actions, the debtor arranged for her mother to give her funds and for a transfer of the funds to United.  Subsequently she contacted her bankruptcy attorney, who demanded return of the funds from United.  Upon failure of such refund counsel filed a motion for sanctions against Bank of America and United Recovery Group for violation of the discharge injunction and for damages under the Fair Debt Practices Collection Act.  A settlement was reached with Bank of America for $2,000, and United failed to respond to the allegations.   The Court denied the FDPCA claim, finding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.  The clear weight of authority is that bankruptcy courts do not have jurisdiction over such post-discharge claims because they do not arise under the Bankruptcy Code or “in” the case and their determination can have no effect upon the bankruptcy estate. Furthermore, such “claims are not ‘related to’ [the] bankruptcy case, and bankruptcy courts may not exercise supplemental jurisdiction to hear unrelated claims.”  Harlan v. Rosenberg & Assocs., LLC (In re Harlan), 402 B.R. 703, 714 (Bankr.W.D.Va.2009) (citing other decisions) (Krumm, J.).  This is the case even when the violation in inextricably part and parcel of a creditors attempt to collect a discharged debt.   The dismissal of these claims was without prejudice to bring them in a court of competent jurisdiction.  As to the discharge violation, the court examined the Bank of America settlement and gave credit for the funds reimbursed in that settlement.  The Court also removed fees for the time allocated to the FDPCA claim.  The Court noted that the debtor indicated in an affidavit that she asked United for time to call her bankruptcy attorney, and they indicated that she did not have time to do so, and if she did not act immediately she would owe $6,000.  The Court found this to be adequate to put United on notice of the bankruptcy.  The Court determined that the conduct of United's employee in pressuring the Debtor to pay a debt which had been duly discharged in bankruptcy when, at the very least, the company through its agents acted in reckless disregard of the existence of such discharge, was sufficiently egregious to justify an award of compensatory and punitive damages as well as reasonable attorney's fees to the Debtor.  The court awarded $2,663.15 in compensatory damages, $2,500 punitive damages, and $3,840 in attorneys fees.  In a footnote the Court also explained since the prime intent of the discharge injunction is to give the debtor a fresh start, this places the burden of ascertaining whether a debt is discharged on the creditor.     

This is the case of Gail Sanders who lives on 60th St. in Chicago, Illinois.  She is interested in filing a Chapter 7 bankruptcy to eliminate credit card debt.  Gail has never filed bankruptcy before.  She is not a homeowner.  She is renting.  Her landlord is St. Edmunds Commons.  She has a yearly lease which+ Read MoreThe post Chapter 7 Fresh Start Recommendation appeared first on David M. Siegel.

My Case Was Dismissed, Now What? Chapter 7 Part 2 Your bankruptcy case was dismissed and now you want to know what options you have. It first depends on what chapter of bankruptcy you filed and then on why the case was dismissed.Chapter 7It is not so common that a Chapter 7 is dismissed. The only obligations that a Debtor has after the filing of a Chapter 7 is to attend the Trustee’s 341 Meeting of creditors, complete the Financial Management Course, also known as the 2ndcertificate or FMC, and providing any requested information to the trustee. Given there are so few obligations, most Chapter 7’s see completion without dismissal or other issues.However, cases can dismissed for failing to comply with the obligations mentioned above. If the Debtor or Debtors do not appear at the Trustee’s 341 Meeting of creditors the trustee will continue it to another date for Debtor or Debtors to appear. However, if Debtor or Debtors do not appear at the continued Trustee’s 341 Meeting of creditors, the trustee can move for dismissal of the case.Failure to comply with trustee’s requests is an unfortunate way to have your case dismissed without discharge. If the trustee requests any information from you directly or through your attorney and you fail to comply with the request, the case will likely be dismissed. If your case is dismissed you do not receive a discharge even if documents of discharge were previously received. Discharge can be revoked for failure to comply. Here is a common example: You attend your Trustee’s 341 Meeting of creditors and the trustee asks that you forward him a copy of your upcoming year’s taxes once they are filed. You say okay, and go on about life. You receive notice of your discharge, wiping all of your dischargeable debts away. Now you do not have to send anything to the trustee right? Wrong, and unfortunately an all too common wrong.One uncommon but certainly possible way to have your Chapter 7 bankruptcy dismissed is for ineligibility to receive a Chapter  7 discharge. In order for you to be eligible for receive a discharge in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, you must not have previously received a Chapter 7 through a case that was filed within 8 years of the filing of the new bankruptcy case. 

My Case Was Dismissed, Now What? Part 1Your bankruptcy case was dismissed and now you want to know what options you have. It first depends on what chapter of bankruptcy you filed and then on why the case was dismissed.Chapter 7It is not so common that a Chapter 7 is dismissed. The only obligations that a Debtor has after the filing of a Chapter 7 is to attend the Trustee’s 341 Meeting of creditors, complete the Financial Management Course, also known as the 2ndcertificate or FMC, and providing any requested information to the trustee. Given there are so few obligations, most Chapter 7’s see completion without dismissal or other issues.However, cases can dismissed for failing to comply with the obligations mentioned above. If the Debtor or Debtors do not appear at the Trustee’s 341 Meeting of creditors the trustee will continue it to another date for Debtor or Debtors to appear. However, if Debtor or Debtors do not appear at the continued Trustee’s 341 Meeting of creditors, the trustee can move for dismissal of the case.Failure to complete the Financial Management Course, also known as the 2ndcertificate or FMC will not end in dismissal of the case but it will result in closing of the case without discharge. Receiving a discharge of your debt is the reason a bankruptcy is filed so closing of your case without discharge means that all of your debt is still owed and defeats the whole purpose of you filing for bankruptcy. To avoid this, complete your Financial Management Course right after the case is filed so that after your Trustee’s 341 Meeting of creditors, there is nothing for you to do unless your attorney or the trustee requests additional information.Failure to comply with trustee’s requests is an unfortunate way to have your case dismissed without discharge. If the trustee requests any information from you directly or through your attorney and you fail to comply with the request, the case will likely be dismissed. If your case is dismissed you do not receive a discharge even if documents of discharge were previously received. Discharge can be revoked for failure to comply. Here is a common example: You attend your Trustee’s 341 Meeting of creditors and the trustee asks that you forward him a copy of your upcoming year’s taxes once they are filed. You say okay, and go on about life. You receive notice of your discharge, wiping all of your dischargeable debts away. Now you do not have to send anything to the trustee right? Wrong, and unfortunately an all too common wrong. 

My Case Was Dismissed - Now What?

By JESSICA SILVER-GREENBERG The dentist set to work, tapping and probing, then put down his tools and delivered the news. His patient, Patricia Gannon, needed a partial denture. The cost: more than $5,700. Ms. Gannon, 78, was staggered. She said she could not afford it. And her insurance would pay only a small portion. But she was barely out of the chair, her mouth still sore, when her dentist’s office held out a solution: a special line of credit to help cover her bill. Before she knew it, Ms. Gannon recalled, the office manager was taking down her financial details. But what seemed like the perfect answer — seemed, in fact, like just what the doctor ordered — has turned into a quagmire. Her new loan ensured that the dentist, Dr. Dan A. Knellinger, would be paid in full upfront. But for Ms. Gannon, the price was steep: an annual interest rate of about 23 percent, with a 33 percent penalty rate kicking in if she missed a payment. She said that Dr. Knellinger’s office subsequently suggested another form of financing, a medical credit card, to pay for more work. Now, her minimum monthly dental bill, roughly $214 all told, is eating up a third of her Social Security check. If she is late, she faces a penalty of about $50. “I am worried that I will be paying for this until I die,” says Ms. Gannon, who lives in Dunedin, Fla. Dr. Knellinger, who works out of Palm Harbor, Fla., did not respond to requests for comment. In dentists’ and doctors’ offices, hearing aid centers and pain clinics, American health care is forging a lucrative alliance with American finance. A growing number of health care professionals are urging patients to pay for treatment not covered by their insurance plans with credit cards and lines of credit that can be arranged quickly in the provider’s office. The cards and loans, which were first marketed about a decade ago for cosmetic surgery and other elective procedures, are now proliferating among older Americans, who often face large out-of-pocket expenses for basic care that is not covered by Medicare or private insurance. The American Medical Association and the American Dental Association have no formal policy on the cards, but some practitioners refuse to use them, saying they threaten to exploit the traditional relationship between provider and patient. Doctors, dentists and others have a financial incentive to recommend the financing because it encourages patients to opt for procedures and products that they might otherwise forgo because they are not covered by insurance. It also ensures that providers are paid upfront — a fact that financial services companies promote in marketing material to providers. One of the financing companies, iCare Financial of Atlanta, which offers financing plans through providers’ offices, asks providers on its Web site: “How much money are you losing everyday by not offering iCare to your patients?” Over the last three years, the company’s enrollment has grown 320 percent. Another company posted a video online that shows patients suddenly vanishing outside a medical office because they cannot afford treatment. The company offers a financing plan as a remedy, with the scene on the video shifting to a smiling doctor with dollar signs headed toward him. A review by The New York Times of dozens of customer contracts for medical cards and lines of credit, as well as of hundreds of court filings in connection with civil lawsuits brought by state authorities and others, shows how perilous such financial arrangements can be for patients — and how advantageous they can be for health care providers. Many of these cards initially charge no interest for a promotional period, typically six to 18 months, an attractive feature for people worried about whether they can afford care. But if the debt is not paid in full when that time is up, costly rates — usually 25 to 30 percent — kick in, the review by The Times found. If payments are late, patients face additional fees and, in most cases, their rates increase automatically. The higher rates are often retroactive, meaning that they are applied to patients’ original balances, rather than to the amount they still owe. For patients, the financial consequences can be dire. Ms. Gannon said she was happy with her dental care, despite the cost, and there was no suggestion that Dr. Knellinger had done anything wrong. But attorneys general in a several states have filed lawsuits claiming that other dentists and professionals have misled patients about the financial terms of the cards, employed high-pressure sales tactics, overcharged for treatments and billed for unauthorized work. The New York attorney general’s office found that health care providers had pressured patients into getting credit cards from one company, CareCredit, a unit of General Electric, which gave some providers discounts based on the volume of transactions. Patients, the investigation found, were misled about the terms of the credit cards, and in some instances, duped into believing that they were agreeing to a payment plan with dental offices when, in fact, they were being pushed into high-cost credit. In June, CareCredit reached a pact with Eric T. Schneiderman, the New York attorney general, to improve protections for consumers, and a spokeswoman said the company “does not incentivize providers to have patients open accounts” or give referral fees to providers. In Ohio, the attorney general has sued the operators of several hearing aid clinics, claiming that they misled customers about using medical credit cards to pay for batteries and warranties. Cameron P. Kmet, a chiropractor in Anchorage, Alaska, said he had stopped offering medical cards. “One missed payment can really ruin a patient’s life,” he said. Mr. Kmet now runs a company that administers payment plans directly between providers and patients, with annual interest rates around 8 percent. Regarding medical credit cards, Mr. Kmet said he had urged providers to ask themselves “whether this is something that you would recommend to a family member or friend.” The answer, he said, is usually no. While medical credit cards resemble other credit cards, there is a critical difference: they are usually marketed by caregivers to patients, often at vulnerable times, such as when those patients are in pain or when their providers have recommended care they cannot readily afford. In addition to G.E., large banks like Wells Fargo and Citibank, as well as several specialized financial services companies, offer credit through practitioners’ offices. The growth of this form of consumer credit is difficult to quantify because data on medical credit cards specifically, as opposed to credit cards generally, is unavailable. But credit cards of all types are playing a growing role in financing medical care. In 2010, people in the United States charged about $45 billion in health care costs on credit cards, according to the consulting firm McKinsey & Company. “When the economy got worse, our business got better,” said Katie Kessing, an iCare spokeswoman. In 2010, a little more than a thousand dentists offered the iCare finance plan — a program that requires patients to pay 30 percent down as well as a fee of 15 percent of the total procedure cost. The number of participating providers has since risen to 4,200. Russell A. Salton, the chief executive of Access One MedCard, a credit card company in Charlotte, N.C., said demand for specialized cards — the MedCard has an annual interest rate of 9.25 percent — is driven by providers interested in removing an “obstacle to providing valuable care.” The company says the number of hospitals offering its credit cards has grown about 25 percent a year in recent years. While neither national medical or dental associations have formal policies, ADA Business Enterprises, a profit-making arm of the American Dental Association that connects dentists and businesses, endorses G.E.’s CareCredit, whose cards are used by more than seven million people nationwide. “Cardholders tell us they like using CareCredit because it gives them the ability to plan, budget and pay for certain elective health care procedures over time,” said Cristy Williams, the spokeswoman for CareCredit. She said the company had improved consumer protections, going so far as to telephone “senior cardholders with significant first transactions to confirm their understanding of the program and terms.” She said roughly 80 percent of patients who opted for the deferred interest paid off their debts before they were charged any interest. She and others in the industry said the credit cards and credit lines had helped patients afford otherwise prohibitively expensive care not paid for at all, or in its entirety, by insurance providers. But state authorities and care advocates in California, Florida, Illinois, Michigan and elsewhere say that older people — many of them grappling with dwindling savings and mounting debt — are running into trouble with medical credit cards and loans. “The cards prey on seniors’ trust,” said Lisa Landau, who heads the health care unit at the New York attorney general’s office. Minnesota’s attorney general, Lori Swanson, is investigating the use of medical credit cards, which she said could come with “hidden tripwires and other perils.” Interviews with patients, along with the review of contracts and lawsuits, show just how significant those perils can be. Carl Dorsey, 74, recalled his experience at Aspen Dental Management, a nationwide chain that has come under scrutiny for its practices. Mr. Dorsey said that after a dentist at Aspen’s office in Seekonk, Mass., told him that he needed dentures, at a cost of $2,634, he was urged to take out a medical credit card. He was charged the full cost upfront, financial statements reviewed by The Times show. Mr. Dorsey, who made about $800 a month working as a used-car salesman, in addition to receiving Social Security, has since fallen behind on his payments. The lapse set off a penalty interest rate of nearly 30 percent. Mr. Dorsey said he was being pursued by debt collectors. “This whole ordeal has been devastating,” said Mr. Dorsey, who along with other patients is part of a civil lawsuit filed against Aspen in a federal court in upstate New York. He said he still needed dentures, noting that the ones he received from Aspen were unusable. Diane Koi-Thompson said that her father, Harold Koi-Than, did not realize that he had signed up for a CareCredit card during a dental visit. She said Mr. Koi-Than, 82, was shocked when a company representative called his home near Niagara Falls, N.Y., saying he had missed a payment. “My dad had no idea he had a credit card, let alone that he was behind on it,” Ms. Koi-Thompson said. She said her father was upset because he is normally meticulous with his finances and thought his memory was failing. Mr. Koi-Than, through a family member, was able to cancel the credit card. The industry’s growth is being driven by people seeking dental care and devices like hearing aids, which are not covered by Medicare. Dental care is a large and expensive gulf, according to Tricia Neuman, the director of Medicare policy research at the Kaiser Family Foundation. The new federal health care law, she said, will not change that. “Lack of dental coverage remains a huge concern and expense,” Ms. Neuman said. Working with care providers, financial services companies have rushed to fill the void. To make medical cards attractive, some companies offer them without checking patients’ credit histories. The cards can be arranged in minutes, with no upfront charges. Such features are attractive selling points. “Your patient does not require good credit,” First Health Funding of Salt Lake City, Utah says on its Web site. On the site of another lender, the words “No Credit Check” flash in bright letters. First Health Funding did not respond to requests for comment. Lawyers and others who assist patients say such features make it easy for people who are already on a weak financial footing to take on new debt. “Ultimately, this credit facilitates a bad financial decision that will haunt a patient because it adds to indebtedness,” said Ellen Cheek, who runs a legal help line for older people through Bay Area Legal Services in Tampa, Fla. Such critics also say that because there are no industrywide standards for pricing care — costs vary from practice to practice — the cards could encourage providers to charge more for treatment. Brian Cohen, the lawyer representing Mr. Dorsey, said the cards enabled providers to “bill whatever they want for care, regardless of whether the cost is reasonable.” State authorities say health care finance in general, and medical credit cards in particular, are a growing worry. In 2010, Aspen Dental, the chain where Mr. Dorsey signed up for a card, reached a settlement with Pennsylvania authorities over claims that, among other things, it had failed to tell patients that missing a payment would mean the rate would rocket from zero to nearly 30 percent. A review of court records and online forums shows hundreds of customer complaints against Aspen, which is based in Syracuse. A civil case brought on behalf of customers is pending in a federal court in upstate New York. Kasey Pickett, a spokeswoman for Aspen, which is fighting the lawsuit, said the accusations were “entirely without merit.” Aspen provides mandatory training for office employees who discuss financing with patients, according to Ms. Pickett. “We know that for many patients,” she said, “the availability of third-party financing may be the only way that they are able to afford the care they need.”  Copyright 2013 The New York Times Company.  All rights reserved.

This is the case of Kelly Stapick who comes to me from Villa Park, Illinois which is in DuPage County, Illinois.  She is also here with her husband, Joseph Stapick.   The couple does own real estate property worth approximately $190,000.  It’s a single-family home.  There is one mortgage on the property and they owe approximately+ Read MoreThe post Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Is The Recommendation appeared first on David M. Siegel.

This is the case of Jimmy Brownlow who resides in Chicago, Illinois.  He’s here for a consultation regarding Chapter 7 or Chapter 13.  Mr. Brownlow has never filed for bankruptcy before.  He does have a two flat which is worth approximately $176,000 and he owes $179,000.  He has property tax arrears of $1400.  He is+ Read MoreThe post Chapter 13 Bankruptcy Recommended For Jimmy Brownlow appeared first on David M. Siegel.

  I usually comment on cases that were just published, but this one caught my interest as an issue that comes up reasonably often, and where the analysis is usually not as thoughtful as it should be.  In In re Krapf, 355 B.R. 545 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) the debtor's received a worker's compensation settlement post-confirmation, apparently based on a post-confirmation injury.  While the majority of cases simply declare the settlement to be disposable income to be devoted to the plan, whether or not exempt; this case looked to the basis of the award.  In Krapf, the award consisted of two parts, $22,000 awarded toward future back surgery, and $18,000 for future loss of income during the surgery and recovery from the surgery.  Id. at 547.     The Court ruled that the $18,000 for future surgery was not income, and therefore not disposable income.  Black's Law Dictionary defines income as “[t]he money or other form of payment that one receives, usu. periodically, from employment, business, investments, royalties, gifts, and the like. See EARNINGS. Cf. PROFIT.” Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004).  Id.  These funds were specifically to correct the repair the damage caused by the surgery, and to put the debtor in the same position he would have been if the accident had not occurred.  Even if it were income, it is not disposable in that it is required for surgery for the maintenance and support of the debtor.  Id.  As to the other $18,000, the Court ruled that the trustee had the burden to show that a modification of the plan was warranted.  Id. at 548.  The Court noted that this also was not new income, but solely replaced income that had already been accounted for in the confirmation process.  Had there been no injury, the same money would have been paid through the debtor's ongoing wages.  The Court denied the trustee's request for modification of the plan.  An issue not raised in the case is what happens in the case of a workers compensation award for permanent disability.  The code requires the debtor to pay all available disposable income for the life of the plan: 3 years for a below median-income debtor; 5 years for above.  In the case of an award for permanent disability the award is likely to be compensation for lost wages beyond the life of the plan, and arguably not subject to an increase in payment under the plan.

A failed bid to reap a Beanie Baby bonanza, which resulted in a fifteen year legal odyssey for a chapter 13 debtor and his attorneys, will live on a while longer as a result of the Fifth Circuit’s recent interpretation of Stern v. Marshall. Unlike the adorable plush toys giving rise to the dispute, the opinion here is neither cute nor soft.   Some sixteen months after oral argument, the Fifth Circuit concluded that consent cannot apply in Stern situations in a cryptic footnote.   The decision is likely to generate controversy until the Supreme Court clarifies the issue later this term.    Frazzin v. Haynes & Boone, LLP, et al (Matter of Frazin), No. 11-10403 (5th Cir. 10/1/13).   The Fifth Circuit opinion can be found here and Bankruptcy Judge Barbara Houser’s opinion can be found here.   Beanie Babies, Oral Agreements and Lawsuits The case began with an oral agreement between friends.   Michael Cohen and his company, Lamajak, Inc., had the right to purchase Beanie Babies and sell them in hospital gift shops.   Cohen believed that Beanie Babies were a passing fad, while his friend, Frazin, did not.   Cohen allegedly told Frazin that he could keep any Beanie Baby profits the company made in excess of $6 million.  Frazin did not ask his friend to put the promise in writing because he did not want to insult him.  When Beanie Babies turned out to be a big deal and made a lot of profits Cohen denied the agreement and litigation ensued.Meanwhile, Frazin filed a chapter 13 petition.    He obtained court approval to employ Griffith & Nixon as special counsel.   After a two week jury trial in state court, Frazin was awarded a judgment for $6.3 million on several theories, including breach of contract, promissory estoppel and quantum meruit.   When Lamajak appealed, Frazin received court approval to engage Haynes & Boone as his appellate counsel.On appeal, the state Court of Appeals found that there was not sufficient proof of an agreement and reversed the breach of contract damages.   The Court of Appeals also reversed the promissory estoppel claim on the basis that it belonged to Frazin’s company rather than to him individually.   The Court of Appeals ruling reduced Frazin’s recovery to $3.4 million.   While Lamajak was seeking review before the Texas Supreme Court, the parties agreed to settle the case for $3.2 million.  While recovering $3.2 million would ordinarily seem like a good deal, Frazin did not think so.  When Griffith & Nixon and Haynes & Boone applied for their fees before the bankruptcy court, Frazin counterclaimed for malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty and claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act.    The case was tried before Bankruptcy Judge Barbara Houser.   Judge Houser ruled against the Debtor on the malpractice and DTPA claims.   She found that there had been a breach of fiduciary duty, but that the breach was not sufficiently severe to warrant fee forfeiture.   She denied all of the Debtor’s claims and granted the fees requested.    The Bankruptcy Court judgment was rendered on April 7, 2009, over a year prior to the Supreme Courts’s decision in Stern v. Marshall.  The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court on January 14, 2011, which was subsequent to Stern v. Marshall.   The Fifth Circuit heard oral argument on June 6, 2012 and ruled some sixteen months later on October 1, 2013.The Fifth Circuit’s RulingThe panel wrote three separate opinions:  a majority opinion by Judge Prado, in which Judge Owen joined and Judge Reavley joined in part; a concurring opinion by Judge Owen and an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part by Judge Reavley.   Judge Prado’s majority opinion relied substantially on Stern v. Marshall.   In a footnote, the court rejected the notion that Frazin’s decision to sue his attorneys in Bankruptcy Court bound him to the results of that litigation.    The Court stated:The Attorneys argue that Frazin consented to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and waived any objection to the contrary by filing his claims there and failing to object. However, when “separation of powers] is implicated in a given case, the parties cannot by consent cure the constitutional difficulty . . . . When these Article III limitations are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect.” (citation omitted). As discussed above, Stern makes clear that the practice of bankruptcy courts entering final judgments in certain state-law counterclaims “compromise[s] the integrity of the system of separated powers and the role of the Judiciary in that system.” (citation omitted). Thus, structural concerns cannot be ameliorated by Frazin’s consent or waiver.Opinion, p. 8, n. 3.   Following Stern v. Marshall, the Court found that the Bankruptcy Court had authority only to decide so much as was necessary to determine the attorneys’ fee requests.   The Court found that the malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty claims were defenses to the fee request so that the Bankruptcy Court had the authority to enter a final judgment upon them.  The Court’s finding on fiduciary duty was grounded in the fact that the Debtor sought only the equitable remedy of fee forfeiture but did not seek affirmative damages.   However, the Court founds that the Bankruptcy Court could not decide the DTPA claims.Because it was not necessary to decide the DTPA claim to rule on the Attorneys’ fee applications, we conclude that the bankruptcy court lacked the authority to enter a final judgment as to that claim.   Nevertheless, we hold that all factual determinations made in the course of analyzing Frazin’s DTPA claim were within the court’s constitutional authority because they were necessarily resolved in the process of adjudicating the fee applications.Opinion, p. 15.Finally, in remanding the case to the District Court for further proceedings, the Court added:We note (though we do not express an opinion) that although the bankruptcy court did not have jurisdiction to make a final judgment on the DTPA claim, the district court may have that authority.Opinion, p. 17.The Clarifying OpinionsJudge Owen wrote separately to emphasize that the Bankruptcy Court retained the ability to “resolve discrete issues that a core bankruptcy proceeding and a state-law cause of action share in common.”   Owen, J., Concurring, p. 18.   Though a bankruptcy court cannot issue a final judgment disposing of certain claims in cases like the present one, this does not mean that bankruptcy courts are neutered in adjudicating core proceedings under 11 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). A bankruptcy court should examine and resolve all challenges to a fee application, even if the challenges could or do constitute one or more elements of state-law or other causes of action that must be finally resolved by an Article III or state court. A bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to resolve discrete factual issues that necessarily must be decided in adjudicating claims for professional fees under § 330. Bankruptcy courts should not shy away from the task of resolving all issues that pertain to a fee application, even if those issues also form the basis, in whole or in part, of a potential state-law cause of action.Id.Judge Reavley, on the other hand, would have affirmed the lower court judgments. We affirm the bankruptcy court’s distribution of estate funds, and that is all I see before us. The two law firms had obtained a large recovery in the lawsuit against Lamajak, Inc., enough to satisfy all creditor claims, and then the court had only to distribute what was left. The firms filed fee applications, to which the debtor Frazin objected and then filed numerous claims against them, including negligence and malpractice and even deceptive trade practice, all directed at the conduct of the lawyers related to the lawsuit against Lamajak, Inc. There was no use of the word counterclaim and no pleading meeting Rule 8 requirements, as a counterclaim must do. I need not spell out my objections to this court’s judgment because no harm is done, at least in this case, and the district court will no doubt simply dismiss whatever has been remanded. However, if it were necessary, I would hold that a bankruptcy court does not lose jurisdiction in deciding the administration of the estate when that has some collateral effect not easily avoided.Reavley, J., Concurring in part and dissenting in part, p. 20.A Curious Collection of OpinionsThe Frazin opinions are curious for the reason that they seem to have arisen in a vacuum.  Although Stern v. Marshall has been a hot topic nationally, there were no amicus briefs submitted in this case.    After holding the case under advisement for sixteen months (which is a really long time), the Court disposed of the most critical issue in a footnote.   The footnote basically said that the answer was obvious. It was as if the Court had said, “Well, duh!”  In doing so, the Court avoided discussing the Fifth Circuit’s own opinion about the validity of consent to trial before a magistrate, Automation Servs. Corp. v. Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp., 673 F.3d 399, 405 (5th Cir. 2012) or the plethora of cases dealing with arbitration.   If the very integrity of the Constitution was at stake, it would have been nice to explain why consent was a non-starter here but works in the other contexts.      In ruling on the issue of consent, the Court did not acknowledge the conflicting opinions from the Sixth and Ninth Circuits or note that the Supreme Court has granted cert on this issue.  Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkinson (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 565–66 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted 133 S. Ct. 2880 (2013); Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 921–22 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 1604 (2013).   However, the Court did mention these decisions in passing in connection with the authority of the District Court.   Thus, the Court was aware of the opinions but chose not to discuss them.While the judges went to great lengths to point out that their opinion had little practical impact in the present case, they did not acknowledge the significant problems this could cause in a host of other contexts.    Given the lengthy amount of time that the case was under submission, the three opinions and the cursory attention given to the most significant issue, it looks suspiciously as though the Court was having great difficulty with the issue and decided to issue an opinion that would resolve the specific case without addressing the herd of elephants in the room.   Of course, this is just speculation.What Does It Mean?This may mean very little once the Supreme Court rules on the issues of consent and waiver in the Bellingham Insurance Agency case.    However, in the meantime, Fifth Circuit bankruptcy courts will have to examine Stern v. Marshall without having consent as a fallback.   Frazinmakes clear that bankruptcy courts may determine claims against estates and any state law issues absolutely necessary to make that determination.   Bankruptcy courts can also determine facts related to those issues and have those facts be determinative of other issues that the bankruptcy court itself could not itself issue a final decision on.   The Fifth Circuit seems to have inadvertently created a situation in which the bankruptcy court is a super-magistrate able to determine claims against the estate and claims relating to property of the estate and to make factual determinations relating to those claims.    Any legal conclusions or facts within these categories would be subject to normal appellate review.   While the opinion did not go this far, it seems to be saying that the District Court may enter judgment on state law counterclaims in which the Bankruptcy Court was allowed to find the operative facts.   Furthermore, if the operative facts were not necessary to a claims or property issue, then the District Court would be permitted to conduct de novoreview of the factual findings and make legal conclusions.    On a final note, the opinion means that the appellate courts are having trouble with the Stern lingo.   The panel opinion referred to Stern as having to do with jurisdiction to enter a judgment, while the issue is properly one of authority.    Judge Owen’s concurrence referred to core proceedings.   However, because Stern’s effect was to remove authority for bankruptcy courts to decide one type of core proceeding, the core/non-core distinction has lost much of its significance.