“Can I get jail time for a DUI if it’s my first-offense?” YES! Even if this is your very first offense, you can still face jail time. Pennsylvania DUI Sentencing Guidelines In Pennsylvania, DUI convictions carry mandatory minimum sentences, which are based on which Tier you fall into and how many prior DU Is you’ve had.  […] The post What Are the Penalties for a DUI in Pennsylvania? appeared first on .

By Courtney NagleStudent loans are a hefty burden for many Americans.There are around 44 million borrowers with student debt, according to a 2017 report from the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau. Outstanding student debt sits at about $1.4 trillion, with nearly 11 percent of debt that was 90 days or more delinquent or in default at the end of March 2018, according to the most recent report by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. So the burden is common ground for many people, to say the least.In recent years, it's been almost impossible to get a court to discharge student loans in bankruptcy.  However, while difficult, student loans have been discharged in bankruptcy before. When loans are discharged, it means the borrower is no longer legally required to repay them.The HIGHER ED Act, H.R. 5549, introduced by Democratic Congressman Peter DeFazio from Oregon in April, would make significant changes to bankruptcy rules regarding student loans and may provide relief for some borrowers. The proposed legislation would broaden the definition of "undue hardship," the standard used to determine if a debt is eligible for discharge. To date, Congress hasn't defined undue hardship and has left it to courts to decide on a case-by-case basis. But momentum is building with the Trump administration and in Congress to define undue hardship for student loan borrowers. Earlier this year, the Department of Education issued a request for public comment to collect data and feedback on whether there's a need to modify how undue-hardship claims by student loan borrowers in bankruptcy are evaluated. The Education Department has expressed concerns that the undue hardship standard in its present form is discouraging borrowers from filing for bankruptcy.Evidence that supports the concern can be found in a study by Jason Iuliano at the University of Pennsylvania Law School. Iuliano found that nearly 40 percent of borrowers who include their student loans in their bankruptcy filing ended up with some or all their student debt discharged, but only 0.1 percent of people who filed for bankruptcy attempted to discharge their student loans. The study suggests that many student loan borrowers who are filing for bankruptcy often don't attempt a student loan discharge since it's challenging to meet the requirements used by most circuit courts.According to the National Consumer Law Center, all federal courts of appeal except the Boston-based 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals and the St. Louis-based 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals have adopted what's known as the Brunner test to define undue hardship. It's based on three factors students must prove:Would you be able to maintain a minimal standard of living if you had to repay the loan?Are the financial difficulties you face temporary, or are they expected to continue for several years?Have you made efforts to keep up with your student loan payments before filing for bankruptcy?Borrowers must be able to prove the student debt is making it impossible to support themselves and their family and their financial situation is not expected to improve for several years.The Department of Education is currently re-evaluating these criteria and developing guidance on determining when a student is experiencing undue hardship. It's also looking at whether to change the weights of each factor and make student loan discharges more accessible for borrowers who need relief.There are arguments for both sides of this issue. Opponents fear that making discharge easier could put student loan programs in jeopardy and that people will game the system and run up debts with no intention to repay. But consumer advocates support the change, saying there are a lack of options for struggling student loan borrowers.These advocates hope that by changing the definition of undue hardship, more qualified student loan borrowers will be able to get debt relief when filing bankruptcy by being able to include their student loans. Whether this change will take place or not is still unclear.For borrowers who are struggling to make their payments and headed into default, here are a few tips to consider with the current rules.Review the Education Department's guidance on bankruptcy. The Department of Education developed guidance for borrowers in 2015 on whether they would be likely to qualify for a student loan discharge through bankruptcy. The guidance provides hypothetical examples of several scenarios where it would be likely. It's important to do your research and use all of your resources.Talk to your lender. Federal student loans come with income-driven repayment plans, deferment or forbearance, and sometimes loan forgiveness. If you are struggling to figure out if there's a good option for you other than bankruptcy, the Student Loan Ranger recommends reaching out to your servicer, lender or a nonprofit credit counselor.  They can evaluate your specific situation and explain what options you have. There may even be a hardship program you don't know about.Copyright 2018 © U.S. News & World Report L.P.  All rights reserved.

If you were injured at work in Pennsylvania, you likely filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Workman’s comp can provide financial support – but will it interfere with your eligibility for other types of benefits, such as Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI)? In this article, the Philadelphia disability lawyers of Young, Marr & Associates […] The post If I Was Injured on the Job and am Receiving Workers’ Compensation, Can I Still File a Claim for Disability Benefits in PA? appeared first on .

Another Fairfax County Family Wastes Thousands with Freedom Debt Relief. I filed a bankruptcy case this week for Alexander and Alina yesterday.   They had been enrolled with Freedom Debt Relief for over five years–the longest enrollment I ever heard of. And according to Freedom Debt Relief, they had only four monthly payments to go […] The post Another Family Wastes Thousands with Freedom Debt Relief by Robert Weed appeared first on Robert Weed.

Depending on your situation, bankruptcy may be the best way to avoid foreclosure and keep your home. Before filing bankruptcy, you should step back and assess your individual situation. Just because something works for someone else does not mean it is the best option for you. Each person’s situation is unique to their specific circumstances. Some things you should consider before filing bankruptcy: The post Is Bankruptcy the Best Way to Avoid Foreclosure and Keep Your Home? appeared first on Tucson Bankruptcy Attorney.

A debtor was liberated from an objection to discharge where the deadline was extended to January 15, 2018, which was Martin Luther King, Jr. Day and the objection was not filed until the next day.    Smart-Fill Management Group, Inc. v. Froiland (In re Froiland), 18-1006 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 7/6/18).    While most practitioners are familiar with the rule which extends deadlines that fall on a Saturday, Sunday or national holiday, there is an important caveat:  the rule only applies to deadlines stated in days or a longer unit of time.   Where a deadline is set for a date certain, there is no extension.What Happened The Debtor filed bankruptcy on August 7, 2017.   The deadline for objections to discharge was set based on sixty days after the first date set for the first meeting of creditors.   The deadline was extended twice.   The second extended date was set for January 15, 2018.   January 15, 2018 was Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, a federal holiday.    The creditor filed a complaint objecting to discharge on January 16, 2018 and the Debtor moved to dismiss the complaint as being untimely.The Court's RulingJudge H. Christopher Mott noted that Rule 9006(a) once stated that "In computing any period of time prescribed by or allowed by these rules, by the local rules, by order of court, or by any applicable statute, . . . (t)he last day of the period so computed shall be include, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday . . . "    In Chapman Investment Associates v. American Healthcare Management (Matter of American Healthcare Management),  900 F.2d 832 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit held that this rule extended a deadline set on a date specific which expired on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.   (Note: I worked on the brief for the losing side arguing that the specific date controlled).    In 2009, Rule 9006(a) was amended to provide: When the period is stated in days or a longer unit of time . . . include the last day of the period, but if the last day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday.To make it perfectly clear, the Advisory Committee stated that it was rejecting American Healthcare Management. The time-computation provisions of subdivision (a) apply only when a time period must be computed. They do not apply when a fixed time to act is set. The amendments thus carry forward the approach taken in Violette v. P.A. Days, Inc., 427 F.3d 1015, 1016 (6th Cir. 2005) . . . and reject the contrary holding of In re American Healthcare Management, Inc., 900 F.2d 827, 832 (5th Cir. 1990) . . . . If, for example, the date for filing is “no later than November 1, 2007,” subdivision (a) does not govern. But if a filing is required to be made “within 10 days” or “within 72 hours,” subdivision (a) describes how that deadline is computed. Judge Mott noted that  "An Advisory Committee Note accompanying a federal rule is highly persuasive and afforded substantial weight in interpreting federal rules, even if it is not binding."  Opinion, p. 7.   As a result, Judge Mott found that the complaint was untimely and dismissed it.As I mentioned above, I worked on American Healthcare Management and unsuccessfully argued that the date is the date.   Until I read this opinion, I was not aware that the rule had been amended and had assumed that any deadline falling on a Saturday, Sunday or holiday was automatically extended.   This opinion is a warning that the rules we grew up with do not remain static.  In some cases they can change with serious consequences.    The new rule makes sense in the age of e-filing.  In the old days, the courthouse had to be open to file a document.   In some cases, courts had overnight dropboxes but there was always the risk that the pleading would be file-marked for the next day when the clerk actually received it.  With e-filing, the clerk's office is open for business 24/7.   There is nothing to prevent an enterprising lawyer from filing a document at 11:59 p.m. on Christmas Day.    There are two practice tips to be gleaned from this opinion.   First, in setting specific dates in scheduling orders and the like, make sure not to set a deadline on a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.  Second, if a deadline ends up falling on one of these dates and you don't want to work on a weekend or holiday, ask opposing counsel for an extension before the deadline expires.  

By Dan RivoliCity taxi drivers’ patience meter is running out. The New York Taxi Workers Alliance rallied outside City Hall on Tuesday as cabbies said they want new regulations to boost wages and the values of yellow taxi medallions. The driver group has advocated for a cap on for-hire cars and to make the meter fare the minimum rate industry wide and give app drivers 80% of trip fare. The city Taxi & Limousine Commission, meanwhile, proposed a minimum wage standard so app drivers could make $17.22 an hour. But the taxi drivers group opposed that, arguing that price would be a ceiling. Bhairavi Desai, director of the alliance, said the focus should be on City Council regulations. “There’s finally momentum in the City of New York to properly regulate this Wall Street darling,” Desai said, referencing Uber. “We don’t want the Taxi & Limousine Commission to play interference with our momentum.” TLC spokeswoman Rebecca Harshbarger said the agency is working with the City Council and the industry to address drivers' economic challenges. The rally followed the release of an over-$1 million Uber ad highlighting its service in the outer boroughs. “As policymakers contemplate new industry regulations, they must ensure that people who have been ignored by yellow taxi and underserved by mass transit aren’t punished,” Uber spokeswoman Alix Anfang said. Councilman Barry Grodenchik, who has taxi drivers in his Queens district, said there’s a new sense of urgency from Council Speaker Corey Johnson to add new regulations to the industry, in light of six taxi driver suicides. “I want it done sooner, rather than later,” Grodenchik said. “My district can’t wait and I don’t think that there’s dilly-dallying going on. It's a very complicated situation.” “The Council is deeply concerned with the emotional, mental, and financial pain drivers in this industry are currently experiencing and remains committed to finding a legislative solution,” Jacob Tugendrajch, a spokesman for Johnson, said. “The Council continues to work on legislation that would protect drivers, increase fairness and combat congestion.” Inder Parmar, an Uber driver since 2013 who has cousins and neighbors who drive yellow cabs, backs efforts in the City Council to set a standard fare across the industry. “Patience is running out,” Parmar said. “City Council, I have a request to them to act on it as soon as possible. This way, we do not see any other driver committing suicide.”Copyright 2018 New York Daily News.

Ruling on an issue of great concern to the debtor's bar, the 9th Circuit reversed the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy court's summary judgment in favor of a condominium association holding that post-petition assessments were nondischargeable in a chapter 13 case.  The  debtor had stopped making payments to the association in 2009, and the association commenced foreclosure  proceedings and the debtor moved out of the condo.  She filed chapter 13 bankruptcy in March 2011, providing for surrender of the condominium unit.   The association filed an arrearage claim of $18,780.39 noting continuing assessments at $388.46/month.  Prior to confirmation the association cancelled the foreclosure sale as the mortgage lender paid the outstanding assessments.  The unit sat unoccupied until February 26, 2015 when the mortgage lender foreclosed.  The Debtor received a discharge under chapter 13 on 24 July 2015.  In April 2015 the association filed an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of the post-petition assessments accruing between March 2011 (when the case was filed) and February 2015 (when the unit was sold at foreclosure).  The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the association, finding that the assessments arose at the time of their assessment and were an incidence of legal ownership of the burdened property.  The district court affirmed.  The 9th Circuit found no circuit court cases on point.  Contrasting views in pre-BAPCPA opinions can be found in Matter of Rosteck, 899 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that assessments were an unmatured contingent debt under the code that arose prepetition upon purchase of the property, and therefore dischargeable) and In re Rosenfeld, 23 F.3d 833 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding that the obligation to pay cooperative association assessments ran with the land and arose each month from the debtor's continued post-petition ownership of the property, and therefore nondischargeable).   The 9th Circuit followed the Rosteck rationale, determining that the association obtained two state law remedies under the declaration of condominium: an in rem  lien and right to foreclose, and an in personam right to bring suit against the property owner.  While the in rem rights are not discharged in chapter 13, the pre-petition in personam obligation is.  The 9th Circuit noted the intent of bankruptcy to grant debtors a fresh start, and the broad discharge in chapter 13. 11 U.S.C. §101(12) defines 'debt' as 'liability on a claim'.  §101(5)(A) defines claim as a 'right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured.  Such definition is intended to encompass all of a debtor's obligation, no matter has remote or contingent.  Thus, the obligation to pay the assessments is a debt since it creates a right to payment.  The fact that future assessments may be a contingent and unmatured form of the debt does not alter the analysis.  The debtor's in personam obligation to pay assessments arose pre-petition when the unit was purchased.  The obligation remains contingent and unmatured conditioned upon continued ownership of the property, but unmatured contingent debts are still dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. 1328(a).  The exception to discharge for post-petition association assessments, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(16) is absent from the list of discharge exceptions in §1328(a), and therefore dischargeable in chapter 13 cases.  The court assumes that the exclusion of this section from the exceptions to discharge in chapter 13 was intentional.  Nor is allowing discharge of such assessments a violation of the 5th Amendments 'Taking's clause, since the association retains it's in rem rights against the property.Michael Barnett www.hillsboroughbankruptcy.com

Unfortunately, there’s a widespread myth that filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in Pennsylvania will cause you to lose your house, your car, and your other personal belongings. This harmful myth has likely stopped thousands of people from filing – but in most cases, it simply isn’t true. On the contrary, most people who file Chapter […] The post If I File a Chapter 7 Bankruptcy in Pennsylvania, Can I Keep my Home, Car, or Other Personal Items? appeared first on .

President Donald Trump has selected D.C. Circuit Judge Brett Kavanaugh to be his second Supreme Court nominee.    A post describing his bankruptcy opinions would be very short.  I could find only one opinion authored by Judge Kavanaugh arising out of bankruptcy court and that case dealt with equitable subrogation under the laws of the District of Columbia.   Smith v. First American Title Ins. Co. (In re Stevenson), 789 F.3d 197 (D.C. Cir. 2015). This is not surprising given the D.C. Circuit's footprint.   The D.C. Circuit has one bankruptcy court with one bankruptcy judge.  By contrast, the Fifth Circuit has nine districts staffed by 26 judges.   The Slim Experience of Judge Kavanaugh with Bankruptcy and the FDCPA Judge Kavanaugh also was on the panel which decided several unremarkable decisions on cases originating in bankruptcy court.    In Capitol Hill Group v. Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw, Pittman, LLC, 569 F.3d 485 (D.C. Cir. 2009), Judge Kavanaugh was on a panel that held that malpractice claims against a firm that represented a chapter 11 debtor were subject to "arising in" jurisdiction and that the bankruptcy court's order granting the firm's fee application was res judicata.    He was also on panels that decided two cases against the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation which arose from bankruptcy filings.    United Steel Workers v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., 707 F.3d 319 (D.C. Cir.  2013); Davis v. Pension Guaranty Benefit Corp., 571 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2009).There is also another case where Judge Kavanaugh could have been exposed to some arguments about how bankruptcy courts are structured.   Ali Hamza Ahmad Suliman Al Bahlul v. United States, 840 F.3d 757 (D.C. Cir. 2016)(en banc) was a case brought by a member of al Qaeda who sought to challenge his conviction for conspiracy by a military tribunal.   One of Al Bahlul's arguments was that he was entitled to be tried by an Article III tribunal.   Judge Kavanaugh's concurrence relied on the long history of using military commissions to try enemy war criminals.   However, Judge Millett's concurrence concluded that structural Article III challenges could be forfeited by failure to raise them below.  In making this argument, he discussed the Supreme Court's opinion in Wellness International Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.Ct. 1932 (2015).   You can see that I am reaching where the most exciting discussion of bankruptcy that I can find is a concurrence by another judge in a case that did not itself involve bankruptcy.Judge Kavanaugh also appears to have very little experience with the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.    He was on the panel that decided Jones v. Dufek, 830 F.3d 523 (D.C. Cir. 2016).   This case held that a collection letter sent by a law firm did not misrepresent that an attorney was meaningfully involved where it contained a prominent disclaimer stating that the attorney was acting as a debt collector and did not threaten legal action.   (My partner Manny Newburger argued this case).Judge Kavanaugh and the CFPB One area where Judge Kavanaugh does have a lot of experience is the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau.   He authored an opinion holding that the CFPB was unconstitutional because it was headed by a single director who could only be removed for cause.    PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016).   However, that opinion was reversed by the en banc D.C. Circuit leaving Judge Kavanaugh in dissent.    PHH Corp. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C. Cir. 2018)(en banc).  He also dissented from an opinion which held that a company could not obtain a preliminary injunction to block a civil investigative demand by the CFPB.   Doe Co. v. Cordray, 849 F.3d 1129 (D.C. Cir. 2017).   Judge Kavanaugh would have ruled that "the Company as a regulated entity has standing to raise its free-standing constitutional claim (that the structure of the CFPB is unconstitutional) and the claim is ripe."    He wrote two other opinions dealing with standing to challenge the CFPB, one for the majority and one in dissent.    In State National Bank of Big Spring v. Lew, 795 F.3d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2015), he wrote that a Texas bank regulated by the CFPB had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the CFPB's structure as well as the recess appointment of its director.   However, he found that a bank did not have standing to argue that a competitor's designation as "too big to fail" gave it a competitive advantage.   In Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 785 F.3d 684 (D.C. Cir. 2015), he dissented from an opinion that found that an attorney who contracted with a debt settlement company did not have standing to challenge the bureau's structure.  He wrote: The Bureau is therefore regulating a business that Pisinksi engages in.  That is enough for standing.   We have a tendency to make standing law more complicated than it needs to be.   When a regulated party such as Pisinksi challenges the legality of the regulating agency or of a regulation issued by that agency, "there is ordinarily little question that the party has standing" as the Supreme Court has indicated. The Dissents of Judge Kavanaugh One important qualification for a Supreme Court justice is the ability to dissent.   A dissent allows a losing justice to unleash his fire and fury on the majority while positioning himself to fight another day.   I found 26 dissents by Judge Kavanaugh.   Many of them were more interesting than his majority opinions.His most consequential dissent was in Heller v. District of Columbia, 670 F.3d 1244 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In an opinion written by future Supreme Court justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg, the D.C. Circuit ruled that the Second Amendment did not establish an individual right to keep and bear arms. Judge Kavanaugh dissented and said that it did.   The Supreme Court agreed with Judge Kavanaugh.In United States Telecom Association v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017), Judge Kavanaugh took on net neutrality.   A panel of the D.C. Circuit found that the FCC had authority to craft the Open Internet Order known as net neutrality.   Judge Kavanaugh dissented from the decision to deny en banc review.  He argued that Congress had not granted the FCC the power to enact the rule and that it violated the First Amendment.   He wrote:The FCC's 2015 net neutrality rule is one of the most consequential regulations ever issued by any executive or independent agency in the history of the United States.   the rule transforms the internet by imposing common-carrier obligations on internet service providers and there by prohibiting internet service providers from exercising control over the content they transmit to consumers.  The rule will affect every internet service provider, and every internet consumer.  The economic and political significance of the rule is vast.The net neutrality rule is unlawful and must be vacated, however, for two alternative and independent reasons.  Of some interest to Austinites is his dissent in FTC v. Whole Foods Market,  548 F.3d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2008).(Whole Foods is based in Austin).   The FTC sought an injunction to block a merger between Whole Foods and Wild Oats.  The District Court denied the injunction and the majority reversed.  Judge Kavanaugh would have affirmed the denial of the injunction (meaning that the merger could go forward) because he felt that the relevant market was all supermarkets (of which Whole Foods had a small market share) as opposed to "organic supermarkets" (in which it was a behemoth).  Whole Foods later agreed to divest some Wild Oats locations and then was itself acquired by Amazon.Judge Kavanaugh also objected to OSHA's attempt to cite Sea World for having a dangerous workplace in connection with its killer whales.  In pointing out that many occupations are full of danger, he wrote:Many sports events and entertainment shows can be extremely dangerous for the participants.  Football.  Ice hockey.  Downhill skiing.  Air Shows.  The circus.  Horse racing.  Tiger taming.  Standing in the batter's box against a 95 mile per hour fastball.  Bull riding at the rodeo.  Skydiving into the stadium before a football game.  Daredevil motorcycle jumps.  Stock car racing.  Cheerleading vaults.  Boxing.  The balance beam.  The ironman triathalon.  Animal trainer shows.  Movie stunts.  The list goes on.But the participants in those activities want to take part, sometimes even to make a career of it, despite and occasionally because of the known risk of serious injury. . . . The broad question implicated by this case is this:  When should we as a society paternalistically decide that the participants in these sports and entertainment activities must be protected from themselves--that the risk of significant physical injury is simply too great even for eager and willing participants?     SeaWorld of Florida, LLC v. Perez, 748 F.3d 1202, 1216-17 (D.C. Cir. 2014)(Kavanaugh, Dissenting).This is perhaps his most lyrical dissent and it is also the one where he breaks from a formal writing style and abandons complete sentences for emphasis. In Fogo de Chao (Holdings), Inc. v. United States Department of Homeland Security, 769 F.3d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 2014), he dissented from a decision which found that Brazilian chefs had "specialized knowledge" which would entitle them to L1-B visas to work in a Brazilian steakhouse.  He faulted the majority for refusing to accord deference to agency findings.   He also agreed with the agency that "one's country of origin, or cultural background, does not constitute specialized knowledge under this immigration statute for purposes of being a chef or otherwise working in an ethnic bar or restaurant in the United States."   Fortunately, the majority allowed the Brazilian chefs into the country and diners were able to eat expensive meals prepared by authentic culinary artists.In Lorenzo v. SEC, 872 F.3d 578 (D.C. Cir. 2017), Judge Kavanaugh thought that the SEC had gone too far in punishing an employee of a registered broker-dealer for forwarding false statements prepared by his boss.   The employee was the director of investment banking at the firm.  However, Judge Kavanaugh's dissent made it sound as though he was a mere clerical employee:Suppose you work for a securities firm.  Your boss drafts an email message and tells you to send the email on his behalf to two clients.  You promptly send the emails to the two clients without thinking too much about the contents of the emails.  You note in the emails that you are sending the message "at the request" of your boss.  It turns out, however, that the message from your boss to the clients is false and defrauds the clients out of a total of $15,000.  Your boss is then sanctioned by the Securities and Exchange Commission (as is appropriate) for the improper conduct.What about you?  For sending along those emails at the direct behest of your boss, are you too on the hook for the securities law violation of willfully making a false statement or willfully engaging in a scheme to defraud? Finally, Judge Kavanaugh dissented from an opinion allowing a former Congressional employee to sue her employer for racial discrimination and retaliation.   Howard v. Office of the Chief Administrative Office of the United States House of Representatives, 720 F.3d 939 (D.C. Cir. 2013).  LaTaunya Howard wanted to sue the Office of the Chief Administrative Officer of the United States House of Representatives for racial discrimination and retaliation under the Congressional Accountability Act.   The District Court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction based on the Speech and Debate Clause of the Constitution which provides that "for any Speech or Debate in any House, shall not be questioned in any other Place."   The majority concluded that the Speech or Debate clause did not provide immunity to legislators if the case could proceed without inquiring into legislative acts or the motivation for legislative acts.   Judge Kavanaugh disagreed.   He wrote:Once we conclude (as we must here) that the employer's asserted reason for the decision involves legislative activity protected by the Speech or Debate Clause, I believe (unlike the majority opinion) that the case must come to an end.  I do not see how a plaintiff employee such as Howard can attempt to prove either that she in fact adequately performed her legislative duties or that her performance of legislative activities was not the actual reason for the employment action without forcing the employer to produce evidence that she did not perform her legislative activities and that her poor performance of legislative activities was the actual reason for the employment action.  In the case, the stated reason for demoting and firing the employee had to do with her communications regarding the legislative branch's budget and her refusal to perform budget analysis for Congressional committees.   To my unschooled eye, it seems to me that Judge Kavanaugh took a Constitutional protection of Speech or Debate and expanded it to any activity related to the legislature.What Does This All Say About Judge Kavanaugh?While I haven't done a deep dive into his jurisprudence it certainly seems to me that there are some patterns.   When it comes to economic regulation or consumer protection, Judge Kavanaugh wants to keep federal agencies in their place.   Whether it is questioning the structure of the CFPB or the authority of the FCC to promulgate net neutrality rules, Judge Kavanaugh insists on crystal clear constitutional and statutory authority. He also takes what he considers to be a commonsense approach in restricting the actions of the SEC, the FTC and OSHA.  However, when a decision involves national security, such as the military commission case or the immigration case, he is much more deferential to the government.   What does this mean for bankruptcy?   Would he view bankruptcy courts as engaging in economic regulation and seek to strictly limit their powers?   Would he be skeptical of rules promulgated by the United States Trustee?   Based on the record presented, I can raise the questions but I don't have clear answers.