Political Science Review: Papageorgiou, Stylianos and Tejada, Oriol, Economics and Politics of Student Debt Relief (April 14, 2025) Ed Boltz Thu, 05/29/2025 - 17:01 Available at: . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5216239 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5216239 Abstract: We study student debt relief as the product of probabilistic voting by an electorate that includes both college graduates and non-college laborers. While politicians favor the most homogeneous group in a probabilistic voting setup, we identify conditions under which politicians forgive student debt even when laborers are more homogeneous than graduates. This political asymmetry in favor of student debt relief gives rise to a double equilibrium that is driven by strategic complementarities among a pivotal mass of citizens: When laborers are not sufficiently more homogeneous than graduates, either this pivotal mass banks on student debt relief, thus going to college, and forcing politicians to forgive student debt, or they reject college, thus preempting politicians from forgiving student debt. Income-driven repayments make politicians forgive fewer students' debt but under a wider range of parameters. We finally identify conditions under which student debt relief and a redistribution in favor of laborers act as strategic complements or substitutes from politicians' perspective. Commentary: As usual,  I  admit my inability to analyze the statistical basis of this research,  especially as it is so beyond my skills that I merely skip over all but the first six pages of the paper.  Further, as always,  I turn my focus not more generally about how  politicians respond to voter pressures around student debt forgiveness. But instead consider  how  bankruptcy fits into this model. Bankruptcy relief operates differently: it provides individualized, legal remedies rather than broad political redistribution. If Congress expands dischargeability of student loans in bankruptcy (or the Trump Administration continues to proceed under the more tolerant SLAP guidance), this reshapes the political landscape in several ways.    Bankruptcy  relief could: Reduce political pressure for blanket forgiveness by offering borrowers a fallback, lowering the need for politicians to act as last-resort fixers. Reshape voter coalitions, as only some borrowers (those in distress) need political help, making graduates a less unified political bloc. Be less polarizing: unlike forgiveness, which many see as directly redistributing taxpayer resources, bankruptcy balances relief between debtors and creditors, looking at both a debtor's income and assets,  avoiding visible harm to non-college laborers. Appear  more fair  to non-college laborers as it imposes some costs, burdens and stigmas on student borrowers by minimizing the perception of a moral hazard for the undeserving.  Act as either a substitute (reducing need for political forgiveness) or a complement (offering both legal and political relief avenues). In short, bankruptcy reform may offer a durable, less politically volatile solution that shifts the incentives politicians face. Combining it smartly with forgiveness policies could create a more balanced and sustainable student debt system.  An impediment to this, however, is that there is often an impression among many student borrowers (and some of the organizations that represent them)  that bankruptcy relief is to be avoided due to its social stigma and the perception that it marks financial failure. This  over-estimates the long-term  negative impacts on those who file bankruptcy.  It also reinforces the often class (and race)  distinction between student borrowers and their "good  debt"  with the "bad debt"  of those (often non-college laborers) who file bankruptcy.  This lack of debt solidarity   plays into the very polarization that this paper identifies. With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document economics_and_politics_of_student_debt_relief.pdf (442.28 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

4th Cir.: Purdy v. Burnett- Dismissal with Prejudice Affirmed Ed Boltz Thu, 05/29/2025 - 16:58 Summary: The Purdys filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy and were subject to the local form Order and Notice, which imposed,  among other requirements  and restrictions,  that they obtain prior approval from the bankruptcy court before incurring new debts in excess of $10,000.  Two years later,  on December 8, 2021,  the Purdys moved to incur a mortgage to finance a home.  While the Trustee did not object to that motion,  the bankruptcy court sua sponte denied the motion (including a subsequent denial of a motion to reconsider) on January 5,  2022.  In April of 2022,  after being provided information regarding the Purdy's income,  the Trustee discovered that they were making a monthly mortgage payment,  having gone forward with the purchase and financing of a home- despite the earlier denial by the bankruptcy court.  While continuing to pursue the mortgage financing,  Ms.  Purdy, shaving the truth far too close, informed the lender that the Trustee had not opposed the motion and provided a letter that appeared to be on the Trustee's letterhead and to include his signature stating that "[o]ut office fully supports Marcus and Amanda Purdy obtaining a mortgage." This letter was a forgery by Ms. Purdy. The Trustee moved to dismiss the Purdy's case and following a hearing on September 27, 2022,  the bankruptcy dismissed the case with prejudice.  Mr. Purdy was barred from refiling for a period of 5 years and Mrs.  Purdy for 10 years. The Purdys appealed arguing that the bankruptcy court erred in admitting the forged letter into evidence as they had not contested that they had violated the local Order and Notice.  The district court upheld the admission of the forged letter,  as it was relevant to the Purdys' opposition to the motion to dismiss their case.  The district court also declined to consider the "irrelevant and baseless"  arguments raised by Purdy's that their self-described "housing decision" caused no damage to any party or that the local rules  were "unconstitutionally nonuniform",  abridged substantive rights and violated the separation of powers.  The district court also upheld the dismissal with prejudice and further referred the matter to the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of North Carolina. On appeal,  the Fourth Circuit again (with Sugar/Sasser v. Burnett being just the most recent examples)  held that the Purdys seek to be excused by  “now object[ing] to the general proposition that the Local Rule governed [their] conduct following [p]lan confirmation.”   Based on the "fraud and knowing violation of court orders and local rules met the high bar for bad faith"   the dismissal with prejudice was upheld . Previous decision: Bankr. E.D.N.C.: In re Purdy- Dismissal with Prejudice for Forged Letter Commentary: Maybe it  was unwise to  appeal  a dismissal of a bankruptcy case with prejudice,  not only by relying on  pleadings that  admitted forgery but also where Ms.  Purdy had pleaded guilty in federal court after being charged with making false mortgage statements.  EDNC Case No. 24 CR-133..  These factors made it virtually certain that the Court of Appeals   would not overturn  the Local Rule,  both in this case and likely going forward (since now at least 6 Circuit judges have looked at it in tainted cases).  But it has also reset the Overton Window  for dismissals with prejudice, if only in an unpublished opinion,  that a 10 year bar to refiling can be appropriate. Unlike in the Sugar/Sasser v. Burnett opinion,  the Court of Appeals did not, however, recognize that Ms.  Purdy may have also had a reliance on counsel defense. With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document purdy_v._burnett.pdf (114.12 KB) Document purdy_criminal_information.pdf (46.45 KB) Category 4th Circuit Court of Appeals

Bankr. E.D.N.C.: Williams Land Clearing, Grading, and Timber Logger v. Apex Funding Source, LLC et al- Merchant Cash Advances are Usurious Loans Ed Boltz Wed, 05/28/2025 - 17:06 Summary: In this extensive Chapter 11 adversary proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina ruled on cross-motions for summary judgment concerning a Merchant Cash Advance (MCA) agreement between the debtor, Williams Land Clearing, and Apex Funding Source. The court held that the MCA was a loan, not a true sale, and that it was criminally usurious under New York law with an effective interest rate of 101.1% per annum. As such, the MCA agreement was void ab initio. Fraudulent transfer claim under § 548: Denied. The debtor received "reasonably equivalent value" because it had not repaid the full loan amount. Preference claim under § 547: Granted in part. A $30,159.42 payment made by the debtor’s customer (Domtar) to Apex within 90 days of the petition date was avoidable. Recovery under § 550: Correspondingly, the debtor could recover that amount for the benefit of the estate. Equitable subordination and objection to claim: To proceed to trial. Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices (UDTPA): Partially allowed. The claim could not stand solely on the allegedly inflated proof of claim, but broader allegations of predatory lending survived summary judgment. Intervenor creditor CFI’s claims: Its attempt to claim the proceeds from the preference recovery as its own (due to a senior lien) failed. The court reiterated that Chapter 5 recoveries belong to the estate, even if based on collateral. CFI's claim for conversion also failed for lack of key elements, including possession and demand. All claims against Apex's attorney Yehuda Klein: Dismissed without evidentiary support. Commentary: This decision is the latest in a growing line of opinions treating MCA agreements as disguised, high-interest loans rather than true sales of receivables. While this case arises in a Chapter 11 context, it resonates strongly with issues in consumer bankruptcy: Recharacterization of MC As as Loans: The court embraced the now-established methodology—relying heavily on Fleetwood Services, LG Funding, and In re Shoot the Moon—to look past contractual form and assess substance over labels. This reinforces the need for consumer bankruptcy attorneys to scrutinize "factoring" and "advance" agreements that mask usurious credit terms. Void Ab Initio Doctrine as Defensive Weapon: Importantly, the court clarified that while a debtor generally cannot bring a standalone affirmative claim under New York’s criminal usury law, a usurious MCA can be invalidated when asserted defensively in response to a proof of claim. This is a critical avenue in consumer bankruptcy, where lenders may file inflated claims based on void contracts. UDTPA as a Complementary Tool: The partial survival of the unfair and deceptive trade practices claim highlights that North Carolina’s UDTPA remains a viable mechanism to challenge predatory financial practices—even when bankruptcy displaces state contract law. While the court did not grant summary judgment on the claim, it allowed allegations of aggressive and misleading MCA marketing to proceed to trial, potentially enabling treble damages and attorney’s fees under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-16. Preference Recovery Benefits the Estate, Not Secured Creditors: For trustees and consumer debtor counsel alike, the ruling reaffirming that prepetition security interests do not attach to postpetition avoidance recoveries under § 550 is a strong reaffirmation of Hutson v. First-Citizens and the estate-centric philosophy of Chapter 5 powers. This helps preserve plan funding in Chapter 13 and liquidation dividends in Chapter 7. Attorney Involvement: The dismissal of all claims against Yehuda Klein reminds practitioners to carefully distinguish between the conduct of lenders and their counsel, unless evidence shows the attorney participated directly in tortious activity or was independently liable. Even though this was a corporate debtor, many consumer debtors are entangled in MCA-like arrangements through small business ventures or gig economy work. This case provides a roadmap for: Objection to claims based on invalid contracts. Preference litigation against aggressive collectors. Rebuttal of "true sale" assertions that attempt to defeat avoidance actions. Use of UDTPA claims as leverage for settlements or affirmative recovery.  With proper attribution,  please share this post. To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document williams_land_clearing_grading_and_timber_logger_v._apex_funding_source_llc.pdf (296.57 KB) Category Eastern District

Tired of eating fees at the end of a Chapter 13 when the debtor-client gets a discharge and you get a write off of the unpaid fees? The problem– attorneys fees incurred during the case but unpaid at case end are uncollectible when the debtor gets a discharge. It happens all too frequently when you […] The post The Trick To Getting Paid For All Your Work In Chapter 13 appeared first on Bankruptcy Mastery.

Economics Review: Gladstone, Joe et al.- Financial shame spirals: How shame intensifies financial hardship Ed Boltz Tue, 05/27/2025 - 19:11 Available at: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749597821000662 Abstract: Financial hardship is an established source of shame. This research explores whether shame is also a driver and exacerbator of financial hardship. Six experimental, archival, and correlational studies (N = 9,110)—including data from customer bank account histories and several longitudinal surveys that allow for participant fixed effects and identical twin comparisons—provide evidence for a vicious cycle between shame and financial hardship: Shame induces financial withdrawal, which increases the probability of counterproductive financial decisions that only deepen one’s financial hardship. Consistent with this model, shame was a stronger driver of financial hardship than the related emotion of guilt because shame increases withdrawal behaviors more than guilt. We also found that a theoretically motivated intervention—affirming acts of kindness—can break this cycle by reducing the link between financial shame and financial disengagement. This research suggests that shame helps set a poverty trap by creating a self-reinforcing cycle of financial hardship.  Commentary: This article,  which I discovered while reading Adam Galinksky's recent and excellent book about the science of leadership,  Inspire, points towards an important difference between  shame and guilt  (which might also be more neutrally called "responsibility") as emotional responses to the financial hardship that leads (or  doesn't lead)  to bankruptcy.    While it is  natural for people to feel bad about financial struggles, it's important to know (and help clients understand) the difference between shame and guilt. Shame can make them feel like they're a bad person—leading to counterproductive behavior like avoiding bills, ignoring help, or giving up. Guilt, on the other hand, means while someone regrets  decisions that contributed to the financial distress,  they still believe that by taking responsibility they can move forward and improve their circumstances. Shame keeps you stuck; the responsibility moves you forward. Our job as consumer bankruptcy attorneys  is to help clients move past  shame and take smart steps toward a better financial future.   With proper attribution,  please share this post.    To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document financial_shame_spirals_how_shame_intensifies_financial_hardship.pdf (1.18 MB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Bankr. W.D.N.C.: Hayes v. US- Avoidance of Transfer to IRS pursuant to § 548 Ed Boltz Tue, 05/27/2025 - 19:08 Summary: In this adversary proceeding, the Chapter 7 trustee, Cole Hayes, sought to avoid and recover a $1,052,682.67 tax payment made by the debtor’s principal, Garth McGillewie, to the IRS shortly after the debtor obtained a $1.5 million business loan. The IRS contended it was a subsequent transferee protected by § 550(b) and that sovereign immunity barred recovery under § 544(b). The trustee proceeded solely under §§ 548 and 550 following United States v. Miller, 145 S. Ct. 839 (2025), which held that § 106(a)’s sovereign immunity waiver does not apply to state law-based avoidance under § 544(b). Judge Kahn granted partial summary judgment to the trustee, finding the IRS was the initial transferee of estate property and thus not entitled to the “good faith” defense of § 550(b). The loan proceeds, although deposited into McGillewie’s personal bank account, remained property of the debtor under South Carolina law due to McGillewie’s fiduciary obligations as manager of the LLC. The court held that McGillewie held the funds in trust for the LLC and that depositing them into his personal account did not divest the debtor of ownership. Further, the IRS had received the funds directly and applied them to satisfy McGillewie’s personal tax debts. The court emphasized that payment of personal obligations using company funds is a classic badge of fraud and confirmed that the debtor was insolvent at the time of transfer. The IRS’s assertion that McGillewie was the initial transferee was rejected on the basis that he lacked legal dominion and control, as required under Bonded Financial Services and Southeast Hotel Properties. Thus, § 548(a)(1)(A) and (B) applied, and the transfer was both actually and constructively fraudulent. Commentary: This opinion is notable for two key reasons: (1) its application of United States v. Miller to confine sovereign immunity defenses under § 544(b), and (2) its detailed treatment of the "initial transferee" issue under § 550(a). Judge Kahn's ruling reinforces the principle that a bankruptcy trustee may recover fraudulent transfers made to the IRS even where the payment was indirect—here, from a business loan wired into a principal’s personal account. The ruling is particularly instructive for trustees and debtor attorneys dealing with misappropriated business loans used to pay personal liabilities. From a consumer bankruptcy perspective, this case offers important lessons when clients are managing small business finances: blurring the lines between business and personal funds can have major consequences. The ruling also opens doors for trustees in both business and consumer cases to pierce personal transactions where insiders funnel estate assets through personal accounts and then to creditors. Practitioners should further note that even with strong sovereign immunity arguments post-Miller, the IRS may still be exposed to recovery under § 548, as long as the trustee can show the property remained part of the estate and was transferred with intent to defraud or for less than reasonably equivalent value while insolvent. This significantly limits the IRS's insulation under § 550(b) and raises the stakes when insider principals improperly divert company funds. Also  worth noting, for those attorneys that tend to be rather myopic in ignoring decisions from outside their immediate district, is that Judge Kahn, from the MDNC,  was sitting by special designation in this case in the WDNC.   With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document hayes_v._us.pdf (551.78 KB) Category Western District

Law Review: Daniel III, Josiah M. and Daniel III, Josiah M., The Historiographical Problem of Municipal Bankruptcy Law (May 13, 2025). Ed Boltz Tue, 05/27/2025 - 18:26 Available at:    Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=5253527 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5253527 Abstract: This paper is the first archival researched history of the genesis of municipal bankruptcy law. It also contrasts the historical method with law and economics as methodology for finding and telling this story. Congressman Hatton W. Sumners, Chair of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives was the key actor, and the legislative process operated as a sort of laboratory for new and more powerful forms of relief for municipal insolvency during the Great Depression under the Bankruptcy Clause. The history has applications today, even in mass tort Chapter 11 cases. Commentary: Obviously,  a history of municipal bankruptcy law does not not bear heavily on the two focal points of this blog,  primarily consumer bankruptcy but also North Carolina.  (As N.C.G.S. § 23-48  seems to place rather serious procedural restrictions on Chapter 9 filings here.)  That aside,  this is an incredibly detailed history of the origins of Chapter 9  and a long- needed supplement to other histories of bankruptcy.   Additionally,   consumer bankruptcy, like municipal bankruptcy, often aims to preserve dignity through a fresh start and essential functions (e.g., housing, income, healthcare) rather than merely maximize creditor returns as Law & Economics scholars tend to fixate. Daniel’s work underscores that bankruptcy should not be viewed solely through the lens of maximizing recoveries for creditors, but rather as a policy tool to balance competing interests and restore individual or institutional viability. Lastly,  Daniels  recognizes that  Hatton W. Sumners, the legislative architect of Chapter IX , explicitly supported white supremacy.  Even if that racism was not explicitly codified into the statute, it certainly shaped the boundaries of who municipal bankruptcy was designed to serve and protect. The law's emphasis on preserving “local governance” and “sovereignty”  have long been dog-whistles that must be read in light of this commitment to maintaining racial hierarchies. With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document the_historiographical_problem_of_municipal_bankruptcy_law.pdf (1000.08 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies

Chapter 7 Trustee Kevin McCarthy Kevin McCarthy is one of the four Chapter 7 trustees in the Alexandria, Virginia, Bankruptcy court. When you file a bankruptcy case in Alexandria, the computer assigns you to one of the four trustees. Trustee Kevin McCarthy doesn’t post his picture. Lawyers work as Chapter 7 trustees part-time, on commission.  Besides his trustee work, he’s a partner in the law firm of McCarthy and White, PC, located in McLean, VA. He focuseses his legal work on creditors’ rights. He graduated from Notre Dame in 1968 and Georgetown Law in 1974. As a Chapter 7 Trustee, he has two sets of bosses.  The US Justice Department, through the Office of the United States Trustee.  And the two Bankruptcy Judges here, Judge Brian F. Kenney and Judge Klinette H. Kindred. We paid a $338.00 filing fee when we filed your bankruptcy case. Sixty dollars of that went to Trustee McCarthy. For each case, including yours, he gets an additional $60.00 that is indirectly collected from Chapter 11 bankruptcies. (Congress thinks the bankruptcy courts to raise enough in fees to pay for themselves.  No other part of the federal court system does that.) As your Chapter 7 Trustee, Kevin McCarthy is in charge of your bankruptcy hearing, which is called the “meeting of creditors.” There are very, very rarely any creditors at the meeting of creditors.  So the Chapter 7 Trustee asks the questions. (Because the trustee is not a judge, he should be called “sir” not “your honor.”) The bankruptcy court computer schedules fourteen hearings an hour.  That’s just over four minutes per case.   Bankruptcy hearings in Alexandria are by Zoom Trustee hearings for Kevin McCarthy are usually scheduled on Wednesdays at 10:00 AM, 11:00 AM, and Noon. You attend by Zoom. You enter his Zoom hearings by using these codes: Meeting Id 723 721 3164, Passcode 0426782547 If you are not an experienced Zoomer, here’s some help on how to join a meeting using an ID and passcode. (Before your Zoom hearing date, Kevin McCarthy has his own form that we are required to fill in. We’ll go over that with you when we have our rehearsal call. We are also required to send in bank statements for each of your accounts one week before your hearing is scheduled. ) That’s a permanent Zoom ID and passcode.  You can test it out any evening, and it will take you to the Kevin McCarthy Trustee waiting room. That way, you’ll be sure you’ll know what to do on your hearing date. This is what you see when you enter the Kevin McCarthy waiting room. (Except you won’t see my picture in the corner.)       The post Chapter 7 Trustee Kevin McCarthy appeared first on Robert Weed Bankruptcy Attorney.

Chapter 7 Trustee Kevin McCarthy Kevin McCarthy is one of the four Chapter 7 trustees in the Alexandria, Virginia, Bankruptcy court. When you file a bankruptcy case in Alexandria, the computer assigns you to one of the four trustees. Trustee Kevin McCarthy doesn’t post his picture. Lawyers work as Chapter 7 trustees part-time, on commission.  Besides his trustee work, he’s a partner in the law firm of McCarthy and White, PC, located in McLean, VA. He focuseses his legal work on creditors’ rights. He graduated from Notre Dame in 1968 and Georgetown Law in 1974. As a Chapter 7 Trustee, he has two sets of bosses.  The US Justice Department, through the Office of the United States Trustee.  And the two Bankruptcy Judges here, Judge Brian F. Kenney and Judge Klinette H. Kindred. We paid a $338.00 filing fee when we filed your bankruptcy case. Sixty dollars of that went to Trustee McCarthy. For each case, including yours, he gets an additional $60.00 that is indirectly collected from Chapter 11 bankruptcies. (Congress thinks the bankruptcy courts need to raise enough in fees to pay for themselves.  No other part of the federal court system does that.) As your Chapter 7 Trustee, Kevin McCarthy is in charge of your bankruptcy hearing, which is called the “meeting of creditors.” There are very, very rarely any creditors at the meeting of creditors.  So the Chapter 7 Trustee asks the questions. (Because the trustee is not a judge, he should be called “sir” not “your honor.”) The bankruptcy court computer schedules fourteen hearings an hour.  That’s just over four minutes per case.   Bankruptcy hearings in Alexandria are by Zoom Trustee hearings for Kevin McCarthy are usually scheduled on Wednesdays at 10:00 AM, 11:00 AM, and Noon. You attend by Zoom. You enter his Zoom hearings by using these codes: Meeting Id 723 721 3164, Passcode 0426782547 If you are not an experienced Zoomer, here’s some help on how to join a meeting using an ID and passcode. (Before your Zoom hearing date, Kevin McCarthy has his own form that we are required to fill in. We’ll go over that with you when we have our rehearsal call. We are also required to send in bank statements for each of your accounts one week before your hearing is scheduled. ) That’s a permanent Zoom ID and passcode.  You can test it out any evening, and it will take you to the Kevin McCarthy Trustee waiting room. That way, you’ll be sure you’ll know what to do on your hearing date. This is what you see when you enter the Kevin McCarthy waiting room. (Except you won’t see my picture in the corner.)       The post Chapter 7 Trustee Kevin McCarthy appeared first on Robert Weed Bankruptcy Attorney.

Law Review: Jonathan M. Seymour, Bankruptcy Appeal Barriers, 82 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 87 (2025). Ed Boltz Fri, 05/23/2025 - 17:26 Available at:   https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr/vol82/iss1/4 Abstract: Appeals in bankruptcy do not look like appeals elsewhere in the federal court system. In particular, bankruptcy appeal barriers are strikingly distinctive. These barriers serve outright to block an appeal from being decided. An appellate court may dismiss an appeal, rather than consider the merits, if facts on the ground have changed so much since the original decision that providing a remedy to an appellant, even if victorious, would not be prudent. Take ongoing litigation in the Boy Scouts bankruptcy case. A plan of reorganization was confirmed fixing the entitlements of victims to compensation. Dissenting creditors argued bitterly the plan was unlawful and have appealed. And they have been proven right: The Supreme Court recently found in its Purdue Pharma decision that bankruptcy courts lack the authority to approve the plan’s central legal device. Even so, those outraged creditors may receive nothing. The Boy Scouts argue that their appeal should be dismissed without reaching the merits because the plan is, in key respects, already implemented. And the existing case law surrounding bankruptcy appeal barriers offers considerable support for this outcome. This Article attempts both to assess the significance of bankruptcy appeal barriers and to evaluate potential justifications for them. These barriers matter deeply to affected litigants but also have systemic consequences. The constitutional legitimacy of the bankruptcy courts is predicated on their supervision by Article III judges. This supervision is substantially eroded by bankruptcy appeal barriers. Nor are these concerns wholly abstract. Bankruptcy judges are powerful. Appeal subjects the insular world of bankruptcy to outside scrutiny from generalist judges who do not necessarily buy into the precepts of bankruptcy culture and are not presented with the same in-the-moment incentives as bankruptcy judges. This Article additionally finds troubling the degree to which some appellate courts seem ready to resort to appeal barriers as an escape hatch to avoid deciding appeals even in quite simple cases, often involving unsophisticated parties. The justifications for bankruptcy appeal barriers, therefore, require a careful look. Normatively, this Article suggests that bankruptcy appeal barriers are on shaky ground. To make the case that bankruptcy appeal barriers could be sharply constrained or even abolished, this Article draws analogies both to the more general federal law of remedies, and to instances under state law—such as Delaware corporate law—where appellate courts must grapple with how to engage in an after-the-fact evaluation of an already consummated transaction. Commentary: One notable and conspicuous omission in Bankruptcy Appeal Barriers is its near-total silence on appeals arising in Chapter 13 cases, writing with the assumption that "bankruptcy"  means "corporate bankruptcy".   While Prof.  Seymour’s analysis of equitable and statutory mootness is incisive and thorough for Chapter 11—particularly large corporate reorganizations—the article does not meaningfully engage with how appeal barriers affect individual debtors, whether under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13, who constitute the vast majority of bankruptcy filers. This omission is significant for several reasons: Numerical Importance: Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 consumer filings vastly outnumber Chapter 11 cases by at least an order of magnitude, not only in terms of numbers of cases,  but arguably even in terms of the amount of debt involved. The appellate issues that arise—such as plan confirmation denials, feasibility, good faith findings, and motions to dismiss—are not only common but carry enormous practical consequences for consumer debtors, creditors and the economy as a whole. Unique Appeal Dynamics: The issues that trigger appeals in Chapter 13 are often final for debtors in practical terms, yet not considered final orders under Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, leading to additional procedural confusion. The article references Bullard but does not explore its chilling effect on Chapter 13 appeals or how it interacts with equitable mootness. Barriers Without Doctrinal Support: While Equitable mootness is rarely explicitly invoked in Chapter 13 appellate rulings, its same bases—finality, reliance, disruption—are sometimes used informally to dismiss appeals as moot or futile, with the effects of this  informal "mootness creep" in  Chapter 13 cases unexplored. In overlooking consumer cases,  particularly under Chapter 13, the article misses a critical point: Bankruptcy appeal barriers are not only a threat to the integrity of Chapter 11 practice but also to the fairness of consumer bankruptcy outcomes. If courts can dismiss consumer appeals—particularly over denied confirmations, claim disputes, or plan modifications—as moot or disruptive without examining the merits, then Chapter 13 becomes not just procedurally burdensome, but structurally biased against debtors.   Further,  while decisions in Chapter 13 or other consumer cases are often overlooked and ignored  by the small subsection of the bankruptcy bar involved in Chapter 11,  those very opinions often have serious ramifications in corporate bankruptcies,  including Bullard and  Till v. SCS Credit Corp.,  until those also creep into their cases.   With proper attribution,  please share this post.  To read a copy of the transcript, please see: Blog comments Attachment Document bankruptcy_appeal_barriers.pdf (971.88 KB) Category Law Reviews & Studies